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SUBORDINATING SPEECH AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL HIERARCHIES 
 
Michael Randall Barnes, M.A. 
 




 This dissertation aims to deepen and broaden the philosophical literature on 
subordinating speech. It aims to demonstrate that how language subordinates is more complex 
than has been described by most philosophers writing on this topic. By departing from the rigid 
confines of the standard Austinean picture, and by drawing on recent work in oppression theory 
and political philosophy, I develop a more expansive conception of subordinating speech that 
more accurately captures lived realities of this problem.  
I argue that the philosophical analysis of subordinating speech as it currently exists is 
limited in several ways, and that these limitations amount to an impoverished understanding of 
what are fundamental aspects of these speech acts. The harms that subordinating speech inflicts 
on its targets (Chapter One), the type of authority that is exercised by subordinating speakers 
(Chapters Two and Three), and the expansive variety of subordinating speech acts themselves 
(Chapter Three) are all under-developed areas in need of further refinement—and, in some cases, 
large paradigm shifts. Other topics like the explosion of abusive speech online (Chapter Four) or 
the distinctively collective speech acts of protest groups (Chapter Five) have yet to be adequately 
addressed by philosophers, and I argue that these need to be considered alongside the ‘paradigm’ 
cases of subordinating speech that inform most models.  
Throughout, the importance of speaker authority is addressed and evaluated. Instead of 
seeing this authority as reducible to either a formal position or a merely local, linguistic 
phenomenon, I argue for a conception of speaker authority that is a richly contextual social fact, 
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distributed unevenly among members of different social groups. In particular, I develop an 
account of collective authority that explains how many speakers can join together to subordinate 
in a way that no individual speaker is capable of doing. This account, I claim, is better able to 
explain the social reality of subordinating speech than individualist models. With a more fine-
grained account of subordinating speaker authority, I claim we are led to a more accurate picture 
of the different subordinating speech acts available to different speakers, along with how these 
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1. OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
  In this dissertation, I defend the claim that speech and language play significant roles in 
constructing and maintaining oppressive relations between social groups. In other words, I argue 
that things like hate speech, slurs, propaganda, abusive and discriminatory language, and more 
are important tools in the creation and sustenance of unjust conditions of domination and 
subordination in the broader society. 
  This, however, is a familiar idea for many—especially for members of the marginalized 
groups targeted by such speech. The contribution I aim to make in this project is to demonstrate 
that how language subordinates is more complex than has so far been described by most 
philosophers of language. That is, the philosophical analysis of subordinating speech as it 
currently exists is limited in several ways, and these limitations amount to an impoverished 
understanding of what I claim are fundamental aspects of these speech acts.1 The harms 
subordinating speech can inflict on its targets (Chapter One), the types of power or authority that 
are exercised by subordinating speakers (Chapters Two and Three), and the variety of 
subordinating speech acts themselves (Chapter Three) are all under-developed areas within this 
domain of philosophy in need of further refinement, and in some cases large paradigm shifts. 
Other topics like the recent explosion of online abusive speech (Chapter Four) or the relationship 
 
1 Note that throughout I use the terms ‘oppressive speech’ and ‘subordinating speech’ interchangeably, simply for 
stylistic reasons. Some authors, like McGowan, tend to prefer “oppressive speech,” while others, like Langton, and 
Maitra, use “subordinating speech.” I am agnostic as to which term is preferable, though I default to “subordinating 
speech” more often. 
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between subordinating speech and other forms of socially-located speech acts—and in particular, 
protest (Chapter Five)—have yet to be adequately addressed by philosophers. 
  In this brief introduction, I first give a quick overview of each chapter’s main claims. I 
then go on to clarify my starting points by considering and dismissing some intuitive, but naïve 
views about subordinating speech. And finally, I situate myself within the existing literature, and 
describe what the main contributions of this project are. 
  Chapter One, “The Harms of Subordinating Speech,” states and explains my main 
thesis—namely, that speech harms. It does so by detailing the varied harms of subordinating 
speech identified in the existing literature, and then arguing that a focus on illocutionary acts—
the focus favored by many leading theorists writing in this area, who have built upon the 
framework originally sketched by J. L. Austin (1962)—fails to capture central features of these 
harms. In brief, because the model of illocutionary acts focuses on discrete events—that is, 
singular transactions—it fails to offer a plausible and comprehensive account of how relations of 
oppression should be characterized in these speech acts. This is the case because conditions of 
oppression and subordination are essentially structural and for this reason cannot be captured in 
transactional terms. Moreover, the illocutionary act model for subordinating speech relies on the 
problematic notion of “paradigmatic” acts of subordination, which often include the intent to 
subordinate. This is something theories of oppression—and theories of oppressive speech too—
can and should omit. The task of Chapter One, therefore, is to thoroughly examine the harms of 
oppressive speech as they have been discussed by various theorists, and to argue that illocution-
focused accounts aren’t up to the task of adequately describing these harms. 
  In Chapter Two, “Speaking with (Subordinating) Authority,” I turn my focus from the 
targets of subordinating speech to its speakers and address how it is they—or, to be precise, some 
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of these speakers—have the power to effectively subordinate with their words. By taking on the 
so-called Authority Problem, this chapter aims to show how even ‘ordinary’ speakers are capable 
of marshalling strong social forces with their utterances. The Authority Problem—a recurring 
objection leveled at theories of subordinating speech—questions how ‘ordinary hate speakers,’ 
that is, your everyday person on the street, could possibly subordinate with their speech since the 
speech acts characteristic of subordination—ranking, authorizing, etc.—are standardly conceived 
as authoritative speech acts. I argue that while authority is in fact necessary for certain types of 
subordinating speech acts, the type of speaker authority needed here is a much broader category 
than is typically acknowledged. It can be informal, situation-specific, even ad hoc, while 
nonetheless destructive. This chapter looks to demonstrate one way in which speakers can come 
to achieve the sort of authority I conceive as relevant to subordinating speech, and in doing so 
sets the stage for the following chapters that go on to describe further types of subordinating 
authority. 
  Chapter Three, “Pluralism in Subordinating Speech Acts,” expands on the results of the 
previous chapter and argues for a rich variety among of the types of speaker authority that enable 
subordinating speech. It also explores non-authoritative entitlements that play a role in 
oppressive speech. In doing so, it expands on the taxonomy of types of subordinating speech acts 
as they are typically discussed, broadening our lens and making visible a variety of forms of 
oppressive speech. In doing so, I argue that current models conceive of the entitlements for 
subordinating speech far too narrowly, and as such fail to properly account for the speaker’s role 
here, by either overinflating or deflating it to fit a one-size-fits-all paradigm. I argue that by 
expanding our conceptions of the entitlements that enable subordinating speech and by 
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acknowledging the variety of types of subordinating speech acts, we’re led to a more accurate 
account overall. 
  To see why, consider how the literature on slurs offers a good example of how productive 
it is to take note of the differences between subordinating speech acts. That is, it is a commonly 
recognized feature of slurs that they can differ along axes of offensiveness, strength, and so on.2 
As Mihaela Popa-Wyatt and Jeremy Wyatt note, philosophers often find slurs interesting because 
they demonstrate an “unusually rich set of effects” (2018, 2880). One pattern that is central to 
many accounts of slurs is the variable offense slurring speech acts generate.3 This refers to the 
fact that offence “varies across different slur words, across different uses of the same slur word, 
and across the reactions of different audience members” (ibid.). It is a common goal for many 
philosophers writing on slurs to develop a theory of slurs that accounts for this wide variety of 
slurring speech acts.4 Indeed, Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt (2018) argue that a necessary feature of a 
satisfactory account of slurs is that it accounts for these different offence patterns.5 
  Here, I’m less interested in how well different theories of slurs do in meeting this goal, 
and more concerned with suggesting that this starting point is one that the broader subordinating 
speech literature ought to take on board. Slurs, after all, are a common component of a lot of 
subordinating speech, and slurring speech acts are best understood as a subset within the 
 
2 The literature here is vast, and I largely leave it aside to focus on the subordinating speech act literature. But see 
Popo-Wyatt & Wyatt (2018); and Bolinger (2017) for recent overviews of some of the major positions. 
3 Note that they distinguish between offence and derogation, where “derogation is part of the speaker’s 
communicative intentions, while offence is an achieved effect on the audience members, determined in part by their 
beliefs and values” (2018, 2881). I don’t agree with this way of distinguishing between these two concepts, but I put 
this aside for the purposes of a more concise exposition. 
4 See, for example, Hom (2008; 2012); Anderson and Lepore (2013); Jeshion (2013); Whiting (2013); Ashwell 
(2016); Kukla (2018); Anderson (forthcoming); and Swanson (forthcoming). 
5 This is because they take it that the goal of any account is to properly capture how these slurs function in the 
various ways they do. They go on to propose their own account: the role-power account, which makes use of 
McGowan’s conception of exercitives. 
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category of subordinating speech, which includes slurring acts and much more.6 That is, we 
should recognize that different effects—like distinct offence-generating patterns—are partly the 
result of different speech acts. Acknowledging this fact of variety—as obvious as it is—serves as 
an important first step and functions as a shared starting point for theorists writing about slurs 
that seems oddly ignored by dominant speech act accounts of subordinating speech. I believe 
philosophers interested in subordinating speech in general ought to follow this lead and 
recognize variety more explicitly, and I argue for this in Chapter Three. 
  Chapters Four and Five represent a slight change in focus. Rather than examine the ways 
in which the standard Austinean picture needs to be adapted—sometimes significantly—to better 
account for the realities of subordinating speech, these chapters build on the results of the earlier 
chapters and examines two areas that social philosophers of language have yet to examine in 
much detail. These are, first, the distinct forms of abusive speech that are found online (Chapter 
Four), and second, the interaction between progressive protest and reactionary counter-protest 
speech (Chapter Five). My goal in these chapters is to show both that these phenomena raise 
important questions worthy of philosophical investigation, and also that examining them leads us 
to a better understanding of subordinating speech in general. Chapters Four and Five are 
dedicated to what I call ‘collective speech acts,’ which I first introduce in Chapter Three. Both 
chapters look at how seemingly disparate utterances can combine to afford the speech a type of 
group-based authority, and in doing so offer powerful avenues for collective action. 
  Chapter Four, “Who Do Your Speak For? And How: Online Abuse and Collective 
Speech Acts,” is about online abuse, and it has two main tasks. First, I argue this is a serious, but 
neglected, area of subordinating speech, and that social philosophers of language ought to pay 
 
6 For an analysis of slurs specifically in terms of slurring acts, rather than slur terms, see Kukla (2018). 
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more attention to specifically online discourse. Second, I argue that accounting for the realities of 
subordinating speech online shows that speaker authority is dynamic and emergent, and often 
depends on the community in more ways than current theories of licensing and accommodation 
are equipped to explain. I consider how features like anonymity and the shared language of 
online abusers help to construct a type of group-based authority that lends potentially harmful 
power to their words. That is, rather than seeing these as a collection of disparate utterances, we 
do better to see online abuse as a collective activity, constituted by a type of collective speech 
act. I argue this better reflects the experience of the targets of online abuse and uncover the 
pragmatic reasons why.  
  I also suggest that a similar framework is appropriate for some forms of offline hate 
speech like racist vandalism and large hate marches, and so argue that online subordinating 
speech is not wholly different than its offline counterpart, but rather that the affordances of 
online communication platforms simply makes explicit what is often implicit in real life. It is in 
this way that online abuse represents, in some ways, a distinct phenomenon but also one that, at 
the same time, sheds light on IRL (in real life) subordinating speech. Overall my hope is to show 
that attention to online subordinating speech is useful for illuminating both the harmfulness of 
that phenomena itself, but also for clarifying features of IRL speech that regularly go unnoticed 
or under-emphasized in existing accounts. 
  Chapter Five, “The Pragmatics of Protest and Positive Propaganda,” builds on the 
previous two chapters’ conception of collective speech acts to consider the speech act of protest 
on the one hand, and the counter-protest speech it often generates on the other. I claim that, much 
like subordinating speech, protest is a clear example of socially-located speech, in part because 
an essential aspect of protest is its function of foregrounding the moral authority of the speaker. 
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This, in turn, can sometimes lead to counter-protest propaganda that aims to present the 
protesters as unreasonable, and therefore not worthy of serious consideration. I argue that this 
pragmatic-epistemic difference marks an important contrast between protest and propaganda. I 
argue that seeing each of these acts as collective speech acts, and furthermore as interacting with 
each other, helps to reveal their differences more effectively than does analyzing each 
independently of the other.  
  Overall, these five chapters aim to describe the reality of subordinating speech in all its 
complexity. It is by avoiding oversimplifications and fully recognizing the way things like hate 
speech, propaganda, abusive speech, and the like function in an interrelated way with so many 
non-speech oppressive forces that we begin to see the problem for what it is. While my main 
focus is on speech and language, throughout the dissertation I hope to make clear how these are 
inseparable from both the broader social forces that shape the meaning of our words, as well as 
the more visceral and violent events that grab people's attention. 
 
2. SPEECH AND HARM: DISMISSING SOME NAÏVE VIEWS 
 
  Before I make a proper start in Chapter One, it’s useful to acknowledge that some 
common ideas about speech and language, as well as the nature of oppression and harm, seem to 
present roadblocks to the general thesis mentioned above. It is best to take some of these on right 
away, if not to defeat or dismiss them once and for all, but to clarify my commitments from the 
beginning. 
  First, there is the issue of definition. It might be claimed that terms like ‘hate speech’ or 
‘propaganda’ are simply too ambiguous, too slippery, or too ill-defined to afford any clarity on 
such contentious issues as harm and oppression. There is some truth to this, in that there are 
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numerous definitions on offer, and I share the skeptic’s frustration that these are not always as 
precise as would be needed for some important tasks, like drafting legislation. However, I do not 
believe this problem is as unsurmountable as is sometimes claimed.  
  Since I am not here arguing for any kind of legal prohibition on hate speech—which 
would require careful precision in its definition—all that’s needed for my purposes is simply a 
working characterization of the type of speech that can serve as a starting point in examining the 
harmful effects of subordinating speech. Hate speech, even roughly defined, serves that task 
here, offering a window to begin analyzing these harms, as well as those that less hateful though 
still subordinating utterances can inflict. So, while I do not deny the frustrating lack of a settled 
definition of ‘hate speech,’ I approach this topic by looking at the overlapping features that 
various definitions share. And though it is commonly frowned upon in philosophical circles, we 
can indeed start with the dictionary, which defines ‘hate speech’ as “[a]busive or threatening 
speech or writing that expresses prejudice against a particular group, especially on the basis of 
race, religion, or sexual orientation” (Oxford Dictionaries). Another definition appears in The 
Price We Pay, where Laura Lederer and Richard Delgado define hate speech as “speech or 
conduct aimed at a group of historically disenfranchised people; speech that reviles, ridicules or 
puts in an intensely negative light a person or group on account of who they are” (1995, 4–5). 
Finally, in the introduction to Words That Wound, Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence, Richard 
Delgado, and Kimberlé Crenshaw describe their focus on “assaultive speech,” that is, “words 
that are used as weapons to ambush, terrorize, wound, humiliate, and degrade” (1993, 1). 
  Taking these together, some immediately apparent common themes include the notion 
that this form of speech ‘abuses,’ ‘reviles,’ and ‘degrades,’ and in general expresses extreme 
prejudice for its target. These intuitive understandings, along with the importance of this speech 
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targeting historically marginalized groups, provide the necessary starting points for my account 
of the harms of subordinating speech. In what follows, I will clarify my focus as I move along, 
making use of the philosophical distinctions as I introduce them. Before that, however, some 
more common misconceptions must be (temporarily) dispelled. 
  Next, there is the widely held belief that speech, and communication in general, is simply 
the transmission of ideas—call this the communicative model of speech. Seen in this way, it’s a 
mistake at best—and thought policing at worst—to suggest that speech can in and of itself harm 
someone. According to this view, even if I wanted to hurt someone with my speech, I simply 
couldn’t do it—the old playground refrain of “sticks and stones …” is built upon this folk-
philosophical foundation.  
  And yet, I believe we’re all familiar with cases where speech does harm. Being subjected 
to a hostile and threatening rant can lead to increased anxiety and intense feelings of 
vulnerability and fear. Spreading (false) rumors about someone can lead them to lose their job or 
housing. Repeatedly being told that one’s disability—or race, or gender, etc.—makes their life 
less valuable can contribute to a sense of inferiority, preventing one from pursuing important 
goals. Feeling threatened, having increased anxiety, losing a job or an apartment, and feeling 
constrained by other’s expectations are all plausible harms, in that they inhibit a person’s full 
flourishing. And they are harms whose source here is found in the speech of others. Some harms 
might be more immediate—feeling fearful and threatened in that moment—and others are more 
cumulative, the result of too many instances to keep track of, as is the case with constant small 
reminders of one's ‘inferiority’ or ‘deviance.’ And so, while “sticks and stones …” may be a 
memorable refrain, its errors are obvious. Indeed, it’s worth noting that parents, guardians, and 
teachers often reach for the “sticks and stones” line precisely when words have clearly hurt. 
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  A related but distinct common view is the while speech may, in some rare cases, amount 
to a harm, it never amounts to oppression. That is so, the thought goes, because oppression is a 
serious and grave wrong, usually taking the form of physical violence, and often backed by 
(unjust) law. The enslavement of millions of human beings was/is oppressive. Radically unequal 
marriage contracts, such as those that permit spousal rape, were/are oppressive. Lynchings 
were/are oppressive. But words? Mere speech? Words and speech are never oppressive on this 
naïve conception. They lack some of the (unstated) essential features that make something 
oppressive—whether that is the element of physical force and coercion, or perhaps some 
sanction provided by the state. While it may be admitted that speech can harm, it’s denied that 
speech can oppress. 
  This is a more significant challenge, but in no way an insurmountable one. I will say 
more on this topic in Chapter One, here it is enough to say that the objection above relies on a far 
too narrow understanding of oppression. While gulags, guillotines, and gas-chambers might be 
the images that come to mind when oppression is discussed for some, this in no way detracts 
from the fact that segregation, discrimination, marginalization, and more are best understood as 
oppressive conditions for many social groups. Physical violence, though an important aspect of 
oppression, is not its sole expression. Attending to the roles language plays in supporting broader 
systems of subordination and oppression—which, it’s worth noting, often still include instances 
of violence—is the goal of this dissertation. As I argue throughout, once we see subordinating 
speech as one aspect of interrelated systems of oppression, we should have no trouble 
understanding certain forms of speech as themselves subordinating acts. Furthermore, I would 
caution anyone from concluding that contemporary society lacks oppressive violence because of 
the (supposed) absence of the most extreme versions of this violence. As Patricia Hill Collins 
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notes, “the very pervasiveness of violence can lead to its invisibility” (1998, 66). Mass 
incarceration is a contemporary phenomenon, and a violent one too; racist policing is violent; 
and the extreme number of missing and murdered Indigenous women and girls vividly shows the 
indifference to violence that subordinated people routinely face. These conditions, and others 
like them, are supported and exacerbated by hateful and dismissive language. Thus, there is 
nonetheless a connection between speech and violent oppression, or so I will argue in more detail 
below. 
  One final initial roadblock I would like to discuss here is the belief that while speech can 
harm, and can indeed oppress, this only occurs when the individual speaker intends to do so. 
This may occur a lot or only a little, but given a putative example of speech that harms or 
oppresses, our main task should be to investigate whether that was the speaker’s intended effect. 
And where it wasn’t—and we’ll know this because they’ll honestly tell us they didn’t intend to 
hurt anyone—the insistence on moral blame is misguided and inappropriate. People, the thought 
goes, shouldn’t be held liable for the unintended effects of their speech; and they certainly 
shouldn’t be called ‘oppressors’ because someone else misunderstood what they meant. 
  The belief that speech is fundamentally about intentions, or the closely related belief that 
a speaker is only morally responsible for how they intended their words to be interpreted, is very 
common. And yet here again, there are relatable cases that betray this seemingly absolutist 
position. Even if the catcalling man truthfully reports that he was only intending to make a joke 
or pay a compliment, that does nothing at all to change the fact that many women interpret this 
behavior as aggressive and threatening. The comedian likely only intends to make people laugh 
when they joke about topics like rape and domestic abuse, and yet they are still blameworthy for 
the recklessness with which they can make some listeners relive traumatic memories. Failure to 
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see so much is more a failure to understand the criticisms being raised in these instances, than 
any sort of coherent view of blame. Negligence, even in the realm of speech, uncontroversially 
shows how the scope of morally blameworthy acts is wider than the scope of one’s intentional 
acts. So we won’t learn much if we only examine speaker’s intentions in morally troubling cases. 
 
3. THE CORE CLAIMS OF SUBORDINATING SPEECH 
 
  To quickly review the above, contemporary philosophers of language working on 
subordinating speech generally agree that (a) speech is about more than the communication of 
ideas, (b) speech can, in fact, harm, and (c) it can even oppress. Moreover, this can occur (d) 
even when it wasn’t the speaker’s intention to do so, and (e) in such cases they can rightly be 
held accountable for their (unintended) acts. 
  There are, of course, many disagreements within this sphere of agreement. Nonetheless, 
there is a consensus within this sub-discipline about what I will call the core claims of 
subordinating speech. These are: that subordinating speech acts are (1) possible, (2) prevalent, 
and (3) quite possibly fall outside the bounds of what is appropriately tolerated by the law and 
morality. My intention in this dissertation is to strengthen, complicate, and ultimately defend 
these core claims. I do so by drawing on recent work in social and political philosophy, and also 
by moving beyond the generally strict Austinean character of the existing accounts.7 
 
7 While the views I go on to criticize are no doubt inspired by Austin, it is unclear how closely they follow the 
program as initially laid in by Austin himself, primarily in his How to Do Things With Words (1962). Austin no 
doubt took the illocutionary act—the act carried out in saying some utterance—to be his primary conceptual focus, 
but it is less certain that he found the perlocutionary effect of utterances—what occurs as a result of a speech act—to 
be as uninteresting or unanalyzable as those who followed him do. It is the overly strict or narrow focus on 
illocutionary acts that is the source of many of my critiques, and there is disagreement over whether this is 
attributable to Austin or not. For one recent account that pushes back against the narrow view as being Austin’s that 
I largely agree with, see Nancy Bauer’s How to Do Things With Pornography (2015). 
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  Rather than abstraction, this project aims to be informed more by the lived reality of 
experiences of injustice and oppression. As I discuss in the coming chapters, many existing 
frameworks focus too intensely on individual speakers and their intentions, and as much of the 
recent—and not-so-recent—philosophical work on oppression makes clear, we should not limit 
oppressive acts to those of a specific agent who has a particular intention to act in an unjust way. 
Rather, we must attend to the structural relations that actions are bound up in and contribute to in 
order to properly describe subordinating speech. I argue that many existing accounts of 
subordinating speech fail to properly describe the relationship between individual subordinating 
speech acts and the broader oppressive norms that give these speech acts their force. The 
importance of speaker authority is central throughout and I develop a novel understanding of 
subordinating speech that re-conceptualizes the role of speaker authority in these acts. Instead of 
seeing this as reducible to either a formal position or a merely linguistic phenomenon, I conceive 
of authority as a richly contextual social fact that is distributed unevenly among social groups. 
  Overall, this dissertation develops a structural, pluralist account of subordinating speech. 
It is pluralist in the sense of recognizing the multiple avenues available for speech to act 
oppressively, and structural in that the primary focus is not on individual acts or intentions, but 
on the collective consequences of diffuse actions, some linguistic and some not. As I argue, these 
two features have not been adequately recognized by leading accounts in the existing literature.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 




Philosophers and legal theorists who write on the potential harms of certain forms of 
speech tend to focus on explicitly hostile hate speech (e.g., “I’m gonna kill you f——t!”), 
assertions of genetic or cultural inferiority (e.g., “All Indians are savages.”), and the overt or 
covert call for genocide (e.g., “Muslims are an existential threat to civilization!”).8 These, along 
with the use of slurs, deeply entrenched epithets, and other cultural symbols of oppression like 
cross burnings and swastikas, are the paradigm cases of subordinating speech. Vivid examples 
like these—often real-life cases—are at the forefront of legal and philosophical analyses of the 
costs of, and plausible limits to, free expression.9  
Words can hurt, as can other expressive symbols and gestures. Most theorists writing on 
the topic of speech and harm agree to this much. But there is less agreement about how to 
conceptualize the mechanisms of harmful speech and its damage. For legal theorists, the focus is 
mainly on speech as it functions as a form of assault—words that wound is the idea—and this 
naturally draws attention to the injuries suffered by the direct targets of such speech. For their 
part, philosophers working in the speech act tradition examine the action constituted by such 
 
8 A note about slurs: throughout this dissertation I aim to avoid using or mentioning them as much as possible. 
While this may seem odd for a dissertation on subordinating speech, and other writers hold views about the 
necessity of confronting this language in all its ugliness, I personally do not wish to take part in their use. This stems 
partly from a disagreement over the possibility of any neutral use of such terms, along with the belief that a lot of 
productive work on this topic can be achieved while minimizing the reader’s exposure to slurs. For more on this, see 
Herbert (2018a). 
9 For helpful overviews of some of the main issues and approaches to the topic of the harms of hate speech, see 
Matsuda, Lawrence III, Delgado, and Crenshaw (1993); Lederer and Delgado (1995); and Maitra and McGowan 
(2012). 
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utterances, conceived as a distinct matter from its contingent results, including the experience of 
injury that can vary from case to case.10  
And while these are no doubt important aspects of the harm of such speech, they do not 
exhaust its harms.11 This chapter aims to explore the harms of subordinating speech in a more 
expansive way, widening the lens of the philosophical analysis of oppressive speech in effort to 
better capture the wide range of harms attributable to such speech.  
To that end, in what follows, I distinguish three areas of harm: (1) the negative 
psychological effects subordinating speech can have on its direct targets, (2) the harm constituted 
by the performance of the speech act itself apart from these contingent psychological effects, and 
(3) the broader societal damage done via subordinating speech, and in particular the maintenance 
of hierarchical relations of domination between social groups characteristic of oppression.12 The 
main aim of this chapter is to catalogue and explain the harms of subordinating speech, which I 
do throughout section 2. Having done that, I go on to argue in section 3 that prominent accounts 
of oppressive speech—namely, illocution-focused models—fail to capture these harms 
adequately, primarily because they are centrally concerned with singular speech acts, rather than 
the broader practices of subordination that give these utterances their force. 
 
 
10 Rae Langton’s (1993) “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” which put J. L. Austin’s (1962) speech act theory to 
work in the service of identifying the subordinating and silencing nature of pornographer’s ‘speech’ marks the 
beginning of this fruitful movement. 
11 Notable exceptions to the limited conception of harm I criticize below include Tirrell (2017); Gelber and 
McNamara (2016); and Ayala (2014). Both of which take a broader look at the harms of subordinating speech. 
12 In this chapter I note the different types of harms attributable to subordinating speech. In Chapter Three, I take a 
similar approach and argue that the different kinds of subordinating speech acts have also not been fully 
acknowledged by many philosophers writing on this topic. 
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1.1. Causing vs. Constituting 
  
Before exploring the harms of subordinating speech directly, one key idea needs to be put 
in place. This is the distinction between speech (merely) causing subordination and some speech 
itself constituting subordination. This distinction is of central importance to the views I will go 
on to discuss. Understanding the distinction and the role it plays in those views is a necessary 
first step in evaluating how well they capture the harms of subordinating speech. 
At a general level, it’s easy to recognize that some speech—hateful, anti-immigrant 
propaganda, for example—can have oppressive effects, like employment discrimination, or even 
racist violence. This might be the case when we can trace a causal line from the distribution of 
hateful ideas about immigrants and racialized groups to discriminatory or violent actions made 
against members of such groups.13 
However, this causal story suggests that these utterances are oppressive only in virtue of 
changing the beliefs and attitudes of some hearers, who then go on to act on these newly formed 
anti-immigrant attitudes and commit discriminatory and violent acts. In this way, the harm is a 
‘mentally-mediated’ harm, meaning that while speech played a causal role, it is via its impact on 
the minds of some hearers, namely, their attitudes and beliefs, which later guide their 
(oppressive) actions. 
While surely true, on its own, this picture leaves too much out. It alone can’t answer 
many of the pressing questions raised by subordinating speech. For instance, because of the lag 
between the hateful utterance and the harmful act, important questions about the scope of 
responsibility remain unanswered. Such questions include whether responsibility should extend 
 
13 Moreover, in both the Nuremburg trials and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, publishers (such as 
Julius Streicher) and broadcasters (Ferdinand Nahimana) were found guilty of crimes against humanity and 
genocide, respectively. See Tirrell (2012, 183–86) for analysis specific to Rwanda. 
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beyond the perpetrator of the act to include the speaker, and if it does, how much responsibility 
the speaker should then bear. The simple causal story does not seem to have the resources to 
address these questions. And this shortcoming leads many theorists to look elsewhere in their 
accounts of oppressive speech. 
Catherine MacKinnon, Rae Langton, Ishani Maitra, and others make the additional claim 
that some speech constitutes subordination—it doesn’t just cause it.14 A quick example can 
illustrate the distinction at play between causing and constituting in the context of speech. Your 
boastful assertion that you “can eat the whole thing” might cause me to bet you that you cannot, 
but it’s my speech act “I bet you five bucks you can’t” that actually constitutes me betting you. 
The difference lies, partly, in what is directly attributable to the speech act itself, and what only 
occurs with the additional support of some further, perhaps non-linguistic, contingent actions. 
Some utterances do certain things, and this is better captured by describing what they 
constitute—what they are, as speech acts—than what they cause. Many utterances happen to 
cause changes in a romantic couple’s relationship, and it is not totally incorrect to say that when 
Sheena first asked Blake out on a date, this eventually caused their marriage. But it is only at the 
ceremony, when they each say, “I do,” that these speech acts constitute their marrying. In other 
words, only in so saying “I do” in the proper circumstances, do they perform the act of marrying 
one another.15 
This distinction between causing and constituting is at the core of J. L. Austin’s speech 
act theory, which offers a useful way of analyzing three distinct aspects of a given utterance: the 
 
14 Others include Mary-Kate McGowen, Jennifer Hornsby, Jason Stanley, Rebecca Kukla, John Michael Ramsey 
along with many more who, though they don’t all explicitly say so, seem to agree with the claim that some speech 
constitutes a subordinating act. 
15 This is, in part, because the utterance “I do,” is conventional shorthand for saying: “I hereby marry you,” which is 
an explicit performative in Austin’s jargon, which will be explained in more detail below. 
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locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary (Austin 1962). On the Austinean model, the 
locutionary content is the (literal) meaning of what’s said; the perlocutionary effects are what 
this speech causes to occur; and the illocutionary act is what’s performed in saying those words 
in those circumstances.  
Consider how, in the wake of the 2017 Québec City Mosque shooting, released 
documents revealed that the one thing that set the shooter on his murderous path was Canadian 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau writing in a tweet: “To those fleeing persecution, terror & war, 
Canadians will welcome you, regardless of your faith. Diversity is our strength 
#WelcomeToCanada” (Cecco 2018). By his own admission, this pro-refugee message angered 
the shooter to the point where he thought it necessary to commit mass murder. One could 
therefore claim that this tweet was one of the causes of tragic Islamophobic violence and murder, 
and hence, oppression. And there would be some truth to this claim when we’re asking what 
were the perlocutionary effects of this speech act.  
So, while some harmful actions can be caused by speech in the sense that the speech 
persuaded or influenced one or more of its hearers to later act in a certain way—in such cases, 
both the persuasion and the later act would be perlocutionary effects of the original speech act. 
But Langton and others argue that other harmful acts are not so ‘mentally mediated’ and do not 
fit this simple pattern.16 Sometimes the utterance itself, as an illocutionary act, is an act of 
oppression, not only because of what effects it eventually brings about, but what the speech does, 
in and of itself. 
 
16 And note that this mental mediation need not be so rational as persuasion supposes. For example, repeated speech 
can also condition hearers to act in certain ways, and this would still fall into a causal model. See Langton (2012). 
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MacKinnon was perhaps the first to argue that some speech—in her case, pornography, 
which is legally considered a form of speech in many countries—constitutes oppression in the 
sense I am alluding to here (MacKinnon 1987).17 In the philosophy literature, Langton took up 
this idea, explicitly combined it with Austinean speech act theory, and argued that because 
pornography can be said to unfairly rank women as inferior, legitimate discriminatory behavior 
towards women, and unjustly deprive them of important powers, it is therefore speech that 
constitutes subordination (Langton 1993).  
To make this argument, Langton uses the example of an apartheid-era South African 
legislator to demonstrate how speech itself can constitute subordination. She asks us to consider 
the legislator who, in saying “Blacks are no longer permitted to vote,” makes it the case that 
black South Africans can no longer vote (Langton 1993, 302–03).18 Her claim is that this 
utterance—the very act of saying those words in those circumstances—constitutes subordination 
because it itself successfully performs the act of, among other things, unfairly ranking Black 
South Africans as inferior to white South Africans. That is, beyond merely contributing causally 
to keeping Black South Africans away from the poles by saying his words, simply in saying what 
he does, the legislator successfully ranks his targets as inferior. Similarly, because these three 
illocutionary acts are performed in the pornographer’s speech acts, pornography is itself an act of 
oppression of women, and not merely a depiction of it (locution), or an upstream cause of it 
(perlocution), though it can be those as well. 
 
17 Althusser (1971) made a similar, though distinct, claim concerning how language is a tool of oppression. Luce 
Irigaray (1985) is another figure who brought out the oppressive aspects of language forcefully. Pinning down the 
philosophical origins of the claim that language oppresses is no simple task. Here I aim only to trace the 
development of a particular version of this claim as it emerged in what might be called feminist philosophy of 
language, which wed MacKinnon’s claims to Austinean speech act theory. 
18 Langton borrows this example from Mackinnon (1987, 202). 
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For Langton and others who take up this framework, the difference between causing and 
constituting lies in the fact that subordination is not just a remote, contingent perlocutionary 
effect of the speech acts typical of pornography, but is instead an immediate, direct illocutionary 
act performed in the speech act itself. Pornography doesn’t only lead to some downstream acts of 
oppression (as it has arguably been proven to do), it also enacts subordination directly, and is 
therefore, under the right circumstances, a subordinating act on its own. Similar statements can 
be (and have been) made for racist or sexist hate speech, which might not only cause 
subordination, but could also constitute subordinating acts. 
 
1.2. Why Focus on Constituting Instead of Causing? 
 
It is important to note that, in principle, none of the above is meant to undermine the 
claim that speech can also cause harm in the sense of perlocutionary effects. The claim that 
speech sometimes constitutes harm may sit comfortably alongside the claim that speech 
sometimes causes harm. They are complimentary, rather than in competition—at least in theory. 
As Mary Kate McGowan notes, however: “[a]lthough such causal connections [to harms] no 
doubt exist, they are very difficult to prove” (2009, 389).19 As such, the constitutive thesis plays 
an important evidential role for many theorists, supporting the claim that speech harms even 
when the causal connections might be in dispute.  
Aside from this evidential role, the cause/constitute distinction also matters for two 
specifically moral reasons, as well, in many accounts. First, as I suggested above, speech that 
 
19 She adds: “Moreover, even if such causal connections could be established, such oppressive causal effects may 
simply be the (high) price we pay for freedom of speech. After all, since these (alleged) causal effects are the result 
of persuasion and hence ‘mentally-mediated’, the speech causing them is highly protected by the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution” (McGowan 2009, 389). 
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constitutes subordination can morally implicate the speaker in the harm created by the speech in 
a more direct way than causal stories, which often leave the speaker one step removed from the 
harm. Isolating the causal influences of any outcome is always a tough task, especially in the 
messy world of real life. On some definitions of “cause,” to say a hate speaker is causally 
responsible for some particular harm is to say that but for the speaker’s action, the harm would 
not have occurred. Yet, for many of the harms these theorists want to attribute to speech, this 
degree of certitude—or causal effectiveness—is not what’s being asserted. To say a hate 
speaker’s words themselves constitute a harm, whether or not they’re part of causal chain that 
results in some specific physical harm, is a distinct claim with different truth conditions. 
Secondly, constitutive accounts direct our attention differently than causal accounts. For 
some speech, the idea goes, what matters is the enactment of certain oppressive norms rather 
than the discrete injury or injuries they cause. In other words, the target of analysis need not—
and perhaps, for strategic or pedagogical reasons, should not—focus mainly on hate speech’s 
role in bringing about vivid acts of physical violence, but on the normative changes they 
institute. Therefore the analysis should instead focus on either those subordinating acts that are 
performed immediately, as in Langton’s example of ranking people as inferior, or, as Maitra puts 
it, how speech can “constitut[e] norms that help to construct social reality for the subordinated 
group” (2012, 99).20  
 
20 To further clarify, she immediately adds: “More specifically, these norms determine, first, the (relative) social 
status of the subordinated group; second, what rights and powers members of the group possess; and third, what 
counts as acceptable behavior towards those members” (Maitra 2012, 99). In this way, Maitra is looking to echo 
Langton’s claims about ranking as inferior, depriving of rights and powers, and of legitimating discriminatory 
behavior. However, because Maitra often implicitly appeals to notions of speech ‘practices’ rather than ‘acts’ as 
constituting subordination, there does appear to be some distance between her view and Langton’s. I return to this at 
the end of this chapter. 
22 
It is these purported analytical benefits—attributing responsibility to the speaker and 
fixing our attention on the normative changes in social reality—that help explain the focus on the 
illocutionary aspect of subordinating speech for many philosophers working on this topic. That 
is, these aims clarify why constituting subordination, rather than simply causing it, is the stated 
goalpost for many.21 
However, as I will argue in section 3 below, ambiguities in the concept of illocution 
weaken its usefulness. I argue that the cause/constitute distinction breaks down, especially for a 
phenomenon such as subordinating speech, and therefore that illocution cannot do the job that 
philosophers have sought for it to do here. I show this in part by highlighting the abstract and 
idealized assumptions underlying the illocutionary approach and argue that a lack of paradigm 
cases of oppression against which to measure subordinating speech acts poses difficult problems 
for this model.  
I argue, though, that this is no great loss, as philosophers are wrong to put too much 
emphasis on illocution as the main mechanism of subordinating speech. I claim that it has the 
drawback of isolating speech acts from their larger context, and in doing so separates the harms 
of subordinating speech from the harms of oppression more broadly. The illocutionary model 
does so because it fixates on individual speech acts made by individual speakers. It therefore has 
limited applicability for the greater terrain of subordinating speech.  
This is not to say that illocutionary acts play no role in the analysis of oppressive speech, 
but rather that it cannot serve as the primary conceptual tool for understanding this problem. I 
 
21 In my experience teaching these topics to undergraduate students at US universities, the rationale for the focus on 
constituting rather than causing subordinating acts is not obvious to the uninitiated reader. This is why I try to make 
these reasons explicit in the above. This is not to claim, however, that these reasons are the ones that any of the 
authors whose work I mention would themselves cite. 
23 
argue that it, in the end, describes one part of the larger whole that is harmful speech. But a more 
complete analysis moves beyond the confines of illocutionary acts. We must attend to the harms 
caused by speech acts as well as those constituted by them. These, along with the other non-
linguistic practices of oppression that give subordinating speech acts their meaning, must always 
be kept in view. This is a difficult task, but a necessary one. As Lynne Tirrell notes: “Attention 
to language discloses it as a causal force behind actions while revealing how our discursive 
practices play a constitutive and normative role in what those actions are and in who we are. 
Language always acts in concert with collateral social practices” (2017, 142). Moving beyond 
the illocutionary aspects of speech, and explicitly including the broader social practices that 
function alongside oppressive speech in our analysis is a necessary step in the goal of 
understanding the harms of subordinating speech.  
Furthermore, including both the harms caused and those constituted by speech acts is 
closer to the experience of the targets of subordinating speech. As Katharine Gelber and Luke 
McNamara state while summarizing their study on the effects of hate speech as told from the 
victims’ perspectives: “there is a close and complex relationship between constitutive and 
consequential harms,” and “attempts to draw a neat distinction between these two types of harm 
risk misrepresenting, and being insensitive to, lived experiences of public racism” (2016, 336–
37).22 To avoid this misrepresentation, my approach throughout this project aims to keep the 
lived experience of subordinating speech in view. I explore how the tools of philosophy of 
language—specifically speech act theory—can help explain and describe how speech perpetuates 
 
22 In full, they write: “Our analysis suggests that there is a close and complex relationship between constitutive and 
consequential harms, and the harms are experienced cumulatively. Attempts to draw a neat distinction between these 
two types of harm risk misrepresenting, and being insensitive to, lived experiences of public racism. The debate over 
hate speech laws tends to focus on discrete single incidents and assess the legitimacy of legal sanctions attached to 
that event. Although that may be necessary to enforce a law, it is an artificial and inaccurate way to understand the 
experiences of being on the receiving end of hate speech” (Gelber and McNamara 2016, 336–37).  
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and maintains these structures of oppression. And where the tools need to be modified to fit the 
account of oppression, I take the facts of oppression as primary and modify the tools, first by 
rejecting the rigid separation of illocution and perlocution characteristic of many current 
accounts. 
I believe that by starting with the observations of oppression theorists that oppression is 
manifested most clearly not in individual acts or obstacles, but the systemic and interdependent 
constraints members of subordinated groups face, we’re led to a distinct approach to the harms of 
subordinating speech than is found in much of the philosophical literature. This approach 
conceives of subordinating speech as one practice among the larger, interconnected practices of 
oppression, and this is not something the concept of illocution is capable of capturing. To show 
this, in the next section I explore the myriad harms of oppressive speech, including the place of 
illocutionary acts within that larger space. Then, in section 3 I argue that illocutionary acts 
cannot serve as the primary mechanism for illuminating the harms uncovered in section 2. 
 
2. THREE AREAS OF HARM 
 
To capture the numerous harms of subordinating speech, it is useful to make distinctions 
among this massive category. For example, in their Understanding Words that Wound, Richard 
Delgado and Jean Stefancic (2004), legal theorists working within critical race theory, note that 
hate speech can differ along a few distinct axes. These axes include to whom the speech is 
directed: whether an individual, a small group (e.g., a Black fraternity), or at an entire 
identifiable group (e.g., all Indigenous Peoples). It can also be distinguished in how it is 
delivered: orally, in writing, on the internet, or it can even take a more tangible form, “such as a 
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monument, flag, or sports logo” (2004, 11).23 Additionally, they suggest there are a ways that we 
can distinguish types of hate speech: “direct and indirect, veiled or overt, single or repeated, 
backed by authority and power or not, and accompanied by threat of violence or not” (ibid.).24 
In this chapter I distinguish the main areas where the harm occurs.25 I focus on three 
distinct areas: (1) the psychological health of those targeted by subordinating speech, which 
often manifests and persists long after any singular instance; (2) the damage inflicted in the 
performance of the speech act itself, which is the identified with the illocutionary act; and (3) the 
harm done to members of the social group(s) targeted in the subordinating speech as members of 
a group, that is, the hierarchical relations between social groups that partly constitute oppression.  
The term ‘area’ is, of course, metaphorical. However, I use it to highlight how each type 
of harm corresponds roughly to a distinct spatial location, starting with the individual target of 
subordinating speech in (1); broadening to include both the target, the speaker, and other 
audience members in (2); and then finally extending outward to encapsulate entire social groups 
in (3). While there is no doubt some ambiguity in how I draw these boundaries, it is my hope that 
by first cataloguing these harms separately, we can then better see how the forces that leave 
individuals and groups vulnerable to these harms in fact connect and mutually sustains one 
another in key ways.  
In addition to cataloguing these harms, another goal of this chapter is to challenge the 
approach implicit in many leading accounts of subordinating speech, represented below by 
 
23 See Veilleux (1995) for an analysis specific to sports mascots. For state-erected symbols like monuments, see Tsai 
(2016). 
24 I go on to discuss different types of subordinating speech explicitly in Chapter Three. 
25 This is therefore similar to how Delgado (1993) distinguishes the harms of hate speech in terms of (a) their 
psychological, (b) their sociological, and (c) their political effects. See also Lawrence (1993) who distinguishes the 
harms of hate speech in terms of (a) the direct psychic injury assaultive speech causes, (b) the reputational libel that 
can result, and (c) the denial of equal opportunity created by discriminatory environments. 
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Langton and McGowan. As I interpret these accounts, they assume that a focus on illocutionary 
acts can help shed light on the structural features of oppression. In section 3, I argue that, in fact, 
we cannot learn much about the structural features of oppression through the analysis of the 
illocutionary acts of subordinating speech. That is, the assumption that a focus on illocution can 
illuminate oppression deserves more scrutiny than it has so far received. And aside from the 
occasional cursory remarks, the psychological effects of subordinating speech are rarely the 
focus of philosophical work in this area.26 This neglect, however, is detrimental to the goal of a 
full understanding of the power of subordinating speech.27 In an effort to remedy both these 
failures, I first describe the plausible harms of subordinating speech in more detail below. 
 
2.1. Psychological Harms 
 
 
2.1.1. Immediate harms 
 
Hateful speech has the power to inflict significant psychological harm. Delgado notes 
that “immediate mental or emotional distress is the most obvious direct harm caused by racial 
insult” (1993, 93–94). “Without question,” he adds, “mere words, whether racial or otherwise, 
can cause mental, emotional, or even physical harm to their target, especially if delivered in front 
of others or by a person in a position of authority” (ibid.). While the particular harms brought 
 
26 The caveat implied by ‘philosophical’ is meant to exclude the groundbreaking work of many leading legal 
scholars in this area, which is often more focused on the harms caused, rather than constituted by, hate speech. See 
Matsuda et. al (1993); Delgado and Stefancic (2004); Lederer and Delgado (1995). 
27 Nancy Bauer makes a good case that this aim for philosophical precision, whether motivated by humility or 
something else, has actually turned philosophers away from the crucial questions they need to be asking (and that 
philosophy is well-suited to try an answer) in this domain. See Bauer (2015, esp. Chapters 5–7). 
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about by any individual instance will vary from case to case, along with the specific reasons why 
that harm occur, some generalities can still be uncovered.  
One of the most important features to note when discussing the immediate harms of hate 
speech is how there is often a violent threat that accompanies these utterances—if only an 
implicit one. Of course, often it is an explicit and direct threat. Other times it is a thinly veiled 
threat where (historical) context fills in the crucial details, as in the burning of a cross or the 
hanging of a noose on a Black family’s front lawn.28 It is for this reason some theorists see hate 
speech in general, as a type of threat. Legal theorist Charles Lawrence III, for instance, draws a 
tight parallel between cross burnings and racist hate speech: 
It [cross-burning] is a threat; a threat made in the context of a history of lynchings, 
beatings, and economic reprisals that made good on earlier threats. […] The Black 
student who is subjected to racial epithets, like the Black person on whose lawn the Klan 
has burned a cross, is threatened and silenced by a credible connection between racist 
hate speech and racist violence. (1993, 79) 
 
While the above examples are rather direct, it is worth noting how even less overtly threatening 
utterances like the calls of “Go back to Africa!” or “Muslims stay out!” have at least an implicit 
threat of further action if the target doesn’t “go back” or “stay out.” I will have more to say about 
the harmfulness of threats as an action in the following section. Here, however, I want to dwell 
on and emphasize the fact that being the target of a violent threat like this is often a traumatic 
experience, and thus, a serious psychological harm. Moreover it is a harm that ought to be at the 
forefront of any analysis of hate speech. 
As Lawrence explains, experiencing such hostile speech is like an “attack,” or “a slap in 
the face.” And furthermore, one which “produces an instinctive, defensive psychological 
 
28 In Virginia v. Black the US Supreme Court took up the question of whether a burning cross is in itself a threat, 
concluding that it is insofar as it is directed at an individual with the intent to intimidate. 
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reaction. Fear, rage, shock, and flight all interfere with any reasoned response” (1993, 68).29 
Moreover, slurs like the N-word function like a “preemptive strike” and tend to “produce 
physical symptoms that temporarily disable the victim, and perpetrators often use these words 
with the intention of producing this effect” (1993, 68). In other words, racist, homophobic, and 
other bigoted epithets are hurled at their targets and, just like the weapons they are, tend to 
wound those on their sharp end. 
This harm, moreover, isn’t simply the visceral result of being unexpectedly attacked—
though, importantly, there is that too—but is rationally informed. One crucial source of this harm 
comes from what Lawrence above calls the “credible connection between racist hate speech and 
racist violence.” This brings with it an additional, correlated harm, in that this can force the 
victim to silently listen to the hate speech directed at them. That this is itself a harm might be 
doubted, but I mention it here because of what it reveals: this being the fact that—despite what 
many free speech liberals say—speaking back is a dangerous option. And taking note of the 
implicit threat in many hateful utterances helps us see why. As Delgado and Stefancic point out, 
“many hate crimes have taken place when the victim did just that—spoke back to the aggressor 
and paid with his or her life” (2004, 13). As such, hate speech throws its targets into this difficult 
position, where they must very quickly read the situation and choose how (or if) to respond to an 
unwanted interruption.  
 
29 From this analysis, Lawrence builds towards an account of hate speech that is (or ought to be) unprotected under 
the first amendment, basing his reasoning on that found in Brown v. Board of Education. As he argues: “Psychic 
injury is no less an injury than being struck in the face, and it often is far more severe. Brown speaks directly to the 
psychic injury inflicted by racist speech in noting that the symbolic message of segregation affected ‘the hearts and 
minds’ of Negro children ‘in a way unlikely ever to be undone.’ Racial epithets and harassment often cause deep 
emotional scarring and feelings of anxiety and fear that pervade every aspect of a victim’s life” (Lawrence 1993, 
74). 
29 
Moreover, even when a target of hate speech deems it worthwhile to speak back, they 
may find themselves at a loss. As Lawrence notes, “the visceral emotional response to personal 
attack precludes speech” (1993, 68). It is for this reason that Caroline West claims that racist hate 
speech “does not function as an invitation to conversation” (2012, 235). And while such a 
remark may seem trivially true, it does fly in the face of the standard liberal response offered as 
an antidote to the harms of hate speech—namely, more speech.  
Laura Beth Nielsen argues this solution rests on bad empirical assumptions, as most 
targets of harmful speech make the informed decision to not respond.30 As she notes “for the 
most part, targets of racist speech do not counter it,” thus shouldering the burdens of the 
interaction on their own (2012, 155). One commonly cited reason is “being fearful for their 
safety” (ibid., 156).  
Even where there is a direct response, Nielsen says “it is hard to imagine that these 
interactions are changing the mind of the original speaker. After all, hurled epithets are probably 
not intended to start meaningful dialogue” (ibid., 159).31 More plausibly, hate speech of this sort 
is often intended to inflict harm on its targets. But, regardless of what the speaker intended, from 
the target’s perspective it is “experienced as a blow, not a proffered idea,” as Lawrence explains, 
“and once the blow is struct, it is unlikely that dialogue will follow” (1993, 68). It is not merely a 
threat, but a threat already fulfilled. 
Nielsen concludes that this fear of further violence, along with other reasons why people 
don’t respond to racist speech “demonstrate the difficulties associated with the prescription for 
 
30 Also, it’s worth noting that white men are the most prone to respond to race-related speech, often trying to 
‘educate’ the original speaker. See Nielsen (2012). 
31 One of the more fascinating aspects of Nielson’s article is how she shows that street begging is actually quite 
regulated as a form of speech, even standing up to judicial scrutiny in some cases. She says this is mostly likely a 
result of the fact that, unlike most racist/sexist speech, it “is a request made by the more disadvantaged to the more 
privileged” (Nielsen 2012, 155). 
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more speech to counter race-related speech in public” (ibid., 157). But even if one were to 
dispute her conclusion, that the targets of hate speech often experience fear and other painful 
emotions could hardly be in doubt. This is distressful, over and above how being threatened can 
cause instinctive and automatic psychological reactions. “The recipient of hate messages,” Mari 
Matsuda says, “struggles with inner turmoil” (1993, 24).  
Hate speech therefore immediately puts its targets into a multiply painful position, and 
this is no accident. As West notes, “hate crimes are typically preceded and accompanied by racist 
hate speech; and both victims and perpetrators generally know this” (2012, 234, emphasis 
added). The connection between hate speech and hate crimes therefore plays an evidentiary role 
for its targets, licensing their fear and other forms of psychological distress. “Racist hate 
speech,” West adds, “is the clearest expression of the kind of hostility that fuels racial 
discrimination and violence, short of the acts themselves; and it indicates to its targets the 
presence of these attitudes and behavioural dispositions in the speaker” (ibid.). In light of this, 
it’s easy to see how forcing individuals to make potentially life-or-death decisions, to assess the 
severity of the threat, and balance their security against other potential values—like standing up 
to intimidation, for example—demonstrates the immense psychological toll hate speech exacts in 
its immediate aftermath. 
 
2.1.2. Lasting harms 
 
But even when hate speech is not the potential prelude to a violent hate crime, and is 
perhaps not even interpreted as a threat, many other psychological and physiological harms 
remain. “The negative effects of racist hate messages are real,” writes Matsuda (1993, 24). 
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Victims “experience psychological symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear in the gut 
to rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
hypertension, psychosis, and suicide” (ibid.). According to studies surveyed by Delgado and 
Stefancic harms include not only “short-term harms” but also more long-term physiological 
harms such as “drug-taking, risk-taking behavior, […] suicide, […] damaged self-image, lower 
aspiration level, and depression” (2004, 13).  
Taking a closer look at some of the lasting psychological effects of hate speech, Delgado 
and Stefancic note that these often include: “fear, nightmares, and withdrawal from society” 
(ibid., 14). For example, the victim of hate speech “may behave circumspectly, avoiding the 
situations, places, and company where it could happen again” (ibid.).32 And since racism, sexism 
and other forms of oppression are nearly ubiquitous, this can have a massive impact on the 
target’s life. Matsuda also notes the far-ranging scope of the consequences of hate speech when 
she writes: 
Victims are restricted in their personal freedom. To avoid receiving hate messages, 
victims have to quit jobs, forgo education, leave their homes, avoid certain public places, 
curtail their own exercise of speech rights, and otherwise modify their behavior and 
demeanor. (1993, 24) 
 
Still other targets respond “with anger, either internalized or acted-out” (Delgado and Stefancic 
2004, 14). And others “may reject identification with their own race” or, conversely, “may affect 
a kind of false bravado” (ibid.).  
Children are a special case worthy of extra attention, as they “are among the most easily 
damaged by racial epithets and name-calling” (ibid., 14–15). West expands on this troubling fact 
 
32 Similarly, West suggests that “racist hate speech may cause those it targets to withdraw from public life and 
discourse” (2012, 237). 
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and elaborates on how being the target of hate speech can have negative effects on one’s self-
esteem, particularly in young children: 
If others repeatedly tell you that you are worthless or contemptible—if they say you are 
dumb dirty, or lazy, simply in virtue of your race which you are powerless to change or 
conceal—then it is likely that eventually you will come yourself to believe that this is so, 
especially if the message of inferiority is reinforced in subtle and not so subtle ways by 
the culture at large.33 (West 2012, 236) 
 
There is little doubt that stigmatization like this has lasting psychological effects upon its 
recipients, including “feelings of humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred” (Delgado 1993, 91). 
Furthermore, theorists point out how the use of slurs can also trigger more explicit messages of 
unequal worth, in part because “they draw upon and intensify the effects of the stigmatization, 
labeling, and disrespectful treatment that the victim has previously undergone,” with the result 
being “long-term emotional pain” (ibid., 94). In other words, immediate and lasting 
psychological harms combine with novel utterances functioning to unearth old wounds.34 As 
Gelber and McNamara report from their qualitative study with targets of hate speech: 
harms are often enduring and not ephemeral. One does not easily ‘shake off’ a racist slur, 
especially when the encounter and its memory are fresh the next time the target hears of 
another attack or reads generally circulated hate speech about his/her community. Our 
analysis suggests that there is a close and complex relationship between constitutive and 
consequential harms, and the harms are experienced cumulatively. (2016) 
 
In sum, an important reason to not skip over these physical and psychological harms too 
quickly, beyond their significance in and of themselves—especially for the individual victims—
is that they contribute to structural inequalities in important ways. That is, these harms “go 
 
33 Parenthetically, she adds: “One needs only to think of the well-known effects on children of parental verbal abuse 
to get a sense of the way in which racist hate speech may impact psychologically on its target; and indeed there is 
evidence that some of the effects of racist abuse on its targets are not dissimilar to the short-term effects of sexual 
abuse on children” (West 2012, 236). And note that on this latter point, West cites Sumner (2004, 160). 
34 As Regina Rini argues in the case of microaggressions, it is precisely because these occur as part of larger patterns 
of similar utterances that we fail to appreciate their significance if we choose to only examine them as isolated 
utterances. As she says: “What makes microaggression distinctively harmful is victims’ awareness that each instance 
is not an isolated accident” (2018, 3). 
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beyond damage to the psyches and bodies of its victims” (Delgado and Stefancic 2004, 15). 
While these harms first emerge in the target’s psyche, they extend outward and may affect the 
victim’s whole life. And sometimes the full effects of emotional and psychological harms of hate 
speech are hidden in plain view.  
As Delgado and Stefancic remind us, “the person who is timid, bitter, tense, or defensive 
as a result of frequent encounters with racism [via racist hate speech] is likely to fare poorly in 
employment and other settings, as well” (ibid.). The impact of stereotype threat is relevant here 
as well, as encounters with hate speech tend to make one’s group identity—and the pernicious 
negative stereotypes many attach to that group identity—salient where it perhaps was not 
before.35 
But seeing these harms as the possible or probable effects of certain instances isn’t to say 
that they are the result of every instance of hate speech, even instances that are explicitly hostile 
and backed by force. The targets may, in some cases, have particularly thick skin, and just aren’t 
the sort of person to be intimidated by a threat. And there is likely something highly specific 
about how any single person responds to different cases of harmful speech. Individuals are 
differentially sensitive not just in general—thick vs. thin skinned—but to particular instances.  
Moreover, these causal, psychological harms of hate speech are most vivid when 
performed in face-to-face interactions and might be dissipated partially when performed via 
different mediums. But where these harms might not occur in every instance or may dissolve in 
different contexts, other harms remain. 
 
 
35 For more on stereotype threat, see Cordelia Fine’s (2010) Delusions of Gender. 
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2.2. Harmful Illocutionary Acts 
 
The preceding provided a short overview of some of the common psychological harms 
that can be the causal effect of being the target of subordinating speech. Legal theorists—
specifically critical race theorists—have paid the most attention to these harms, in part because 
of their aim to make legal cases for actionable torts and the prohibition of certain forms of hate 
speech. These harms are not so much neglected by philosophers writing on subordinating speech 
as they are underemphasized and underexplored. Overall, philosophers pay greater attention to 
harms that are inflicted in the performance of the speech act itself—those that comprise the 
illocutionary act. McGowan makes this shift in focus away from causal harms explicit when 
describing her approach to oppressive speech: “rather than focus on what a certain category of 
speech causes,” she writes, “I am interested in what such speech actually does, in and of itself” 
(2009, 389–90).36 
Whereas the causal harms can be thought to follow from the speech acts, the illocutionary 
harms are claimed to be the more direct, less contingent result of the utterance. That is, while it is 
certainly true that by saying “Jews will not replace us!” a pack of marching white supremacists 
can cause the fear, heightened anxiety, and raised blood pressure of their Jewish (and non-
Jewish) onlookers, it is a further and distinct fact that in saying these words the speakers do 
many other things.37 Some conceivable examples include: they rank Jewish people as inferior; 
they discriminate on the basis of ethnic/religious identity; and they might even subordinate 
 
36 Similarly, Langton notes the following when discussing the central focus of the anti-pornography ordinance that 
partly inspired her work: “It was about a harm enacted by pornography as a speech act, an ‘illocutionary’ act, in 
terms introduced by J.L. Austin— a harm distinct from its content, as ‘locutionary’ act, and its effects, as 
‘perlocutionary’ act. The claim was that pornography can enact harm— just as an oppressive law can enact harm” 
(2017, 24). 
37 The distinction between acts performed by saying X and those performed in saying X is first laid out, as a helpful 
heuristic device, by Austin (1962). 
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through their words. Plausibly, through their utterance they also silence, terrorize, demean, 
debase, debilitate, degrade, assault, and so on. Beyond that, other, similar utterances might 
ridicule, humiliate, exclude, outgroup, disrespect, and much more.38  
All the above verbs are meant to identify different illocutionary acts that are enacted in 
saying certain words in particular circumstances. They identify speech acts that, even though 
they often imply future downstream consequences, are not dependent on harmful future effects 
for being acts of harm themselves. Therefore, the illocutionary harm is identified with what the 
speech act constitutes, rather than what it causes, recalling the distinction made earlier.39 In other 
words, when the utterance itself constitutes a harmful act, it is a harm, whether or not it also 
causes further physical or psychological harms. 
Take, for instance, threats. Above I examined some of the common psychological effects 
of being repeatedly targeted by racist hate speech, which some consider threats. And yet, each 
individual instance of a threat might not result in any of these harms. Perhaps the target might 
have so-called thick skin, or perhaps the details of the situation render the speaker less imposing 
than they might otherwise be. A lone, elderly white man targeting his hate speech at a large 
group of younger gay men might not succeed in making his audience feel threatened at all, and 
thus they likely won’t incur the psychological costs described above. 
There is nonetheless a difference between feeling threatened, and being threatened—or, 
more precisely, between being threatened and experiencing the usual negative psychological 
effects of being threatened. And just because an individual might not experience any specific 
 
38 I go into greater detail about the sheer variety of subordinating speech acts, including where they overlap and 
reinforce one another, in Chapter Three. 
39 This is so even while most writers on this topic acknowledge some inevitable overlap and ambiguity between 
what is caused and what is constituted. See, for example, McGowan (2009, 404–05). I go on to explore this tension 
in the following sections. At the moment I aim only to explain the central claims being made. 
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psychological harm in a given instance doesn’t mean we should conclude no harmful act was 
performed. To threaten someone is an illocutionary act, and it may be harmful irrespective of the 
possible causal harms discussed above. Like promises, threats fit into the category of illocutions 
that Austin labels “commissives.” These are speech acts that “commit the speaker to a certain 
course of action” (1962, 150–51). But Austin makes clear that their success as speech acts is 
independent from their success at predicting the future, like whether the speaker follows through 
with their promise or threat.40 Much like how it’s not necessary for me to actually carry out your 
commands for you to successfully order me, it’s not necessary for you to later assault me for you 
to successfully threaten me. 
This isn’t to say that every instance of a particular utterance constitutes a threat and 
therefore a harm. The context, or total speech situation, matters for identifying illocutionary acts, 
and plays a role in whether an utterance is a threat, and whether that threat is harmful. Even 
saying “I’m threatening you right now” wouldn’t always amount to a threat if it occurred during 
a play, for example. But like most speech acts, threats are not fixed solely by the audience’s 
reaction. This is not because those effects do not matter; far from it. Rather it is simply that they 
are not all that matters. The shift in normative landscape also matters, and this occurs largely via 
the utterance itself, and not solely because of any later effects. 
In what follows, I focus on the illocutionary acts of ‘enacting,’ ‘inciting,’ and ‘ranking.’ 
Enacting because it plays a particularly important role in McGowan’s account of subordinating 
speech, inciting as it has been the focus of many legal prohibitions on hate speech, and ranking 
because that is perhaps the fundamental speech act of subordination on this illocutionary 
 
40 This elides over a bit too quickly the important role that ‘uptake’ plays in fixing, even partly, what speech act was 
performed. For example, if I warn you to watch out for bears, but you think I’m joking and therefore don’t take it as 
a warning, was my utterance, in fact, a warning? I return to this issue below. 
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approach. Moreover, they each illustrate another of Austin’s categories of illocutions, in addition 
to ‘commissives’ discussed above; namely, ‘exercitives’ and ‘verdictives.’41 
 
2.2.1. Exercitives: Enacting oppressive rules 
 
In a series of articles, McGowan argues that speech can itself “enact” discriminatory 
rules, and hence oppression. Moreover, she claims that speech act theory helpfully reveals this 
illocutionary aspect of (some) racist and sexist utterances (McGowan 2003; 2004; 2009; 2012). 
Her account explores and expands the type of speech act Austin named “exercitives.” The 
defining feature of an exercitive is that it “enacts permissibility facts” (McGowan 2009, 392)—
which we might also call ‘rules’ or ‘norms.’ 
Examples of exercitives are easy to come by, especially in relationships where some form 
of hierarchy is present. A parent, for example, telling their child “no more games before you 
finish your homework,” enacts the fact that it is now impermissible for the child to play any 
further games until they finish their homework. When the boss announces that “any employee 
who leaves before the store is clean will be fired” enacts the new permissibility facts that it is 
impermissible for the employees to leave early, as well as the fact that it is now permissible for 
the boss to fire anyone who does.42  
 
41 Along with those mentioned above, ‘silencing’ has also received special attention in the literature, particularly 
within feminist literature about the harms of pornography. This literature—too vast to summarize here—begins with 
MacKinnon’s observation that there are “words that set conditions” for other speech act’s success (1993, 63–68). 
That is, there are “some kinds of speech [that] can set the conditions for other kinds of speech: they make some 
speech acts possible for some, and impossible for others” (Hornsby and Langton 1998, 27). Pornography, they go on 
to argue, does just this, and inhibits the speech of women. That is to say, “pornographic speech acts help create a 
communicative climate in which the felicity conditions for some of women’s speech are not met” (ibid.). 
42 It is important to note that these are not (necessarily) legal or moral permissibility facts, but rather more local and 
context-dependent facts. 
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McGowan adds that if the rules that are newly enacted through an exercitive are 
themselves discriminatory rules, then that speech act constitutes an act of discrimination. And if 
it is discrimination on the basis of race, then utterance is an act of racial discrimination. As such, 
when a Black man steps onto a bus filled with only white people, and a white man utters: “Turn 
around boy, you’re not welcome here,” that man enacts the (local) rule that the Black man is not 
permitted on the bus—or at least he tries to.43  
What some racist speech does, then, is functionally identical to what a “whites only” sign 
hung up in a business does, making it impermissible for people of color to get service at this 
particular business.44 And since the latter is an illegal act of racial discrimination, so is—or at 
least might be—the former (McGowan 2012, 136–38). And since racial discrimination is one 
aspect of broader systems of racist oppression, McGowan concludes that “speech oppresses in 
virtue of enacting permissibility facts (that oppress)” (2009, 392).45 
In Chapter Three, I will argue that this approach mischaracterizes the majority of 
subordinating speech. Here, I only want to emphasize how it is important for McGowan that the 
harm she identifies is not caused by speech but is instead constituted by it. It matters because 
McGowan says that looking to what some speech is—what harmful act it constitutes—triggers a 
different type of evaluation than assessing the potential harms it might cause. In the latter case, 
the question becomes whether the benefits of permitting such speech might outweigh the harms 
that it causes. Here we weigh the pros and cons of regulation. For example, in many nations the 
 
43 Adapted from McGowan (2012). 
44 It is worth restating that these permissibility facts need not be moral or legal permissibility facts. They can be 
more local. In this case, what is newly impermissible might be for the employees to serve people of color without 
sanction from the owner. 
45 It is worth noting how McGowan puts things in even stronger terms, singling out the exercitive as the illocution of 
all oppressive speech acts. As she puts it, “[s]ince oppressive speech enacts permissibility facts (that oppress), 
speech must be exercitive in order for it to be an act of oppression” (2008, 392). In Chapter Three I argue against 
this view of subordinating speech, when I go into McGowan’s view in more detail. 
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harms of defamatory speech—as well as the harms incurred by regulating it—are thought to 
outweigh the benefits of permitting this speech, and so the legal prohibition of defamation is 
thought justified. But things might be different—or so some claim, at least—for something like 
racist hate speech, where the cost-benefit analysis may go the other way.46 A focus on causal 
harms leads to the issue of balancing harms and benefits, and this, McGowan argues, leads to an 
impasse in the debate over hate speech (2009, 389; 2012, 122).  
She aims to avoid this impasse by focussing on what harmful speech constitutes. 
Classifying speech according to what it constitutes, she claims, enables potential legal 
regulations that would be more difficult within a strictly causal account. Thus, McGowan 
believes that examining the specifically illocutionary aspect of subordinating speech reveals 
harms—like racial discrimination—that open up new avenues of understanding and is crucial in 
developing strategies for how to confront and counter these harms.  
Below I will present reasons for skepticism about the viability of this approach. As I see 
it, the attempt to draw such a sharp line between the illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of 
subordinating speech acts is both conceptually impossible and strategically unwise. We cannot 
carve off the effects of racist speech and hope to focus solely on the act they constitute. The two 
are inextricably linked. I believe this becomes apparent when we take a closer look at the claim 
that some speech constitutes harmful acts and put this alongside descriptions of the 
perlocutionary effects of subordinating speech. I continue to explore these ideas throughout 
section 2, before turning to criticism in section 3. 
 
 
46 One example is Andrew Altman (2012), who argues that the laws prohibiting Holocaust denial and other anti-
Semitic language sweep too broadly, potentially including some of Kant’s racist writing. And, he argues, this show 
that these laws are currently unjustified. 
40 
2.2.2. Incitement as an illocutionary act 
 
The idea of classifying speech according to what act it constitutes in effort to potentially 
regulate certain types of speech is not new. In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argued that “even 
speech” ought to be constrained when its utterance constitutes “a positive instigation to some 
mischievous act.” They go on: 
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, 
ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur 
punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a 
corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard. (1859, 
Chapter Three, paragraph 1) 
 
The claim here is that the type of act being performed when making an utterance can depend on 
its context. The very same content—that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor—is in one case a 
mere expression of an opinion, and in another an incitement to violence. In noting this 
difference, Mill are acknowledging the role of context in fixing what act is being performed by 
an utterance. In each case, the very same words are uttered, but very different speech acts are 
performed. And crucially, the latter “may justly incur punishment” because of what act it is, 
while the former ought to always be immune from such punishment—at least by their lights.47 
Daniel Jacobson makes this point explicit when, in discussing how speech act theory can 
assist Mill in making this distinction, he notes that “the conception of incitement as an 
illocutionary act [may] help provide the subtler understanding necessary to distinguish speech 
that is probably harmful from that which positively incites” (1995, 71–72). That is, while some 
statements—for example, that private property is theft, or that there is no god—may still 
eventually lead to harm and violence when merely circulated through the press, it is only when 
 
47 A similar point lies at the heart of the 'fighting words' doctrine in the limits of US free speech laws.  
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such statements themselves constitute an act of incitement that prohibition or punishment is 
legitimate.48 
And, like Jacobson does for Mill, Langton suggests speech act theory can help make 
sense of the underlying thought in the United Nation’s prohibition embedded in its Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Article 7 states that everyone is “entitled to equal protection 
against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such 
discrimination” (Universal Declaration, emphasis added).49 And while here it is incitement to 
discrimination—rather than violence—that is at issue, Langton claims it is nonetheless 
incitement as an illocutionary act that is positioned as deserving of special attention and possible 
prohibition.50  
The intended target of such a prohibition include historical examples like the Nazi 
propagandist Julius Streicher’s publication Der Stürmer, which contained anti-Semitic 
caricatures along with hateful calls to genocide, or anti-Tutsi broadcasts in the lead up to the 
Rwandan genocide, which likened the Tutsis to snakes and cockroaches.51 More proximate 
examples include the rise of anti-Muslim messaging in post-9/11 US52—up to and including the 
 
48 It is worth noting that Hornsby and Langton disagree with this assessment of Mill and go on to claim that the 
incitement Mill has in mind here is properly distinguished as a perlocutionary effect of certain speech (1998). 
Nevertheless, in later work, Langton highlights ‘incitement’ as one harmful illocutionary aspect of hate propaganda 
(2012), and so she agrees with my broader point, that incitement is, at least sometimes, an illocutionary act. 
49 For more on the illocutionary dimension of the Universal Declaration's prohibition on certain speech, see Altman 
(2012), and for a similar analysis of the UN's International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, see Langton (2012). 
50 That such a prohibition on incitement can sit comfortably alongside a robust freedom of opinion and expression—
at least according to the Universal Declaration’s Article 19—suggests that it is the illocutionary act, and not the 
locutionary content, that is under suspicion. Holocaust denial is, perhaps, a special case, however. As this is one 
‘opinion’ whose mere expression has been deemed worthy of criminal prohibition in many states. And yet, it is 
worth noting that the discussion of the beliefs and claims of Holocaust deniers is not banned. And this suggest that it 
is still nonetheless a type of illocution—assertion—that is claimed to amount to incitement, rather than say, 
reporting. See Waldron (2012) for the claim that, in most cases, the content of the utterances that he believes ought 
to be prohibited could nonetheless still be expressed, though with less invective language. 
51 See Tirrell (2012) for analysis of the role of language in the Rwandan genocide. 
52 Waldron (2012) contains many examples and discussion of anti-Muslim hate speech in contemporary US society. 
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present—and many of Donald Trump’s now-infamous remarks concerning Mexican and South 
American immigrants.53  
The idea behind such special concern for these types of utterances is that speech that 
constitutes incitement to violence and/or discrimination—especially racial or religious violence 
and discrimination—is outside the bounds of what a just society should tolerate. It is beyond the 
pale. And it is beyond the pale because of what it is and what it does. As Langton writes: 
It [racist hate speech] promotes racial hatred and discrimination—‘promotes’ in a causal 
sense. It also incites racial discrimination and hatred, and promotes racial hatred and 
discrimination—‘promotes’ in an advocacy sense.… So hate speech ‘promotes’ hatred in 
both illocutionary and perlocutionary ways: it advocates and causes hatred. (2012, 75–76) 
 
While Langton’s conception of hate speech has both a constitutive, as well as causal dimension, 
it is primarily the constitutive—illocutionary—dimension that Langton addresses in her analysis. 
On this analysis, attention to the illocutionary act embodied by these utterances reveals how they 
perform the act of rendering a verdict of inferiority and/or suspicion about some group(s), and 
calling for violence based on retribution, revenge, or deluded sense of self-protection.54 Seen in 
this way, the speech act is what Austin labels a ‘verdictive,’ that is, the act of rendering a 
judgment. And is it this feature of the speech that Langton suggest renders it harmful and open to 
regulation.  
It is worth pausing to note that here the focus is mainly on hate speech as it functions as 
propaganda, rather than hate speech as it functions as an assault.55 In this capacity, its ‘targets’ 
 
53 In announcing his candidacy, Trump said, “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re 
not sending you. They’re not sending you. [sic] They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re 
bringing those problems with us [sic]. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I 
assume, are good people.” See Washington Post (2016) for the full remarks. Saul (2018a) discusses some of the 
hateful rhetoric of Trump’s campaign. 
54 The importance of the notion of “white genocide” for white supremacist groups highlights this last feature well, in 
my opinion. 
55 Langton (2012) acknowledges this is her focus and refers her readers to the work of Matsuda (1993) for an 
account of hate speech as assault. This represents the tendency I alluded to above, where philosophers tend to 
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are not only the racial minorities whom it disparages, but also members of the same racial/ethnic 
group as the speaker. Indeed, this might be considered its primary audience. Much like how the 
corn-dealers are not themselves the main intended audience in Mill’s example, this type of racist 
hate propaganda is perhaps best understood as ingroup speech. In this capacity, it looks to spread 
its message to like-minded and potentially sympathetic ingroup members. This sort of incitement 
may thus be seen as acts of outreach and advocacy. Jeremy Waldron suggests the implicit 
message of this type of ingroup hate speech consist in something like the following:  
We know some of you agree that these people are not wanted here. We know that some 
of you feel that they are dirty (or dangerous or criminal or terrorist). Know now that you 
are not alone. Whatever the government says, there are enough of us around to make sure 
these people are not welcome. There are enough of us around to draw attention to what 
these people are really like. Talk to your neighbors, talk to your customers. And above 
all, don’t let any more of them in. (2012, 2–3) 
 
This clarifies the underlying idea of speech as an act of incitement, spelled out explicitly. 
It both passes judgment and calls on others to action. While these two components of the speech 
act are related in a direct way to downstream acts they bring forth—whether this is exclusion, 
discrimination, violence, or even genocide—Langton stresses how this emerges from the act 
being performed immediately. “The effects are there,” she says, “because of what hate speech is, 
as an illocutionary act: it incites hatred” (2012, 76). This is implicit in her analysis of the South 
African legislator’s speech, considered above. As she puts it, it is because the legislator’s speech 
constitutes an illocutionary act of ranking and legitimating that Black South Africans later suffer 
further discriminatory abuses. But rather than mere cause and effect, she urges us to see the 
effects as the result of the enactment of a status, something performed in the illocutionary act. 
 
acknowledge the causal harms of hate speech, but don’t themselves engage in much analysis of this aspect of 
subordinating speech. Chapter Two takes up the speech act approach to ‘assaultive’ hate speech, which similarly 
centers on verdictives. 
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The above analysis provides part of the story of the harm found in the illocutionary act. 
And while it is helpful at first to consider how ingroup members are the primary audience for 
this type of hate propaganda, it is crucial to examine how the outgroups members receive this 
speech. I go on to do so now as I continue to explore the illocutionary dimension of the harm of 
subordinating speech, all with an eye to later demonstrate the limitations of this approach. 
 
2.2.3. Verdictives: Ranking as inferior 
 
Though they aren’t the immediate audience of the type of ingroup hateful speech 
considered above, people of color, immigrants, women, etc., are not simply on the sidelines, 
unaffected by this speech until it spills over into the realm of ‘action.’56 In addition to the 
potential incitement of ingroup members, hate propaganda also often has an immediate impact 
on its indirect audience—e.g., the outgroup members it demonizes and degrades. 
To say that speech incites hatred is, in part, to say that it directly contributes to a climate 
where racist hatred is more pervasive and vibrant. It does so even if no one in its intended 
audience acts any differently as a result,57 but through how it alters “the permanent visible fabric 
of society” (Waldron 2014, 3). And, according to advocates of the illocutionary model, one way 
to understand how it accomplishes this is by seeing these speech acts as verdictives, whose force 
is that of an authoritative judgment. 
The description of these utterances as “authoritative judgments” might arouse suspicion 
where the speakers are not themselves in any recognizable position of authority—and so, unlike 
 
56 One salutary aspect of speech act theory is how it breaks down speech-action binaries. This is one reason I adopt 
the terms of speech act theory while also criticizing some conceptions of them. 
57 Though, it is worth noting, that this is unlikely as an empirical assessment of the effects of hate propaganda. 
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the legislator case. In these cases, the thought might be: aren’t these speakers just hapless bigots, 
whose own low-status renders their speech more embarrassing than menacing? To be sure, 
verdictives do standardly require the speaker to occupy some position of authority. To call the 
runner ‘safe,’ the speaker must be an umpire, and shouts from the crowd have no impact on the 
score of the game.  
This objection to the force of subordinating speech is called the Authority Problem, and I 
take it up in more detail in Chapter Two. Here I simply want to note how it would be a mistake 
to think ‘ordinary’ hate speakers have no impact on the lives of the people their utterances target, 
even if it is ‘low speech,’ more like shouts from the crowd then the umpire’s official judgment. 
Unlike in baseball, where the game operates separately from the crowd, when you live among 
the crowd—just as marginalized people live alongside the dominant—the words and judgments 
of these speakers do have real impact. 
We see this best when we consider how members of the group(s) targeted by such speech 
might take up these speech acts. Even if they are not its direct intended audience, they are still 
likely to encounter these messages—indeed, it’s likely that propagandists count on this. First, 
there is the expressed message plausibly received by the members of minority groups attacked by 
such speech, which Waldron summarizes as: 
Don’t be fooled into thinking you are welcome here. The society around you may seem 
hospitable and nondiscriminatory, but the truth is that you are not wanted, and you and 
your families will be shunned, excluded, beaten, and driven out, whenever we can get 
away with it. We may have to keep a low profile right now. But don’t get too 
comfortable. Remember what has happened to you and your kind in the past. Be afraid. 
(2012, 2) 
 
If left unaddressed by the wider society, according to Waldron, the overall effect of these 
utterances is the disintegration of whatever formal and informal assurances of inclusion the 
wider (putatively egalitarian) community endorses. Without these assurances, minority 
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communities cannot exist as equals alongside the other members of society. And, for Waldron, 
this corrosive, undermining aspect of hate speech is what reasonably grounds legal prohibitions 
on such speech for nations committed to the equal dignity of all its members (Waldron 2012, esp. 
Chapters Three and Four). And for speech act theorists like Langton, it is in understanding hate 
propaganda as an illocutionary act—one that advocates, promotes, and incites hatred—that 
reveals how speech acts like these function to immediately and directly marginalize members of 
the targeted groups. This is what these utterances do, constitutively. They are a direct attack on 
the dignity of the members of oppressed groups. 
Langton clarifies this issue concerning the illocution of legitimating, also a verdictive act, 
not too dissimilar from incitement. She acknowledges that “one effect of legitimating something 
is that people believe it is legitimate.” But, she adds, “they believe it is legitimate because it has 
been legitimated, not vice versa” (1993, 303). That is, their beliefs are to be explained by the fact 
that certain behavior has “indeed been made legitimate in that particular arena of activity” 
(ibid.).58 This is so, because “the illocutionary act of legitimating something is to be 
distinguished from the perlocutionary act of making people believe that something is legitimate” 
(ibid.).59  
 
58 Those last few words are crucial, as this is a claim relative to a particular domain, one that itself may not 
ultimately be legitimate. As she adds in the immediately following, “there may still be some perspective outside that 
arena from which one can say that discriminatory behavior is never truly legitimate” (Langton 1993, 303). 
59 Langton further clarifies her views on this in later work by appealing to how she understands the difference 
between ‘score’ and ‘common ground,’ when she writes: “What Lewis sees as two ways of understanding the score, 
we can see as complementary. We need both. A change in attitudes is a downstream effect of what is done with a 
ball, or with words, in the ‘game’ itself. Aiming to fulfill certain regulative rules (about winning the game), the 
batter scores a home run, as defined by certain constitutive rules (about what counts as a home run). As Lewis puts 
it, the score ‘straightway’ changes— which means at that very time. The attitudes ‘in many heads’ change thereafter, 
as a causal consequence. The home run is comparable to an illocutionary speech act; the attitudes to some especially 
salient perlocutionary acts. Score tracks illocutionary acts (inter alia). Common ground tracks (some) perlocutionary 
acts. To identify normative score with psychological common ground would be to risk psychologism.” (Langton 
2018a). 
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According to advocates of this model, then, it is by looking at the illocutionary aspect of 
this speech that best reveals a distinct and important harm of hate speech. This contrasts with 
attention to either its locutionary content, which doesn’t tell us enough about how these words 
are being put to use, or its perlocutionary effects, which is not specific enough, as it plausibly 
includes not only increased racial hatred in some audience members, but also indignation and 
outrage in others. For Langton and McGowan, concentrating on the illocutionary dimension 
helps to both narrow the focus and draw attention to what matters most in evaluation these 
speech acts. And to be sure, their work does indeed uncover significant dimensions of the harm 
of subordinating speech.  
As this approach rightly reveals, it’s a mistake to consider hate speech solely in terms of 
offering a disembodied message that competes with legal assurances of inclusivity that some 
audience members come to believe, and others reject.60 To do so uncritically neglects the roles 
that context, power, and authority all contribute to the harms of hate speech. I explore the topic 
of speaker authority more fully in the next chapter. But even when bracketing the impact of 
speaker authority on the harms of subordinating speech there is no shortage of harms attributable 
to hate speech as an illocutionary act. These are utterances of exclusion. They defame their 
targets as criminals and/or terrorists,61 exploiting the ambiguity of generics.62  
 
60 And this assumes these assurances even exist; often they do not. Examples of the lack of even formal, legal 
assurances of equal status abound. From laws against same-sex marriage, to failures to recognize the existence of 
transgender people, as well as the brunt faced by undocumented persons who are literally smeared with the term 
‘illegals.’ 
61 For Waldron, understanding hate speech as a type of group-defamation or libel provides compelling reasons to 
justify legal prohibitions on such speech. See Waldron (2012). 
62 In recent work, Langton offers a helpful explanation of the power of hate speech (and other forms of speech) to 
harm even without authority. She writes: “Hate speech might wound without authority, because other factors 
contribute to its force: the oppressive history of slurs, and the power of words to invoke and retrieve that history; the 
‘truthiness’ of danger and conspiracy claims, got from a seeming-truth of the content, not the seeming-
trustworthiness of the speaker; the attention-grabbing, evidence-resisting power of lurid rumours, whatever their 
source; the word-transcending power of graphic images to shape attitudes; the ambiguity of unquantified generics, 
reifying danger or inferiority, tarring too many with a too-sweeping brush. Hate speech may work to alter perception 
48 
Yet, as I will argue below, in drawing such a sharp contrast between illocution and 
perlocution—and thus, between causing and constituting harm—Langton and others commit two 
related errors. First, they tie the success of their accounts to the plausibility of such a sharp 
distinction, which as I will argue is unfounded. Second, and more significantly in my mind, they 
restrict the analysis of subordinating speech in such a way that it fails to do justice to the actual 
phenomena under investigation. The first step I make towards making this argument more 
plausible is to describe my third area of harm—those that occur at the structural level. 
 
2.3. Unjust Structural Relations 
  
There is another area of harm that is not captured in the above two. Beyond the 
psychological harm that sees hate speech as akin to direct assault, and in addition to the 
illocutionary harms that impact the targets of subordinating speech even when these causal 
harms are absent, there is the harm done to the broader society. That is, there is a harm done to 
the members of the entire groups targeted by subordinating speech, rather than just those 
members who happen to be (part of) the speech’s audience. 
This third area of harm is not fully distinct from the other two, since it serves as a 
precondition for the precise types of harms the other two areas aim to describe. That is, the 
psychological harms of racist hate speech are importantly distinct from the psychological harms 
that may result from similar speech, such as non-racist verbal bullying, which may overlap in 
many ways with racist speech.63 The psychological harms caused by hate speech, such as 
 
itself, so that we literally come to see our fellows as dehumanized or animal-like, literally hear them as shifty, 
contemptible, or dangerous. Unlike the law, the harm in hate speech dwells partly in factors independent of its 
authority” (Langton 2018a). 
63 See Kumashiro (2018) for an analysis of when these overlap. 
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feelings of fear and vulnerability, have unique features when what one (reasonably) fears is 
assault from a racist society, rather than from specific, known individuals, as is typical in 
bullying. Moreover, since McGowan's claim is that some speech constitutes the enactment of 
oppressive discriminatory permissibility facts, she takes it as a given that for this to be so, “an 
unjust social arrangement is nevertheless required” (2009, 391). In this way, both the (causal) 
psychological harms and the (constitutive) illocutionary harms discussed above implicate wider 
systems of oppression. In other words, they each get part of their force as harms from 
background injustice, and so a complete understanding of either would require an analysis of 
oppression (McGowan makes this point explicit, see 2009, 398ff). 
This section offers a brief, incomplete sketch of such an account—a complete account is, 
of course, well beyond the scope of this project. In addition to this sketch, the other main goal of 
this section is to fill in further details about how subordinating speech contributes to unjust 
hierarchical relations between social groups—that is, how speech contributes to oppression. 
 
2.3.1. Oppression and oppressive speech 
 
While the literature on the features, mechanisms, contours, and experiences of oppression 
is expansive, here I intend only to draw out two common themes. First is the fact that oppression 
affects individuals as members of identifiable social groups. As Marilyn Frye remarks in her 
classic essay on the topic: “One is marked for application of oppressive pressures by one’s 
membership in some group or category. Much of one’s suffering and frustration befalls one 
partly or largely because one is a member of that category” (1983, 15–16). This is evident in the 
examples considered above. Racist hate speech impacts members of marginalized racial groups 
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as members of those groups. It is virtue of a perceived identity that hate speakers select their 
targets.64 
Similarly, the importance of group membership is evident in the cases of propaganda 
described above. It is obvious how Nazi propaganda targeted Jewish people as Jewish people 
and how anti-Tutsi propaganda singled out Tutsis as deserving denigration. Acknowledging this 
amounts to a truism about these forms of dehumanizing propaganda: it targets a group or several 
groups in order to increase animosity towards those groups. Without a social group to disparage, 
it would be a different form of propaganda altogether—if we even consider this type of speech 
propaganda anymore.65 The importance of group membership, then, and in particular the visible 
markers of group membership, must be kept in view in any coherent account of the harms of 
oppression, including oppressive speech. 
The other common element of analyses of oppression I wish to bring out is its structural 
nature. Again, it is impossible to do justice to the richness and variety of the existing literature. 
For my purposes, though, what is crucial to bring out is the necessity to conceptualize oppression 
at the macro-level, in addition to detailing its micro-level harms. While individual instances of 
violent hate crimes, flagrant sexist discrimination, or angry racist tirades are micro-level 
instantiation of oppression—its most visible, blunt instruments—it is in virtue of how these 
micro-level harms and constraints systematically connect into “networks of forces and barriers” 
 
64 I say “perceived” here because hate speakers occasionally read their target’s identity incorrectly—mistakenly 
shouting anti-Muslim content at Sikhs is a common case in North America—and yet it is still true that they targeted 
that individual in virtue of group-membership. 
65 At this point, I am agnostic as to whether propaganda that does not serve to disparage any group is still 
propaganda, or whether it is something else entirely. Environmentalist propaganda might be an example here, but I 
do not wade into this issue. My reasons are mainly to sidestep thorny questions about the proper definition of 
propaganda in order to focus on the uncontroversial cases. Moreover, since my aim in this chapter is to describe the 
varied harms of subordinating speech, I believe it is reasonable to put aside propaganda that plausibly does not harm 
(as it does not target) any social group. 
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that oppression becomes the pervasive an all-encompassing injustice that it is (Frye 1983, 3).66 
What’s more, it is important to recognize that there is not one system of oppression—say, class 
oppression, as the caricature of Marxism goes—that lies at the foundation of all experiences of 
oppression, but rather there are many, which combine and interlock in myriad of ways. As 
Patricia Hill Collins et al explain: 
the notion of interlocking oppressions refers to the macro-level connections linking 
systems of oppression such as race, class, and gender. This is the model describing the 
social structures that create social positions. [Furthermore,] the notion of intersectionality 
describes micro-level processes—namely, how each individual and group occupies a 
social position within interlocking structures of oppression described by the metaphor of 
intersectionality. Together they shape oppression. (Collins et al. 2002, 82) 
 
Iris Marion Young makes a similar, though distinct point when she offers a “plural 
explication of the concept of oppression” in Justice and the Politics of Difference (2011). As she 
argues, oppression is not capturable by any set of necessary and sufficient conditions. That is, 
there is no universal experience of oppression that properly picks out all genuinely oppressed 
people. The oppressive forces that shape the lives of Black people in the US, Palestinians in 
Gaza, Indigenous Peoples worldwide, and many more oppressed groups are importantly 
different, though still related. For Young, a social group is oppressed if its members routinely 
experience any one of what she calls the “five faces of oppression”—exploitation, 
marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.  
In identifying these five systemic practices as being constitutive of oppression, Young 
pulls the focus away from individual, hateful events—like lynchings—as being the hallmarks of 
oppression. While it is no doubt true that many instances of oppressive acts are the direct result 
of someone acting from a hateful motive, Young aims to draw attention to the pervasive and 
 
66 Frye’s famous birdcage metaphor is a useful illustration of the interrelation between these two levels. For more 
contemporary accounts, see Cudd (2006); Haslanger (2012; 2015); and Zheng (2018). 
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everyday oppressive practices that have their causes in “unquestioned norms, habits, and 
symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of 
following those rules” (2011, 41).67 Immense social problems like systemic economic 
exploitation, pervasive homelessness, and the marginalization of many peoples’ cultures are 
often the cumulative effects of countless smaller decisions and actions. According to Young, we 
see these best when our eye is on the structural patterns that are the result of seemingly 
innocuous transactions. 
My purpose in highlighting the two above features of oppression—the group condition, 
and the structural condition—is to bring out something that I believe is elided over in much of 
the subordinating speech literature. This is the pair of facts that, first, oppression manifests in 
myriad and varied ways and therefore is irreducible to any set of core features that could 
adequately capture every instance, so we are better off looking toward the structural constraints. 
And second, that the individuals targeted for subordinating speech are harmed as members of 
oppressed groups, and this has important consequences for all other members of these groups.  
Without disputing the importance of the harms brought out by the previous two 
categories already explored, my claim is that many further relevant harms like stereotyping, 
objectification, Young’s cultural imperialism, and more are not adequately captured by a focus 




67 As Young defines it: "structural oppression refers to the vast and deep injustice some groups suffer as a 
consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions, media 
and cultural stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms—in short, the 
normal procedures of everyday life” (41). 
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2.3.2. Social inequality and language: An expansive view 
 
In her description of the harms of subordinating speech, MacKinnon writes, “[a]ll the 
harms of [racist propaganda]—including stereotyping, objectification, deprivation of human 
dignity, targeting for violence, and terrorization of target groups—are harms of social inequality” 
(1995, 301). To this, she adds that social inequality:  
is substantially created and enforced, that is, done, through words and images. Social 
hierarchy cannot and does not exist without being embodied in meaning and expressed in 
communications. […] Segregation cannot happen without someone saying ‘get out’ or 
‘you don’t belong here’ at some point. Elevation and denigration are all accomplished 
through meaningful symbols and communicative acts, in which saying it is doing it. (307) 
 
What MacKinnon is here calling social inequality is what I am identifying as the third area of 
harm in my analysis of subordinating speech: its role in shaping the unjust group-based 
hierarchies that partially shape oppression. This area, I claim, has a much wider scope than what 
is plausibly captured by the attention given to the illocutionary force of subordinating speech acts 
by philosophers of language.  
To be clear, as I see it, illocution is a useful analytical category for describing the force 
and immediate impact of many cases of subordinating speech. Chanting “Jews will not replace 
us,” broadcasting “All Tutsi are snakes and must be eliminated” on the radio, and posting “We 
don’t serve Muslims” in a business are all helpfully seen as words that do something in the here 
and now, and illocution aims to capture that. However, if we are to fully capture the role that 
words, speech, and language play in enabling and sustaining oppression, we must broaden our 
focus beyond illocution.  
Harms arising from speech acts that are less immediate than threats or incitements can 
and do play crucial roles in setting the stage for the oppressive practices elaborated by Young 
and others. Not all of these are captured by illocutionary acts, and this is for good reason, as 
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illocution is meant to isolate the act performed in making certain utterances in certain contexts—
that is, how “I do” becomes the act of marrying in certain context. Less immediate outcomes, 
even if they are foreseen, are standardly lumped into the perlocutionary, which comprises all the 
varied outcomes the speech act helped bring about. So, while marrying is illocutionary act, 
everything from upsetting your in-laws to making your parents cry are (some of) the 
perlocutionary effects of “I do”; so the example standardly goes.  
Illocution is useful when the goal is to isolate the performative force attributable to just 
the speech act, absent any further contingent contributions. Yet, in the analysis of oppression and 
oppressive speech, our aim shouldn’t be limited to detailing the direct acts constituted by certain 
utterances, as much more deserves our attention. This is demonstrated by the expansive way in 
which the oppressive force of language is described by writers working outside of the narrow 
Austinean framework.  
For example, in her chapter titled “Language,” bell hooks reflects on a poem by Adrienne 
Rich with the repeated line, “This is the oppressor’s language, but I need it to talk to you.” hooks 
goes on to say “I know that it is not the English language that hurts me, but what the oppressors 
do with it, how they shape it to become a territory that limits and defines, how they make it a 
weapon that can shame, humiliate, colonize” (hooks 1994, 168). She goes on to describe various 
ways in which language can have an unseen repressive force—such as the denigration of African 
American English Vernacular (AAVE), including its near total absence in academic circles. 
Relatedly, there is Frantz Fanon’s remark that,  
If a man who speaks pidgin to a man of color or an Arab does not see anything wrong or 
evil in such behavior, it is because he has never stopped to think. […] To speak to black 




Philosophers of language concerned with the social and political dimensions of speech 
ought to resist frameworks that unduly restrict their focus, or risk losing sight of relevant 
phenomena. Because, when we ignore these broader aspects of the oppressive force of language, 
what we’re left with is an impoverished understanding of reality. By marginalizing the ways in 
which language contributes to oppression, though only with further extra-linguistic support, the 
accounts of subordinating speech remain overly abstract. Moreover, seeing these cases as 
marginal misunderstands the importance language plays in these broader systems of oppression 
and relies on a division between speech and actions that ought to be more fully rejected, 
particularly by speech act theorists. 
 
2.3.3. Speech and action 
 
In my view, oppressive speech and oppressive acts are not separate practices best 
analyzed apart from each other but inform one another as together they constitute the realities of 
oppression, both in its abstract linguistic, as well as in its brute, material forms. In this respect I 
believe I am following MacKinnon, who argues: 
Together with all the material supports for inequality, authoritatively saying someone is 
inferior is largely how structures of status and differential treatment are demarcated and 
actualized. Words and images, are how people are placed in hierarchies, in castes. They 
are the way social stratification is made to seem inevitable and right, how feelings of 
inferiority and superiority are engendered, how indifference to violence against those on 
the bottom of these hierarchies is rationalized and made to seem normal. (1995, 309)  
 
As I understand MacKinnon’s view, this is not to ascribe any mysterious powers to language for 
its ability to subordinate and harm. Rather, it describes a reciprocal relationship between the 
words and images used for and to oppressed groups and the non-linguistic oppressive practices 
they inform and rationalize. As she points out, this includes practices that silence the voices of 
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marginalized people, rendering their suffering invisible, while the ‘burdens’ of their oppressors 
are at the same time given a privileged place in most political discourse.68 In this way, speech, 
words, and language both set the stage for violent oppressive acts, and also provide the lens 
through which these acts are interpreted. It is in this way civilian murder becomes ‘collateral 
damage.’  
Seeing this reciprocal relationship follows naturally from understanding oppression in 
structural terms, where the meaning of individual acts is revealed through attention to the 
broader practice of which it is a part. For this reason, it is imperative for philosophers concerned 
with the role of speech in oppression to acknowledge the situatedness of that speech in a broader 
system of oppression that includes many different types of acts. As Lederer and Delgado put it: 
“the purpose of hate speech is the subordination of one people by another,” and while the 
“mechanisms of this subordination are different in every case,” in any event, “they usually 
include a complex, interlocking series of acts, some physical, some verbal, some symbolic” 
(1995, 5). Isolating the linguistic aspect would serve only to separate one feature of 
subordination from its larger web.  
Violence, exploitation, material inequality, segregation and much more are the lived 
conditions of oppression. Philosophers concerned with how language enacts and maintains 
subordination ought to be concerned with these features, and their accounts of how speech 
oppresses ought to illuminate these conditions. However, as I argue below, the standard model of 
oppressive speech, which focuses on illocutionary aspect of utterances, is not up to the task of 
 
68 One striking example of this occurs in the way white male perpetrators of sexual assault are often viewed 
sympathetically and undeserving of any harsh punishment as it will leave too long-lasting a scar on an otherwise 
admirable life, while survivors are blamed for somehow bringing the assault on themselves. Kate Manne has 
recently given the name “himpathy” to this phenomenon (Manne 2017, Ch. 6). 
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illuminating the realities of subordinating speech. This is the case because these broad structural 
conditions most naturally fit among the perlocutionary effects. Yet, for the reasons elaborated 
above, Langton and McGowan are most invested in claiming oppression to be an illocutionary 
aspect of speech. In the next section I examine some problems this approach inevitably 
encounters and suggest that this general strategy is not as worthwhile as is assumed. 
 
3. AMBIGUITIES IN THE ILLOCUTIONARY 
 
Whether there exists a sharp line separating the illocutionary from the perlocutionary 
aspects of a speech act is a philosophically rich question. However, in what follows I want to 
bracket how this question might be addressed and answered in the case of non-subordinating 
speech acts. That is, I want to put aside what the right answer might be for morally-neutral 
utterances—if such a category even exists is a question I leave aside—and instead focus 
primarily on how this division plays out in specifically subordinating speech. While this 
approach has the potential drawback of allowing a lot of moral noise to interfere with our 
judgments about cases, I believe it makes up for this by keeping the relevant explanandum in 
view.  
This approach has the additional benefit, I believe, of avoiding some of the pitfalls that 
existing models encounter, where instances of oppressive speech are analogized to more routine 
discourse contexts where a coherent conversation with clear contours and participants is the 
paradigm. This shouldn’t be our starting point for analyzing subordinating speech, as it runs the 




3.1. The Indeterminacy of the Illocutionary 
 
Addressing the question of the (in)determinacy of the illocutionary act requires returning 
to the distinction between causal and constitutive notions of harmful speech. Looking here 
reveals a tension in how theorists who claim this is the primary mechanism through which 
speech subordinates understand the notion of illocutionary harm. As I noted above, these 
theorists suggest that the main harm of subordinating speech is more immediate than some 
downstream effects it might cause—hence the greater focus on the illocutionary act rather than 
(subsequent) perlocutionary effect. In other words, we need not wait and see if some hateful 
utterance later results in an oppressive act like gender-based violence, the speech itself is an act 
of subordination. 
At the same time, these theorists also hold that “speech can harm not just directly, such as 
by causing fear and anxiety in its targets, but also somewhat indirectly, by affecting the positions 
of groups to which those targets belong within the social hierarchy” (Maitra and McGowan 
2012, 7). That is, speech sometimes harms not by being the direct cause of psychological pains, 
but by indirectly fixing facts “about the distribution of social power, including facts about who 
has this power, and who lacks it” (ibid.). The classic example, discussed above, is that of a 
legislator declaring that members of a minority group no longer have the right to vote. In doing 
so, they make it the case that this group now loses a power they once had, and now comes to 
occupy an inferior position in the social hierarchy. And this is apart and quite distinct from 
speech harming directly by itself causing psychological distress of some sort. 
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In the combination of these two claims, however, a tension emerges.69 The illocutionary 
act is both the immediate act being done in saying those words; and it is also the act whose chief 
result is “somewhat indirect,” mediated by various institutions across time and space. To be 
clear, these two claims are not incompatible, but nor are they equivalent; and I will claim they 
pull in opposite directions. 
To start, I believe this is the result of two distinct notions of speech causing harm 
functioning as the contrast to speech constituting harm in each case. First is the idea that speech 
can cause harm by infecting the hearts and minds of (some of) its audience and uses a long-term 
notion of cause. For example, anti-Muslim hate speech, in its propagandistic mode, spreads out 
from the original speakers and is taken up by some who then act on its message in violent ways. 
This account of speech causing harm is the ‘mentally-mediated’ variety, where the mind referred 
to here is that of perpetrators of violence, who are themselves not the speakers nor the victims. 
The second account is the more direct causal variety, where speech can cause harm by 
immediately assaulting its target, most obviously by causing psychological distress like fear, 
anxiety, and much more. And while the full effects of the assault might take days, weeks, or a 
lifetime to fully manifest, the idea here is that the utterance functions as the moment of assault.70 
This is one idea of how speech causes harm, and it is the type of harm I surveyed in section 2.1.  
Both notions of speech causing harm are contrasted with the claim that speech itself 
constitutes a harmful—indeed oppressive—act. Compared to the first notion, the constitution 
view says speech can also harm immediately. And compared to the second notion, the 
 
69 It is worth noting how these different understandings may be due to the former view—the immediate harm—
coming most explicitly from Langton, while this latter approach—the indirect harm—coming from Maitra and 
McGowan. To be sure, the accounts offered by these three theorists are not interchangeable. Nonetheless I see a 
similar underlying commitment to the primacy of illocution in each, and so treat them similarly. 
70 See Tirrell (2017) for a conception of harmful speech as functioning like a toxin. And like toxins, there is 
variability in terms of how long a toxin may remain latent before its full effects are known. 
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constitution view says that speech can also harm indirectly, by fixing normative facts rather than 
like an assault on the physical person. 
I bring up these two contrasts to point out how, on the standard illocutionary framework, 
both causal notions are captured by the perlocutionary effects of a given speech act. This is the 
case because both are aspects of how speech can evince different “states of mind and behavior in 
ourselves and others” (Bauer 2015, 58). Both the immediate pangs of fear in the target of hate 
speech and the gradual solidification of hateful attitudes in the bigot fall in this category, and 
both are distinct from the normative change described by the illocutionary act.  
This wide breadth of the perlocutionary is no accident. It is, so to speak, a feature, not a 
bug. In Austin’s example of the one man saying “shoot her” to the other, the realm of the 
perlocutionary covers everything from the second man’s surprise at the first man’s utterance, his 
being persuaded to shoot, and the woman being shot. To this we might add her family’s grief, 
the trial for their crime, both men’s guilt, their imprisonment, and so on. While these effects are a 
motley crew, they are all distinct from the illocutionary act, namely, the first man’s advising that 
the second man shoot her.71 Seen in this way, it is obvious that the perlocutionary effects 
encompass a lot, while the illocutionary is intended to narrow our focus to the particular act 
inherent in the utterance itself.72  
This is a natural consequence of the Austinean picture, where the category of the 
perlocutionary is meant to “introduce the idea of extra-linguistic or incidental consequences of 
speaking—of, as it were, further things that are done for which the conventions attaching to 
 
71 Or was he ordering her? Even though illocution is relatively narrow, it is still open to difficult ambiguities. 
72 Though I say particular act, it need not be a singular act, and the idea that a single utterance can encompass a 
number of acts is not incompatible with the illocutionary being a narrow category. That is, speech act pluralism 
doesn’t threaten the main point I hope to be drawing out here. 
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forms of speech do not by themselves provide” (Hornsby and Langton 1998, 24). And it is this 
understanding of the (narrow) illocutionary act and the (expansive) perlocutionary effects that 
leads many speech act theorists—including Austin—to focus almost exclusively on illocution, 
which is considered more analyzable because of its relative constraint. But as I will begin go 
argue now, this leads to a faulty approach to subordinating speech. 
Let me begin with another example: I invite you to dinner. You are caught off-guard and 
refuse my invitation. I am embarrassed. Here, my invitation and your refusal are properly 
understood as illocutionary acts, because they are acts determined by linguistics, semantics, and 
convention. You’re being surprised, though, and my embarrassment are perlocutionary effects, 
along with many other things, as these are incidental consequences not fixed by language, but 
rather by other psychological, social, and extra-linguistic facts. When all goes well, this is how 
the analysis works. 
But things aren’t always so neat. Sometimes, the status of an illocutionary act is in doubt. 
There exists a substantial literature on the complicated status of several important speech acts 
when the audience’s uptake is in some sense not optimal. Can we say that a speaker actually 
promised, warned, or refused if their audience doesn’t take them to be promising, warning, or 
refusing?73 According to Austin, a warning is at least in some sense “unhappy” if the hearer to 
 
73 For philosophers like Langton and Hornsby who follow Austin and take audience uptake to be a necessary 
component of the illocutionary act, this is a crucial topic. It opens up a key line of analysis and argumentation: 
namely, if audience uptake—that is, according to these writers, the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s intent—is 
required for successfully pulling off an illocutionary act, then the man who doesn’t understand the woman’s ‘no’ as 
a refusal makes it the case that the woman can’t actually refuse, and she is, in effect, (illocutionarily) silenced 
(Langton 1993; Hornsby 1994; Hornsby and Langton 1998). And, according to Hornsby and Langton’s argument, 
women can be illocutionarily silenced by a patriarchal society in general, and pornography in particular. However, 
between the woman’s ‘no’ and the man’s (psychological) response, it remains unclear whether any illocutionary act 
has occurred at all. It is ambiguous. 
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whom it is directed doesn’t understand the speech act to be a warning—perhaps instead taking it 
to be a joke. 
While this is an issue for many types of speech acts, the problems multiply in the case of 
subordinating speech. A straight woman mutters “gross” when her two gay friends kiss. They 
react with surprise and alarm concerning her homophobic comment. She counsels them not to be 
so sensitive, as she was “just joking.” But was she? Is her comment an ‘unhappy’ joke, or an 
oppressive judgment, or perhaps both? When it’s not obvious what illocution she performed in 
saying her speech act, its sensible to look to the further effects her utterance may have caused to 
aid our analysis. But as sensible as this is, it clearly shows the dependence of illocution on 
perlocutionary effects. 
This is most evident when considering the notion of ‘accommodation,’ which plays an 
important role in many recent accounts of subordinating speech.74 Here, the full force and even 
type of a given speech act is partly determined by whether an audience lets a speaker’s words go 
unchallenged, or whether they engage in counter-speech. In between the audience’s silent 
accommodation or blocking speech act, however, the original utterance exists in an ambiguous 
state. Saray Ayala and Nadya Vasilyeva make this ambiguity explicit when they write: “We 
picture a sort of limbo in which the conversational score is updated after speaker’s utterance and 
the permissibility facts are to be enacted unless something is done to stop it.” From this they 
conclude that the “interlocutors’ move is constitutive of speaker’s speech act” (Ayala and 
Vasilyeva 2014, 6–7).75 
 
74 Some recent papers where something like accommodation plays a key role in the overall account include Maitra 
(2012), Langton (2012), Langton (2017; 2018a; 2018b), Ayala and Vasilyeva (2014) and more. I return to this topic 
throughout this dissertation, mainly in Chapters Two, Three, and Four. 
75 Discussions about the different effects of ‘calling out’ versus ‘calling in’ do much the same work in revealing the 
importance of audience reaction to the status of potentially subordinating speech. 
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As plausible as this may be as a description of how subordinating speech functions in 
situ, it reveals a tension in the underlying account. In short, if the type of speech act that a given 
utterance constitutes is only established after being interpreted, and perhaps blocked or 
accommodated by its audience, then the illocutionary act depends in part on the perlocutionary 
effects, and the divide cannot be so strict. This poses a serious problem for accounts that focus 
on the illocutionary act as rigidly distinguished from its perlocutionary effects, as Rebecca Kukla 
(2014) points out. She argues: 
on [Hornsby and Langton’s] account, performative force is not effected in the act of 
speaking, but rather partially constituted by a wholly separate, contingent subsequent 
event, namely the audience’s recognition of the speaker’s intention. But this recognition 
is a perlocutionary effect of speaking, and hence the performative force they are talking 
about does not seem to be illocutionary after all. (2014, 454) 
 
How serious this problem is depends on one’s understanding of the illocutionary.76 For 
some, this is simply a straightforward consequence of Austin’s theory, and shouldn’t be taken as 
any sort of objection (Hornsby and Langton 1998). For others, like Daniel Jacobson, this 
demonstrates how an implausible understanding of Austin holds “the performance of an 
illocutionary act hostage to the perversity of one's audience” (1995, 74). And while Jacobson 
rejects this view, he nonetheless admits that on his own approach to speech act theory, it is “no 
simple matter to determine when a given illocutionary act has been brought off” (ibid.). Because 
a speaker always requires something of their audience to successfully perform an illocutionary 
act, there appears to be an indeterminacy inherent to this category.  
I believe this represents a significant problem for accounts that prioritize the analysis of 
constitutive harms embodied in illocutionary acts. This is the case, because even though authors 
 
76 Maitra argues that the inability to properly demarcate the illocutionary from the perlocutionary is a problem that 
ultimately undermines Hornsby and Langton’s conception of silencing. See Maitra (2009). 
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like McGowan explicitly reject attending to what speech causes, illocutionary acts in fact require 
perlocutionary effects to be the acts they are. As such, causal effects must come into 
consideration, and the distinction is not as sharp as is suggested. In the next section I demonstrate 
how this is not simply a problem for the coherence of the concept of illocution—which is not my 
primary concern—but also for the general analysis of subordinating speech. That is, rather than 
clarifying the core features of subordinating speech acts, the focus on illocution in fact pushes 
the analysis away from crucial features of the overall speech situation. 
 
3.2. Felicity Conditions and ‘Paradigm Cases’ of Subordination 
 
Generally, if we want to know whether a given illocution occurred, we need to look to 
what Austin calls the “felicity conditions” of that illocution. These are the features that determine 
whether a given speech act was successful or not—or “happy” or “unhappy,” to use Austin’s 
terminology (1962, 14). For example, the reason why some “low type” can’t successfully 
christen the ship ‘the Generalisimo Stalin’ even though she swoops in, smashes the bottle and 
utters the right words, is because not all of the necessary felicity conditions are in place. Namely, 
only speakers with the right entitlements—the right kind of authority—can christen the ship. It’s 
not just anyone with a bottle. I’ll return to the issue of speaker authority in subordinating speech 
in more detail throughout the dissertation. Here, though, I want to bring out and question the 
basic idea of identifying the felicity conditions of subordinating speech acts.  
The difficulty of identifying the felicity conditions of a given speech act type can vary 
from relatively straightforward to seemingly impossible. On the easier end there are the highly 
structured speech acts typical of formal organizations. What specific conditions need to be in 
place to call a meeting to order, or swear someone into office, is often explicitly written down in 
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a rule book somewhere. But in less formal settings, the felicity conditions are harder to identify, 
and disagreement about whether a speech act was successfully pulled off, or even which 
particular act was performed, is common. 
I tell you “I’ll be there!” when you invite me to the bar you’re be going to tonight. Did I 
make a promise, state my preferences, or just express an expectation of myself? Maybe you and I 
disagree, especially when you show up, but I don’t. “In situations of disagreement,” Langton 
tells us, “the disputed illocution usually falls short of the paradigm case for the given locution.” 
In the paradigm case, she continues, “one knows just what the felicity conditions for the given 
illocution are, and one knows that they are all satisfied” (1993, 308). For many illocutionary acts, 
the paradigm cases wear their performativity on their sleeves quite explicitly. Had I said, “I 
promise to be at the bar later tonight,” we would likely both agree that I made a promise, even if 
I didn’t fulfil it in the end. 
For the class of utterances Austin names “explicit performatives,” the speaker makes 
their action plain through grammar and syntax. The main examples are often ceremonial, as in: 
“I hereby christen this ship Curly’s Gold”; or “By the powers vested in me, I hereby I pronounce 
you married”; or “As the scheduled business has all been attended to, I hereby adjourn this 
meeting.” These illocutions, always in the “present first-person singular indicative,” and often 
including the telltale word ‘hereby,’ offer one image of the paradigm that gives a particular 
illocution its felicity conditions. 
But things need not be so formal. If the chair of the meeting says, “meeting’s over,” or 
“we’re done here,” it would likely the same effect as her more explicit utterance. And note that 
any version of her utterance will have a different effect than that of an onlooker saying very the 
same words—making the same locution. So, surface grammar and locutionary content only offer 
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rough clues to the felicity conditions of a given illocution. This is a straightforward result of the 
observation that the same locution can do a great many different illocutions, and vice versa. The 
sentence “It’s a bit too salty, isn’t it?” could function as a genuine interrogative, or, depending on 
the circumstances—the “total speech situation”—come off as an assertion, a request, an order, or 
even a devastating insult. 
In the case of subordinating speech, things get even more complicated. Langton, for her 
part, recognizes this difficulty and takes on the challenge it presents in her application of speech 
act theory to pornography. In arguing that pornography constitutes the subordination of women, 
Langton acknowledges that this is a disputed interpretation of its illocutionary force, and 
suggests that it is analogous to situations where people might disagree whether an utterance 
really constituted a marriage (perhaps because the officiant lacks some important credentials) or 
if the utterance “shoot her” really constituted ordering (rather than advising, as the speaker 
maybe intended). Nevertheless, she argues that, much like in these situations, we can make 
progress on deciding what illocution occurred by asking whether the disputed utterances match 
closely enough the paradigm cases where the felicity conditions are both understood and 
successfully met. 
When illocutionary force is in dispute, Langton claims we can make the case for a 
particular illocution having occurred in at least three ways. First, we might claim that “vagueness 
or ignorance notwithstanding, some felicity conditions—important ones—are satisfied, and that 
is good enough.” Second, we may examine whether the “uptake appropriate for the claimed 
illocution has been secured.” Or, third, if “a speech act’s effects are best explained by supposing 
that it has a certain illocutionary force” we may then conclude the supposed illocution in fact 
occurred (1993, 309). Langton acknowledges that “all three ways of arguing are fallible, and 
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they come in ascending order of fallibility,” but suggests that “each of the three, or some 
combination of them, may be useful, depending on the evidence we have” (ibid.). 
To make progress on this question, then, Langton uses the example of the apartheid-era 
South African legislator as the paradigm case for subordinating speech.77 This example is worth 
exploring in more detail. First, let me put aside one major dis-analogy that Langton claims can be 
overcome. This is the fact that the South African legislator, but not the pornographer, occupies a 
formal position of authority that gives their speech more force than it otherwise might have. 
Langton claims this question is “at the heart of the controversy” and I put this aside only to take 
it up more fully in my next chapter, which directly addresses this Authority Problem for 
subordinating speech.  
Even putting this problem aside, however, other issues remain. My general concern here 
is with the philosophical tendency to abstract away from the broader contextual features of an 
utterance with the hope of isolating (and therefore investigating) some supposedly more central 
conditions of a subordinating speech act. In Langton’s case, this is demonstrated by which 
features of the apartheid-legislator example she draws out and puts to use.  
Regarding her second and third strategies noted above, Langton suggests that the speech 
acts of apartheid “are speech acts that achieve a certain uptake: they are taken to be verdictive 
and exercitive acts (though not all hearers will take them to be subordinating acts).” Furthermore,  
they are illocutions that have a pattern of perlocutionary effects on the beliefs and 
behaviors of the population: whites believe blacks to be inferior, believe discrimination 
against them to be legitimate, and believe them to have fewer rights; whites discriminate 
against blacks, and blacks stay away from polling booths. (1993, 310) 
 
 
77 To be precise, Langton does not explicitly claim the apartheid speech act is the paradigm. Specifically, she writes: 
“I have not tried to say exactly what the paradigm for subordination is, but I have suggested that the speech acts of 
apartheid offer a clear example” (1993, 310). So perhaps it is better to say she takes these to represent a paradigm, 
rather than the paradigm. 
68 
That is, according to the (admittedly fallible) method of argument to the best explanation, “part 
of the explanation for whites’ discriminatory behavior is that such behavior has been legitimated 
by law. Part of the explanation for blacks keeping away from certain areas is that they have been 
ordered away” (1993, 309). 
It’s important to note the modesty of Langton’s claims here. First, it is only some hearers 
who take the speech acts of apartheid to be acts of ranking and legitimating (verdictive and 
exercitive acts, respectively). Second, these utterances serve as part of the explanation for the 
effects in question. They aren’t the whole explanation, but one, she believes, is worth isolating 
our attention on.  
This argument is thus an instance of the idea, already explored above, that a given 
“pattern of perlocutionary effects”—in this case, the “beliefs and behaviors of the population”—
are there because of what the speech is, as an illocutionary act. However, here we run into the 
problem discussed in the previous section, raised by Kukla. Namely, if it is only because of the 
perlocutionary effects of speaking that a speech act has a certain force, then it doesn’t seem to 
be, strictly speaking, an illocutionary act (Kukla 2012). Or at least, the divide between 
perlocutionary and illocutionary—and the greater attention given to the illocutionary—ought to 
be suspect. 
It was because of this problem that we were first led to examine the felicity conditions of 
a type of speech act. As for the important felicity conditions of subordinating speech acts, 
Langton explicitly discusses only speaker authority. Yet, some of the important—indeed 
necessary—contextual features aside from the legislator occupying a position of authority likely 
include other facts, even in this paradigmatic example. For instance, the existence of a 
military/police force to enforce the government’s legislation is required. There is also the fact 
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that a powerful anti-Black minority agrees with the laws in question, and crucially, most likely 
did so on the basis of beliefs they held before the legislator’s speech act. There is the existence of 
negative stereotypes about the Black majority. There is the selective media coverage that 
exacerbates these stereotypes. These features all appear just as crucial to the legislator’s 
felicitous illocution as their formal role in the overall oppressive apparatus.  
We can see this simply by imagining what would follow had the legislator instead uttered 
“whites are not permitted to vote,” from the same position of authority. My intuition is that the 
result would be widely different. This suggests that the felicity conditions necessary for 
subordinating speech are more expansive than Langton’s initial gloss brings out, extending 
beyond mere speaker authority and into the realm of social and political context within which the 
utterance occurs.78 On Langton’s analysis, though, the connection to oppressive structures 
remains implicit, but it does more work than she acknowledges. Indeed, it is only because of 
these implicit connections to the broader political context that her example is as compelling as it 
is. Once we remove them from the example, it loses its force. 
In short, the strategy of narrowing our focus to some ‘core’ features of subordinating 
speech acts is fraught with difficulties. It requires identifying the felicity conditions of 
subordinating speech. But this approach is problematic because it is doubtful we could, even in 
principle, identify paradigmatic instances of subordination. Because of its totalizing and 
structural nature, subordination shapes both the macroscopic and microscopic features of one’s 
life under its thumb. Attempting to isolate paradigmatic cases of subordination—and 
 
78 Ramsey (2013, 112–13) makes a similar observation about Langton’s legislator example, using the example of 
“people under 21 are not permitted to vote.” And, in a similar vein, Tirrell (2018b) notes the larger context that 
renders a judge’s sentencing utterance effective (13); and makes explicit how “[i]nstitutional settings often mask the 
audience’s role in successful speech acts. […] Even speech that feels like the exercise of pure authority nevertheless 
relies crucially on hearer uptake” (21). 
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subordinating speech—inevitably pushes important and complicated dynamics aside in favor of 
what’s more observable. In Langton’s case, this means isolating speaker authority as the sole 
felicity condition of subordinating speech. But, by lingering on the example, we’re led to the 
thought that there is so much more at play. And if this is a problem for the paradigmatic case, it 
is only more so in the more mundane and everyday cases that litter the real life of subordinating 
speech. 
In sum, Langton, along with other philosophers such as Maitra and McGowan, pursues a 
narrowing approach by using illocution as the central concept.79 Yet, if we take seriously the 
thought that our analysis must address “the total speech act in the total speech situation” (Austin 
1962), we are led to believe that this task isn’t only difficult, it’s impossible, and moreover 
obfuscating, as it pushes aside key features that an adequate analysis must include. 
 
3.2.1. Ideal and nonideal (speech act) theory: A short detour 
 
 My criticisms from the previous section can be strengthened when we consider further 
idealizations implicit in some strains of speech act theory. Parallels that exist between the 
ideal/nonideal theory debate in political philosophy and the concerns I am raising about an 
illocutionary-focused approach to subordinating speech bring this out well. At first blush this 
might seem a bit odd, since the topics that Langton and others use speech act theory to illuminate 
are undoubtably nonideal. This is true. Nonetheless, the methodology of speech act theory, as 
employed by Langton and others, engages in some unhelpful idealizations that undermine its 
applicability, and ultimately hinder its ability to analyze the problems at issue. 
 
79 It is worth nothing, though, how each at the same time notes the difficulty of such a pursuit, with Maitra being, in 
my eyes, the most skeptical of its ultimate plausibility. 
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As Mitch Green observes, “Speech act theory traditionally idealizes away from many 
aspects of a communicative situation, including those in which one speaker is marginalized or 
another is given undue authority” (2016). Mary Louise Pratt makes a stronger claim when she 
describes the “ideological dimensions of speech-act theory,” which tend to designate “much of 
what people do linguistically as lying outside the norms of their language” (1986, 70). And while 
both are referring mainly to more traditional accounts like those of Grice, Austin,80 and Searle, 
we can note how this tendency to idealize and abstract has not been fully overcome, even in 
cases of subordinating speech. 
In her “The Ideology of Speech-Act Theory,” Pratt notes how some assumptions in 
speech act theory can be taken too quickly for granted. These include the idea that one-to-one 
speech functions as the paradigm of all other linguistic acts, and the assumption of an underlying 
unified (true) subject as the seat of beliefs, desires, intentions, etc., against which the speech act 
is to be assessed. These assumptions make cases where there are many speakers and hearers, and 
where a speaker speaks for, or through, others seem abnormal. Yet, this is odd, because it is no 
way abnormal for a person to be speak “as a member of some collective, or as a rank in a 
hierarchy” (Pratt 1986, 63). Most people do it every day as part of their job.  
Because of a set of assumptions and absences, Pratt claims that speech act theory tends to 
normalize a particular subset of actual communication, and these “‘normalized’ forms of 
expression invoke a harmonious and homogeneous social world that is quite different from any 
known social formation” (1986, 69). The problem then, is not only one of omission, but 
 
80 Though it is worth noting that Pratt distances her critique from Austin and is more concerned with those who 
came after him, namely Searle (1976; 1994). 
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ideological idealization.81 Pratt’s critique is thus reminiscent of Charles Mills argument in his 
“Ideal Theory as Ideology”—despite her article appearing twenty years earlier. There Mills 
claims that what “distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealizations to the exclusion, or at 
least marginalization, of the actual” (2005, 168). 
In the case of Langton, this problem emerges in terms of the paradigms against which she 
analyzes subordinating speech acts. Aside from the specific issue the nonexistence of a paradigm 
of subordination poses for identifying felicity conditions—considered above—there is the further 
problem that Langton’s apartheid example treats the legislator’s speech as that of a single 
speaker. She speaks of the legislator, after all. In this way, the legislator’s role as a mouthpiece 
for the state is rendered negligible. But of course, it matters greatly that their utterance is not 
attached strictly to their own intentions, beliefs, etc., but that of an office with specific powers. 
This problem extends when considering more ‘everyday’ occurrences of subordinating 
speech as well. Because of the ideological assumptions inherent in the paradigm, we might be 
led to investigate whether the particular speaker holds specific intentions or beliefs—for 
example, the intention to discriminate, or beliefs about the inferiority of people of color, etc.—
and whether they have authority in a way similar to that of a legislator. This approach, however, 
takes the problem of oppression and examines it through an overly individualized lens. It matters 
very little what the precise intentions or beliefs of a given speaker are when they say things that 
are reasonably interpreted as hateful, often by using the same words and phrases as out-and-out 
 
81 As she elaborates, “these lines of normalization are ideologically laden. Among the cases systematically marked 
deviant, one invariably finds all ludic kinds of expression (language as play rather than productive work); some 
forms of expression primarily associated with women, such as gossip, small talk, or euphemism; and other forms 
like circumlocution, indirectness, or deliberate ambiguity, that are associated with communication across hierarchy 
and across lines of conflict. […] There are good reasons to be dissatisfied with a theory that designates much of 
what people do linguistically as lying outside the norms of their language” (1986, 69–70). 
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bigots.82 And by using a legislator’s speech as the yardstick against which other potentially 
subordinating speech acts are measured, we’re led to a conception of speaker authority where it 
is easily recognized and identified, though we have very little reason to suppose this will be the 
case generally. 
In general, one problem posed by positioning a particular speech act as the paradigm of 
subordinating speech—in this case, the apartheid legislator’s speech—is that it implicitly 
endorses a hierarchy of subordinating speech. Oppressive speech acts are measured by how 
closely they match the paradigm. This is like the ideal theorist’s approach to justice. Once the 
ideal is identified, injustice is found in deviations from that ideal—and the further the deviation, 
the greater the injustice. And much like the nonideal theorist’s critique of that general approach 
to political philosophy, we can similarly recognize that this approach is not the only game in 
town.  
Rather, we can adopt a nonideal speech act theory where we begin from the actual, and 
describe the features found there in detail. Then, from an adequate description of the lived 
experience of subordinating speech we will have the resources available to develop appropriate 
models and theories. Beginning from a conception of the paradigm of subordinating speech 
serves no purpose here, when there is little reason to suppose there is but one type of 
subordinating speech act. Rather, it is a diverse and multiply realizable category, and we ought 




82 I elaborate on this in Chapters Three and Four. 
74 
3.3. Assessing the Illocutionary Account 
 
With the preceding description of some problematic aspects of a focus on the 
illocutionary act, we can return to the question of whether the attention philosophers give to it in 
accounts of subordinating speech are worth these drawbacks. That is, do the analytical insights 
offered by the illocutionary account of oppressive speech outweigh the potential hurdles the 
account must overcome. Above I noted two advantages the claim that speech constitutes harm—
as an illocutionary act—was meant to secure. These are (1) attributing responsibility directly to 
the speaker of harmful utterances, and (2) drawing attention to normative changes in social status 
rather than only violent acts or psychological distress. I will take each of these in turn. 
 
3.3.1. Attributing responsibility to the speaker 
 
 One benefit of identifying the illocutionary act as a harmful act in itself is that it arguably 
follows directly from this that the speaker is in some sense responsible for the harm. Rather than 
only being a source of motivation for hate-based violence and discrimination perpetrated by 
others, the speakers of subordinating speech acts themselves are guilty of performing harmful 
(illocutionary) acts. This side-steps the ‘mentally-mediated’ defense of absolving the speaker 
from harm by noting that harm is not found only in the violent physical outburst of bigots, but 
also in their verbal acts. By fixing attention on the illocutionary harm, speakers themselves are 
put on the moral hook for their words. This move does well to bolster the claim that people are—
or ought to be—responsible for their words, and that common excuses like ‘mere words’ or ‘just 
trolling’ are inadequate. 
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 However, with the previous section’s analysis in mind, I want to argue that things are not 
so simple. The problem, in brief, is that if the goal concerns assigning responsibility, then it 
matters what model of responsibility is being presupposed and invoked, and under the 
illocutionary model, that is primarily an individualistic, blame model of responsibility. Yet, as 
Iris Marion Young (2004; 2006; 2011; 2013) and others have argued, the systemic nature of 
oppression calls for a distinct model of responsibility beyond the traditional blame model.  
 It’s useful to note that the blame model of responsibility functions mainly by isolating the 
blameworthy individual(s), and therefore has the tendency of absolving others. This is exactly 
why the ‘mentally-mediated’ defense is invoked by those who utter hateful speech. They might 
admit (publicly, at least) that an act of racist violence was a grave moral wrong but claim that the 
blame lies solely with the perpetrators of the act. When this plea is successful, it serves to 
absolve the speaker of any responsibility. It works (when it does) by characterizing the claim that 
a single utterance has the power to subordinate on its own as nonsense. And they do so by 
comparing this to the more tangible harm of physical violence.  
So, while the illocutionary model may do well to get the speaker on the moral hook, it 
does so at the cost of isolating their speech from its wider context, which is picked up and 
ridiculed by critics. Thus, there is a severe cost to this approach, and one that should give us 
pause. As Matsuda notes, “[p]art of the special harm racist speech is that it works in concert with 
other racist tools to keep victim groups in an inferior position” (1993, 39). To properly capture 
this fact, we cannot separate the harmfulness of subordinating speech from the harms of 
oppression more broadly, but the focus on illocution runs this risk. Because of this, isolating 
speech from further facts of oppression is a tactic that ought to be resisted, but it is implicit in the 
model that foregrounds the illocutionary act apart from its complete context.  
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Before moving on, it’s useful to consider briefly the motivation one might have for tying 
moral responsibility primarily to illocutionary acts, and only perlocutionary effects secondarily, 
if at all. The worry is that perlocutionary effects are, in an important way, out of the hands of the 
speaker, and so beyond their control. This is certainly true when we consider how wide the scope 
of the perlocutionary is meant to cover, at least according to the standard Austinean 
conceptualization. And if the domain of the perlocutionary is beyond the control of the speaker, 
it seems to follow this is not apt area to locate responsibility—hence the move away from causal 
accounts.  
Yet, there is some disagreement about the proper scope of the perlocutionary, and 
therefore its potential analytical helpfulness. Some recent work that attempts to analyze speech 
acts primarily in perlocutionary terms seem to be, in my opinion, implicitly pushing back against 
the interpretation that the perlocutionary effects are simply anything and everything that causally 
follows from an utterance, and thus totally unhelpful.83 I see myself as fitting within this camp of 
speech act theorist who resist the idea that this approach to language is solely or even primarily 
concerned with illocution. 
For example, in aiming to expand this aspect of speech act theory, Stanley Cavell 
remarks that while it’s true “the perlocutionary effects of an utterance may be as various as the 
motives for speech, and, as with any human action, an utterance will have (in general) intended 
and unintended effects and consequences.” But he goes on to add, “to know what perlocutionary 
acts I am liable for ‘bringing off' is part of knowing what I am doing and saying, or am capable 
of knowing and saying (2005, 174). That is, it is not entirely a mystery what effects our speech 
acts are likely to have. And in many cases, our very reason for saying something is to bring about 
 
83 See, for example, Saul (2018a) and Hominh (2016), for two accounts that make this goal explicit. 
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certain effects. To ignore this aspect of speech is to push aside as irrelevant many of the key 
characteristics of subordinating speech, namely, its effects on the wider community.84  
As the discussion of section 2 is meant to show, the effects of hate speech and other 
forms of oppressive utterances are wide ranging, and to reduce these to a narrow set of features 
as the illocution model does risks downplaying the experience of the targets of such speech. 
Furthermore, in many cases, hate speech is often intended to have these effects. That is, the 
speakers of hate propaganda aim not only to advocate for racial hierarchy in an illocutionary 
sense, but also to convince their audience of the need for action. This is a clear perlocutionary 
goal that needs to be accounted for in our analysis. It is in service of these goals, and much more, 
that they often seek as many platforms and as much coverage as possible—seemingly working 
according to the belief that there’s no such thing as bad publicity85—and have their eye on their 
wider audience.86 Moreover, fear, anxiety, and a sense of isolation are not well captured in 
illocutionary terms. But the account of responsibility implied by the focus on illocution narrows 
the blameworthy acts too much, and fails to capture this wide range of harms—both causal and 




84 Despite the general focus of her account, Langton herself makes this point when she writes: “Besides expressing 
feelings, hate speech provokes feelings. It invites an emotional response, as well as a cognitive and practical one. It 
tells someone what to feel, as well as what to believe, and what to do. Its effects—its perlocutionary goals, in 
Austin’s terms—include hatred, for some hearers, pain and fear for others” (2017). 
85 Indeed, one section title of the leaked style-guide for the neo-Nazi website The Daily Stormer was “All Publicity 
is Good Publicity.” See Phillips (2018) The Oxygen of Amplification for an analysis of how far-right groups exploit 
journalists in order to increase the reach of their messaging. For a liberal defense of the practice of ‘no platforming’ 
consistent with strong freedom of speech, see Simpson and Srinivasan (2018). 
86 Stanley Cavell notes the importance of the second person in perlocutionary acts, which he contrasts with 
illocutionary acts in the following: “As Austin insists, in the case of illocutionary acts, even though it may be only 
implicit in various grammatical forms, ‘The ‘I’ who is doing the action does […] come essentially into the picture.’ 
So I might comparably say: In perlocutionary acts, the ‘you’ comes essentially into the picture” (Cavell 2015, 180). 
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3.3.2. Normative changes in social status: The construction and maintenance of hierarchies 
 
 To be sure, normative changes occur via speech acts. But, in the case of subordinating 
speech in particular, it is worth asking what sustains those changes. Between friends, one making 
a promise is often all it takes to normatively bind one to the other, and we recognize this when 
we say the promisee can reasonably hold the promiser to their word. It is in these cases that, as 
Austin is fond of saying, our word really is our bond.  
Yet for oppressive speech—and oppression more broadly—the normative story is much 
more complicated. This came out in the above discussion of the omissions in taking the 
apartheid-era legislator’s utterance as a paradigm of subordinating speech. While I agree the 
legislator’s speech functions to rank Black South Africans as inferior and unjustly deprives them 
of their rights, it is not speech alone that kept Black South Africans oppressed. The enforcement 
of these laws, and the extra-legal violence that occurs alongside the law—often with its implicit 
approval—constitute other barriers to equality for subordinated groups.  
While linguistic acts are one route by which racial (and other) hierarchies are established, 
justified, and spread, our understanding of these acts is enhanced when we put them in their 
proper place, alongside the other, nonlinguistic acts that back up these words with force. This, of 
course, includes violence, as being subject to violence simply because of one’s membership in a 
group is one hallmark of oppression (Young 2011).87 Putting subordinating speech acts alongside 
non-verbal forms of harassment, intimidation, and violence therefore offers a clearer picture of 
how the overall pattern of these practices function to create and sustain oppressive hierarchies. 
 
87 Consider also Matsuda’s remarks that: “Violence is a necessary and inevitable part of the structure of racism. It is 
the final solution, as fascists know, barely held at bay while the tactical weapons of segregation, disparagement, and 
hate propaganda do their work” (Matsuda 1993, 24). 
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While I doubt Langton and the other philosophers I discuss would deny any of this, I maintain 
that the illocution-focused model they defend has the effect of isolating speech from its 
background. By analogizing oppressive speech to other illocutionary acts, they neglect how 
subordinating speech is unlike those other acts. John Michael Ramsey expresses this point nicely 
when he writes:  
The force of oppressive speech is not explained by or exhausted by the illocutionary force 
of a speech act, as is the force of a promise-utterance or warning-utterance. Instead, the 
force of oppressive speech originates in and is explained by the background, normative 
practices of which the utterance is a move. (2013, 193) 
 
In other words, we must look to the background, along with the other practices of subordination, 
if we are to understand the force of subordinating speech. This would be an improvement upon a 
view that locates its subordinating potential in terms of a single act—as the illocutionary model 
is apt to do. 
My view recognizes subordinating speech as (one) part of a broader practice of 
subordination. It is for this reason I took the time to discuss the wide range of harms attributable 
to speech and situated this within an account of oppression. Doing so highlights subordinating 
speech acts as part of broader practices of oppression that includes structural violence, voter 
disenfranchisement, epistemic injustice, the wealth gap, and more. This also offers a better 
picture of subordinating speech even when we focus solely on speech. In an insightful footnote, 
Maitra recognizes this when she sketches an alternative view of understanding the claim that 
speech constitutes subordination. According to this alternative:  
to say that speech can constitute subordination is to say that, under certain circumstances, 
the practice of producing speech of the kind in question is a subordinating practice. On 
[this interpretation] the practice of producing racist hate speech (for example) may be 




Maitra only discusses this alternative view of the constitution thesis once more, where she briefly 
suggests that it could assist us in our understanding of authority and responsibility for 
subordinating speech (Maitra 2013). There, she also notes the further advantage “that such a re-
framing might avoid controversies over how to understand illocutionary acts such that 
subordinating falls into that category” (2013, 92n). This is the controversy that I have explored 
throughout this chapter. And as I have been suggesting, we do well to move away from the 
illocutionary act approach as our primary understanding of subordinating speech. This approach 





In this chapter I have offered a description of the expansive harms of subordinating 
speech and argued that the philosophical focus on illocution as the main mechanism by which 
speech subordinates is unfounded. This chapter had two main goals. One goal was to provide a 
comprehensive account of the plausible harms of subordinating speech. Any attempt to do so 
will likely fail to fully capture every aspect of such speech, and my account is abridged in many 
ways, I’m sure. Yet I hope that by marking out three distinct areas of such harms—as they are 
approached by writers with different theoretical commitments—I have both conveyed the wide 
scope of these harms and shown how they are inextricably related. 
The second main goal of this chapter was to push back against a strain in social 
philosophy of language that privileges illocutionary acts as the proper lens for analyzing 
subordinating speech. I have argued that this standard neo-Austinean framework fails in a few 
key ways, namely, by isolating subordinating speech acts from the broader practices within 
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which they take part. In the next chapter, I follow up on an important topic that was side-stepped 









For those who are members of disadvantaged social groups, being the target of hate 
speech can be a regular experience that can lead to many physical and psychological harms—as I 
discussed in Chapter One. Yet, as we saw, many agree that the destructive element of hate 
speech extends beyond its ugly downstream consequences. That is, beyond being the cause of so 
many harms in the lives of its targets, hate speech itself seems to be a particularly harmful act. 
Indeed, along with many others, I see it as a subordinating act, one that marks its targets as 
inferior in an unjust act of ranking. Getting clearer about how this ranking occurs—indeed, how 
it is even possible—however, is a difficult task. 
One problem arises from noticing how, for many speech acts, the speaker needs a special 
kind of standing to be able to perform them at all. That is, some speech acts require a particular 
entitlement, or authority, to be successfully carried out. This is a familiar idea. In everyday life 
we do many things with our words: we make promises, apologies, bets, and threats, and so on. 
Among these acts, some require a certain standing to accomplish successfully. To call a strike in 
baseball, you must be the umpire; to declare war in the USA, you must be the president. Yet, the 
type of standing required in each case is quite distinct. The president’s saying ‘strike’ lacks the 
same force that my own utterance does. Neither one of us can make a ball a strike with our 
utterances, because neither of us has the right standing. 
 
88 This chapter is adapted from my paper “Speaking with (Subordinating) Authority,” which was published in  
Social Theory & Practice 42 (2): 240–257 (2016). 
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For subordinating speech, this idea of appropriate standing leads to a challenge that has 
been called the Authority Problem. According to the Authority Problem, for speech to 
constitute—and not just cause—subordination, it must be spoken by speakers who occupy 
recognizable positions of authority. Yet, in the case of ordinary instances of hate speech—that is, 
hate speech uttered by the ordinary person on the street—speakers would seem to lack the 
required authority by definition, and so their words necessarily cannot subordinate.89 On this 
view then, ordinary hate speakers—as we might call them—therefore cannot subordinate, simply 
because they are just that: ordinary. 
In “Subordinating Speech,” Ishani Maitra (2012) defends the claim that ordinary 
instances of hate speech can sometimes constitute subordination. Her strategy in responding to 
the challenge posed by the Authority Problem is to admit that authority is indeed required for 
subordinating speech, while also arguing that “there are more ways in which a speaker can come 
to have authority […] than have generally been realized” (Maitra 2012, 96).90 She describes two 
such possible ways speakers can come to have subordinating authority where they once lacked it. 
First, through “derived positional authority,” where a speaker gains authority in virtue of 
inheriting a part of someone else’s basic positional authority; and second, via “licensing,” where 
a speaker’s audience grants her the authority she seeks through its actions or inactions (ibid., 
109, 111). In the case of licensing—which will be my main focus here—Maitra’s aim is to fully 
disentangle authority from social position. In these cases, she argues that speakers can acquire 
authority over others without occupying or inheriting any position of authority whatsoever. 
 
89 While this is no doubt a vague category, the crucial distinguishing feature of ordinary instances of hate speech 
that is at issue in this paper lies in the fact that these speakers occupy no obviously relevant positions of authority. 
Moreover, it is worth remarking that these cases make up the vast majority of hate speech that is uttered. 
90 As will become clear later, I believe this is, overall, the correct strategy to take when answering the Authority 
Problem. For an account that does not take authority to be necessary for subordinating speech, see McGowan (2004; 
2004; 2012). I discuss this alternative in more detail in the next chapter. 
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I believe that this account is deeply—and interestingly—mistaken, and in this chapter I 
raise some problems for the account of licensing speaker authority Maitra offers for 
subordinating speech. In particular, I take issue with what I see as its highly localized character, 
which effectively divorces the subordinating authority of ordinary hate speech from the broader 
normative context, including social features that I claim play essential roles in subordinating 
acts. For this reason, I worry the account is unable to properly distinguish between cases where a 
speaker does and doesn’t have the authority to subordinate. Seeing this mistake points us towards 
a better account of speaker authority. For these reasons, I develop an alternative answer to the 
important question of how ordinary hate speakers can sometimes come to possess authority and 
offer a competing picture of how licensing functions in these cases. Crucially, as I defend it, the 
type of speaker authority that’s required in cases of ordinary hate speech is still positional 
authority, though it need not be formal nor clearly defined. I call this type of authority informal 
situational authority. 
I begin in section 2 by briefly explaining the standard argument for how speech can 
constitute subordination, which I first discussed in the beginning of Chapter One. I then describe 
an example of an ordinary instance of hate speech and make clear how it appears to fail in the 
face of the Authority Problem. Next, in section 3, I consider Maitra’s account of licensing, which 
aims to answer this problem by demonstrating one way in which ordinary speakers can be 
invested with a kind of authority that is not tied to any social position. In section 4, I then show 
how her account seems to entail counterintuitive results, labeling cases as potentially 
subordinating where I believe the label shouldn’t apply. I locate the source of this difficulty in 
the narrowly local picture Maitra defends, and explain the problematic implications this has for 
her account of the pragmatic structure of hate speech. In section 5, I argue that this problem 
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stems from Maitra’s claim that licensing invests people with authority directly, and not through 
social positions. I believe that by appealing to social positions, even in licensing, we end up with 
a better picture of how some speakers can come to possess the necessary authority and 
subordinate with their speech. I suggest how this is possible by sketching an account of informal 
situational authority. Finally, I show how this approach also offers a better picture of what's 
required to challenge and defy these acts by those who may be seen to fall into the position of 
bystanders. 
 
2. SUBORDINATING SPEECH AND THE AUTHORITY PROBLEM 
 
Since the late 1980’s, an influential movement in the philosophy of language has focused 
on the important intuition that one of the many acts speech can be used to do is to subordinate.91 
A key development in this area has been the thought that some speech, such as racist hate 
speech, doesn’t just lead to subordination, but is itself a subordinating act. That is, speech can 
subordinate. When probing what this meant in Chapter One, I focused on clarifying the 
distinction between causing and constituting. Here, I want to ask what is included in the concept 
of subordination. 
In broadest terms, to subordinate another is to diminish his or her civil status. Getting 
more specific, we can identify three features of subordinating acts. First, they unfairly rank their 
targets as having inferior worth; second, they legitimate discriminatory behavior towards their 
targets; and third, they unjustly deprive their targets of some important powers (Langton 1993, 
 
91 Catharine MacKinnon is acknowledged as providing the key first moves on this topic; see MacKinnon (1987). 
And while much of the early (and ongoing) work in this area has primarily addressed pornography as subordinating 
speech, many insights have been carried over to work on racist (and other forms of) hate speech. 
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303–04). Some explicit examples of subordination are laws that define enslaved people as the 
property of their masters, or women as the property of their husbands. These invoke a hierarchy 
of civil statuses and confer greater and lesser rights and powers to the different classes they 
define. And this doesn’t need to be so explicit in the law, but can be embodied more subtly—
though, often not that subtly—in the institutions, practices, and norms of a given society. 
In what follows, I focus primarily on the act of ranking as inferior as a telling component 
of subordination, in part to more closely follow Maitra’s approach to the problem (2012, 100). 
The question I aim to explore here is whether and in what ways ordinary hate speech can be seen 
to successfully issue rankings of inferior civil status to its targets, and thus possibly subordinate.  
When it comes to how speech itself can constitute subordination, we saw earlier that the 
“paradigmatic” example is the apartheid-era South African legislator who, in saying “Blacks are 
no longer permitted to vote,” makes it the case that Black South Africans can no longer vote.92 
According to Langton, this utterance—the very act of saying those words in those 
circumstances—constitutes subordination because it itself successfully performs the act of, 
among other things, unfairly ranking Black South Africans as inferior to white South Africans. 
That is, simply in saying what he does, the legislator successfully ranks his targets as inferior.93 
As others have pointed out, one obviously relevant reason the legislator’s speech is able 
to subordinate in this way is because his authority is grounded in the particular formal position 
he currently occupies—namely, that of a legislator. A legislator has what we can call the 
positional authority to rank certain citizens as inferior to others in his jurisdiction, and this is all 
 
92 Langton (1993, 302–03). As I note, I discussed this first in Chapter One, where I criticized its use as the 
‘paradigmatic’ instance of subordinating speech. 
93 This distinction, of course, alludes to the Austinean distinction between perlocutionary and illocutionary acts. See 
Austin (1962, 101–09). 
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in virtue of being a legislator. Positional authority of this kind is what makes the legislator’s 
ranking less like the simple expression of an opinion, and more like the rendering of a verdict.94 
Much in the same way that the umpire calling a strike makes it so, the legislator’s positional 
authority is taken as a key reason why his speech act ranking Black South Africans as inferior is 
able to succeed, and thus for his speech to subordinate. More mundane cases of ranking share 
this important feature. For example, a teacher has the ability to rank her students in a class 
activity precisely because her position as a teacher gives her the authority to do so (Maitra 2012, 
100). Try as they might, the students’ parents cannot place their child at the top the class simply 
by saying it is so. 
There are three further features of the legislator’s authority beyond its mere positionality 
that appear relevant: First, there are formal provisions that place people in positions of authority; 
second, these are partly comprised by the particular actions of others; and third, the authority 
lasts for a clearly demarcated period.95 In any case, it’s useful to begin with the idea that it is 
positional authority of this kind that makes the legislator’s ranking succeed.  
With all this in mind, consider the following example of ordinary hate speech, drawn 
from Maitra:  
An Arab woman is on a subway car crowded with people. An older white man walks up 
to her, and says, “F***in’ terrorist, go home. We don’t need your kind here.” He 
continues speaking in this manner to the woman, who doesn’t respond. He speaks loudly 
enough that everyone in the car hears his words clearly. All other conversations cease. 
Many of the passengers turn to look at the speaker, but no one interferes. (2012, 100–01) 
 
Along with many others, I see this as a plausible example of a subordinating speech act. Yet, the 
speaker is not in any recognizable position comparable to the South African legislator; there are 
 
94 It is the legislator’s positional authority that gives his speech the verdictive and exercitive force—to use the 
Austinean terms—that allow him to subordinate. See Langton (1993, 304–305). 
95 For more on these features, see Maitra (2012, 104). 
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no actions taken by anyone that formally confer authority on him for any clearly demarcated 
time period. He would therefore seem to lack the positional authority required to make 
successful rankings of others. This is the challenge of the Authority Problem. And so, while his 
speech may be an attempt to rank his target as inferior, absent the clear authority to do so, it 
seems this ranking must fail. To make things explicit: If occupying a formal position of 
authority—like that of a legislator—is necessary for one’s speech to succeed in ranking others, 
we’re then led to the conclusion that ordinary instances of hate speech like this cannot constitute 
subordination, quite simply because they don’t come from legislators, but ordinary speakers who 
lack the relevant positional authority. Avoiding this counter-intuitive conclusion and explaining 
how and why racist hate speech of this sort can indeed be subordinating is the goal of the 
remainder of this chapter. 
 
3. MAITRA’S SOLUTION TO THE AUTHORITY PROBLEM 
 
Maitra’s strategy in responding to the challenge presented by the Authority Problem is to 
disentangle authority from social position. Through her account of “licensing,” speakers can 
come to have authority over others without occupying any recognizable position of authority. 
This allows even ordinary hate speakers to gain the authority they need for their subordinating 
speech acts to succeed. 
To explain this idea, she asks us to consider a group of friends trying to plan a hike 
together (Maitra 2012, 106). As no one expresses any strong preferences in the logistics of the 
trip, they fail to make much headway in actually planning the outing. After having enough of 
this, one friend, Andy, decides to take charge and make decisions. He assigns specific tasks to 
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each of the different members of the group. No one objects, the tasks are all completed, and the 
hike later takes place as Andy planned.  
Maitra’s claim here is that in this case Andy clearly comes to have the authority to assign 
tasks to the group, and that his “instructions, moreover, are authoritative speech” (ibid.). That is 
to say, his speech act constructs viable norms for his audience, and this can be seen by the group 
following his directions. However, as Maitra points out, Andy’s authority is not in virtue of any 
clear social position. It’s therefore, she claims, a type of speaker authority that isn’t positional 
authority. Furthermore, it’s only through the act of speaking itself that Andy comes to have any 
authority at all. That is, he has no authority prior to giving the instructions, but is granted this 
authority by the group only when no one objects to his orders and it becomes clear they plan on 
following through with the tasks he assigns—as Maitra notes, though, the boundaries here are 
essentially fuzzy. Finally, we may note that for speech to be licensed like this, it doesn’t require 
“the licensors agree with the license in any substantive sense” but only that any reservations 
aren’t made public (ibid., 107). So, some of Andy’s friends may not be too pleased with his 
choices, and yet, so long as they keep these thoughts private, they are still expected to do as 
instructed—that is, the norms are still applicable. As such, disagreement—even strong 
disagreement—is compatible with an audience granting a speaker authority and thereby enabling 
her speech to construct new norms in social space. To summarize, then, here we seem to have a 
clear case of authority that’s not positional, didn’t require any formal granting of authority, 
results mainly from omissions rather than acts, and is perhaps open ended. 
With this account of licensing in mind, Maitra claims we now have the tools to interpret 
the earlier example of ordinary hate speech as authoritative. As was previously said, the speaker 
can be thought to be issuing an attempted ranking that aims to mark his target as inferior. Given 
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what was said above, however, it’s now possible to see how he succeeds with his ranking. In 
drawing the attention of all the other passengers in the subway car with his tirade, Maitra 
suggests we might think of the passengers all as participants in a single conversation, like the 
hike-planners (ibid., 115). And, by failing to voice any objection, we can now see the hate 
speaker’s audience as licensing his speech, therefore granting him the authority he needs to make 
this ranking succeed.  
As we just saw, the fact that the speaker occupies no formal position of authority prior to 
his utterance doesn’t entail his audience cannot give him—even unwillingly—the authority his 
speech act needs. Like Andy’s friends, the subway passengers’ continued silence allows them to 
grant the speaker the authority he lacked prior to speaking. With their silence, the passengers 
refuse to challenge the hate speaker’s ranking of the Arab woman as inferior, and this permits the 
ranking to add its content to the shared background of the conversation, making it successful.96 
And so, even ordinary instances of hate speech may in fact subordinate, since even ordinary hate 
speakers can be licensed in this way.97 
Now we should pause to note that this is not to claim this is what happens in every, or 
even most, cases of hate speech. Maitra’s claim is more modest, saying only that there is no 
principled reason to outright reject the idea that ordinary instances of hate speech might 
sometimes subordinate in this way. It is a claim about sufficient conditions, not necessary ones. 
Yet, this is still a potentially significant result, as it would demonstrate that the authority to 
 
96 The idea of a conversational ‘background’ or ‘common ground’ appealed to here comes from Robert Stalnaker; 
see Stalnaker (2002). 
97 In a similar (though distinct) manner, McGowan argues that any contribution to a conversation invokes rules of 
accommodation, and that an ordinary instance of hate speech can constitute subordination in virtue of functioning as 
a “conversational exercitive,” that is, an illocution that enacts permissibility conditions in a particular domain. Rae 
Langton, Sally Haslanger, and Luvell Anderson see this as one way to account for the Authority Problem. See 
McGowan (2004, 99–101); as well as Langton, Haslanger, and Anderson (2012, 759–60); and, for background, see 
Lewis (1979). I thank an anonymous reviewer for Social Theory & Practice for highlighting this connection for me. 
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subordinate need not always be tied to formal positional authority, like that of a legislator. In 
what follows I want to suggest that Maitra’s account is half right. That is, I argue that Maitra is 
correct in saying that subordinating authority is not always formal positional authority, but 
incorrect in claiming that it is not positional authority, nonetheless. Indeed, I believe the type of 
authority that makes ordinary instances of hate speech subordinating is fundamentally positional, 
and intend to show this through a critique of licensing. 
 
4. PROBLEMS WITH MAITRA’S SOLUTION 
 
On Maitra’s view of licensing, as we’ve seen, it’s possible for subordinating speaker 
authority to emerge out of the facts of the local speech situation. By this, I mean facts about the 
content of what is said, and whether or not it is plausibly added to the conversational 
background, which can be determined on the basis of whether it is challenged or not by the 
speaker’s audience. I believe this narrow focus on local features causes three related problems. 
First, this leads her view to provide counterintuitive results concerning when a speaker does and 
doesn’t have the authority to successfully issue rankings and potentially subordinate, as it seems 
to ignore the broader social factors necessary for subordination. Second, and consequently, I 
believe this account has difficulty distinguishing between cases where an utterance has the 
performative force of a ranking, and ones where it functions more plausibly as an expressive, in 
that it is taken as primarily an expression of the speaker’s wholly personal emotions rather than a 
claim about the world.98 And lastly, as I will explain in the following section, Maitra’s account 
 
98 The account of expressives I appeal to here—and explain more fully below—comes from Kukla (2014, 450–53). 
It is worth noting that Kukla is using ‘expressives’ in a non-Austinean way, and thus takes us away from the 
Austinean framework that Maitra employs. While this involves a slight change in terminology, I believe it is 
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has problems clarifying the domain of speaker authority, since it holds that licensing invests 
authority in a person independent of any social position. 
Imagine a case similar to the subway example, except that instead of an Arab woman 
facing the brunt of an older white man, a well-dressed white man is accosted by a lone, unkempt, 
young male passenger. The young man calls the older passenger “a greedy f**k,” who “got rich 
by raping the planet,” and claims loudly that the world would be “better off without him” and his 
ilk. Just like in the original example, all other conversations cease, and no one, including the 
target, voices any objection to the statements being made.99  
Some—though not I—might be tempted to describe this modified case similarly to the 
original. That is, the speaker might be thought to be issuing a ranking that aims to mark his target 
as an inferior and undesirable. With sustained silence from the other passengers, his ranking 
succeeds. And since unfairly ranking as inferior is a feature of subordination, we might conclude 
that this younger man subordinates his target in saying what he does. Yet, I believe it is very 
unlikely that this example depicts a case of subordination, and figuring out why can help us 
understand the type of authority at play in ordinary instances of hate speech. 
The first and most obvious way to avoid this counterintuitive result would simply be to 
point out that what’s gone wrong here is that this ranking is not an unfair or unjust ranking, and 
therefore not subordinating like the original case.100 We might say, then, the ranking succeeds, 
 
ultimately fruitful, in part because it allows us to examine the issue of uptake more broadly. I thank an anonymous 
reviewer for Social Theory & Practice for encouraging me to clarify my shift in terminology here. 
99 Much like the original subway case, this one is likely not unfamiliar to anyone who has lived in a larger city for 
some time, and I chose it in part because of its familiarity. As such it should be thought of as taking place within an 
‘everyday’ context, rather than, say, at a political rally, which would be relevantly different. 
100 Of course, intuitions likely conflict on this point, and many, including an anonymous reviewer for Social Theory 
& Practice, would see this as an unfair or unjust act—though perhaps not a subordinating one. In any case, my point 
is simply that there is a lack of symmetry between the two subway cases under consideration, and we need to 
investigate their differences more closely. 
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but it’s not subordinating because its content is not morally objectionable. This distinction 
between fair and unfair, or just and unjust, acts of ranking helps to separate the troubling case of 
the South African legislator from the more mundane case of ranking one athlete as faster than the 
others (Langton 1993, 304). So, it must be registered that this second subway case does not 
involve anything near the type of unjust ranking found in the initial example. I take it as given 
that the two subway cases differ dramatically in their content, in that one is deeply unjust while 
the other is arguably anti-oppressive. This has clear implications for the subordinating force of 
the one in contrast to the other.  
But I won’t pursue this strategy, in part because it makes ‘unjust’ do a lot of the crucial 
work, and I’m somewhat skeptical it’s up to the task. What I want to point out, moreover, is that 
this is not all that is different in these two cases—the explanation is not that simple, though it 
seems to be the (only) one that Maitra’s account permits. Even once we acknowledge this 
distinction in the content of the utterances in the two subway cases, the young man’s utterance is 
still clearly quite different from the completely innocuous form of ranking done at the end of a 
100m dash or after an ice dancing routine. First, it is not obviously the mere registering of an 
empirical fact (as the 100m dash is), but rather involves the projection of specifically ethical 
values (and so, unlike ice dancing). And second, it issues a ranking not about athletic or artistic 
ability, but about one’s standing in a social hierarchy. Arguably, any departure from equality 
here is prima facie unjust.101 This is not to say it comes anywhere near rivaling the type of 
injustice at issue in our first case, it is only to note that I find this route—that while both cases 
describe the successful issuing of a ranking, only the first is an unfair ranking and that is where 
 
101 One broad camp of egalitarians—Relational Egalitarians—can be thought to oppose any social system that 
endorses any hierarchy in the area of social standing; see Anderson (2012, 43–44). 
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the difference lies—too quick and too blunt. Furthermore, I just don’t see these two cases as 
being even this similar to each other, even aside from their differences in content. 
To this end, I think it’s best to resist the notion that the young man’s attempt at ranking 
his target as inferior, whether fair or unfair, succeeds. One way to do this is to see why the 
passengers may not take the young man to be attempting a ranking at all, even if this is exactly 
what he intends to be doing. That is, whether some utterance has the performative force of an 
assertion or of an expressive is sometimes not up to the speaker, but rather partially constituted 
by the uptake it receives (see Kukla and Lance 2009). As Rebecca Kukla argues, the difference 
between these two speech-acts—assertions and expressives—lies, in part, in how assertions 
make truth claims “about how the world is, and it either is or isn’t that way for everyone” (Kukla 
2014, 450, emphasis in original). In doing so, assertions seek “uptake in the form of agreement 
or rational challenge” (ibid., 451). Expressives, on the other hand, may be thought of as mere 
expressions of one’s feelings, and therefore as “‘wholly personal,’ non-truth-bearing speech 
acts” (ibid.).102 This difference shows up in the uptake expressives receive. As Kukla points out, 
“it doesn’t even make sense for me to ask whether I agree or disagree with [your expressive], or 
whether it reflects the world correctly. […] It is merely an expression of feelings, disconnected 
from rational discourse” (ibid.). I want to suggest that the young man’s utterance in our second 
example is best understood as functioning as an expressive in his situation. What he perhaps 
intends to be a statement about the world, the passengers might understandably take as an 
outburst of anger, and respond accordingly.103 Their silence, therefore, might not be indicative of 
 
102 Kukla takes the phrase “wholly personal” from Naomi Scheman; see Scheman (1993, 24–25). 
103 Here it is worth acknowledging that rankings and assertions are not identical acts. However, I agree with Maitra 
when she claims that the two are importantly related, and that “a speaker can perform a ranking just by asserting 
something;” see Maitra (2012, 112). 
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their granting him the licensed authority to issue a successful ranking, but, instead, tolerance for 
his anger, perhaps.  
But I don’t want to say the same thing about the ordinary hate speaker in our first case. 
Indeed, my basic claim is that these two cases share very little in common at the level of 
pragmatics. That is, beyond the important differences in the content of our two cases, it is the 
differences in their pragmatic structure that provides crucial insight into the subordinating 
authority of ordinary hate speech. 
As I see it, even if the hate speaker sees himself as merely voicing his own ‘wholly 
personal’ anger, it’s important to see something else, something very close to Maitra’s 
description of the case, going on. No matter his intentions, in speaking as he does—and being 
who he is—I take it that he performs a subordinating act. We might see this as the flip side of a 
phenomena Kukla terms “discursive injustice.” Cases of discursive injustice occur when a 
speaker who has the standard entitlements to perform a certain speech act goes about performing 
this act in all conventionally appropriate ways, and yet because of her gender, the uptake she 
receives constitutes her speech act as a different kind of act than its input would conventionally 
dictate (2014, 444–45).104 An utterance that would standardly be an imperative might become a 
request, simply because it comes from a woman in a traditionally male-dominated environment. 
And so similarly, despite the fact that ordinary speakers are not normally in a position to 
construct norms for others with what can be seen as potential rankings, the social position of 
some ordinary speakers, like the ordinary hate speaker in our original subway case, empowers 
their speech with unique performative force. 
 
104 Kukla notes that this phenomena is not restricted to instances where gender is the salient feature; discursive 
injustice also occurs where race, ability, orientation and other forms of membership in disadvantaged groups are at 
the fore. 
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I take it that something along these lines helps to explain the differences in the pragmatic 
structure of the two subway cases, as I highly doubt the ranking of the man in the second subway 
case is—aside from content—identical to that of the Arab woman. Yet, if the authority to rank 
others can be an emergent fact of the local speech situation, and if the deployment of rankings, 
given the right response, add their content to the shared background, something close to identity 
in pragmatic structure seems to be a plausible consequence of Maitra’s view. As Maitra puts it,  
[w]e might say the ‘essential aim’ of assertions is to make a difference of a particular 
kind to the shared background for a conversation, namely, to add its content to the shared 
background, and so to eliminate all possibilities incompatible with that content. … [And] 
we can say that a ranking, just like an assertion, seeks to add its content to the shared 
background of the conversation. If none of the participants to the conversation objects, 
the content may be added. That means that the background must be updated to eliminate 
all possibilities incompatible with that content. (Maitra 2012, 112) 
 
My worry is that what distinguishes the second subway case from our original example are 
features that Maitra’s account of licensing has difficulty explaining. 
This localized understanding of authority is clearest when Maitra says that in the case of 
licensing, the scope of authority “extends only to the parties to the conversation, and no farther” 
(2012, 117).105 She goes on to explain how the overlapping feature of multiple instances of hate 
speech “reinforce the subordination that each instance separately contributes” (ibid. 117–18, 
emphasis added). On this picture, then, the main difference between the two cases is in how 
often each occurs; their internal features are, in many key ways, the same. 
More importantly, I worry that an account of licensing of this sort runs the risk of 
ignoring the fact that hate speakers are never starting from scratch.106 It’s simply not the case that 
 
105 To be clear, Maitra is here describing the “jurisdictional” question of authority for cases of licensing. 
106 This is similar to the argument I made in Chapter One about Langton’s use of the South African legislator’s 
speech as a paradigm example of subordinating speech. Like Maitra, she over-inflates the role of an isolated speech 
act from a single speaker. I take these to be distinct, though obviously related criticism. 
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the speakers in our two subway examples above are making anything close to similar moves with 
their speech acts. What’s needed is an account of how ordinary instances of hate speech draw on, 
exploit, and give voice to pre-existing oppressive social norms that they then reshape and deploy 
in their utterances. Indeed, I take it that it’s partly because ordinary hate speech is so ordinary, in 
the sense of not uncommon or familiar, that it is able to have the authority it does, and this 
element of familiarity needs to be recognized in our account of subordinating authority. 
 
5. INFORMAL SITUATIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
To begin to build an alternative account, I want to appeal to Lynne Tirrell and her 
explanation of how our social interpretations and practices distribute “situated power” to 
particular individuals (1993, 14). This situated power is distributed, in part, through what Tirrell 
calls the “default interpretations” that one’s community enables.107 And while Tirrell’s focus in 
that paper is the default interpretation that a man is a full agent, and a woman is “less so” (ibid., 
14), to this we can add racist interpretations that depict people with darker skin as suspicious, as 
more likely than whites to commit crime, etc. When these interpretations are backed up by a 
community—such as by norms, laws, and institutions that enable and encourage the police to 
stop, search, and ultimately detain and incarcerate anyone they deem ‘suspicious’—they 
empower some individuals more than others, and allow them to perform certain acts that are 
unavailable to the disempowered. Tirrell claims, and I agree, that “this conception of situated 
power helps to bridge the gap between social practices and individual experience” (ibid.). 
Returning to the two subway cases: the ranking of an Arab person as inferior and 
 
107 Tirrell credits this concept of situated power to Tom Wartenberg; see Wartenberg (1988). 
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unwanted because of a possible connection to terrorism is, while deeply unjust, an association 
that is sadly backed up by the broader community.108 The hate speaker is best thought of, then, as 
giving voice to this pre-existing racist interpretation. He is functioning more like a mouthpiece 
for this interpretation, and less like a self-originating source of new norms. But crucially, it is 
also because of his status as a white man that his assertions are more likely to carry real weight 
in his community; indeed, they are more likely to be taken as assertions with truth-content rather 
than wholly personal expressives. These features fail to carry over to the modified example. But 
notice how neither—not the well-known racist association of his rant, nor the excessive standing 
given to white men in some societies—is established in the local speech situation; rather they are 
part of the background social norms that inform the local situation from the outside. Yet, an 
account of licensing like Maitra’s is isolated from these vital aspects of subordinating hate 
speech. 
These potential oversights in Maitra’s account, I now want to suggest, ultimately stem 
from her claim that licensing invests people with authority directly, not through social 
positions.109 For example, in the hiker case, Maitra says that “licensing invests Andy with 
authority. It does not invest authority in whoever occupies some given position” (2012, 114). My 
suggestion is, rather, that this is exactly what licensing does; the authority that speakers come to 
have through licensing is in virtue of creating and moving into relevant positions of authority, 
even if highly local and ad hoc ones. Andy’s authority emerges from his coming to occupy the 
position of hike organizer—a position that only exists because he creates it and moves himself 
 
108 What it takes for an interpretation to be backed up by the broader community is an important question that is, 
unfortunately, too big for me to answer here.  
109 It is clear that Maitra takes this to be an important upshot of her paper, as she says that “having authority isn’t the 
same as occupying a position of authority” (Maitra 2012, 114). 
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into through his speech. I suggest we call this type of authority informal situational authority. 
To get clearer on this idea, we might think of the initial instructions that Andy issues as 
functioning as a meta-call. As Mark Lance and Rebecca Kukla define it, a meta-call is “one in 
which the primary function of the call is […] to restructure normative relationships and 
possibilities for making first-order calls” (2013, 473). In the hiking case considered above, Andy 
is seeking the entitlement to issue commands to his friends—something he does not have 
standing to do at first. Yet, in uttering commands that require some authority to be binding, Andy 
can be thought to be both asking for this authority and marshalling it at the same time. His 
words, then, “do double duty” (ibid., 474–75). While his commands aim at his friends’ 
compliance, more fundamentally his utterances seek to alter his status relative to his audience, 
putting him in a position to determine the norms that bind them all.110 
Moreover, I believe this framework helps to resolve a possible ambiguity in Maitra’s 
account. While she explicitly says licensing invests people with authority, she also says it is the 
person’s speech that is licensed, and what’s more, that they are only licensed within a restricted 
domain, that is “someone is licensed to perform certain actions that affect certain others” (2012, 
107n).111 This explains why Andy can only order his friends to do things relating to their hike. If 
he tried to go beyond this domain, say, and ordered his friend Tomas to breakup with his 
boyfriend, it’s very unlikely this would be taken as an authoritative speech act. Yet, on the view 
that licensed authority is both attached to the person and open-ended, it’s hard to see what rules 
this out so obviously. You could of course say this order is unlikely to go unchallenged and so 
 
110 We might then think of his first utterance as functioning primarily as an entreaty. An entreaty, for Lance and 
Kukla, is a meta-call that “calls [on] someone to grant to the caller an entitlement to make certain kinds of claims 
that the called is not yet in a position to make” (2013, 474). 
111 Moreover, at another point she says because of “licensing, the speakers are in a position to perform their intended 
acts” (Maitra 2012, 113). 
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would not survive the licensing process. But it seems unnecessary to appeal to a failure of 
licensing here when the order looks, on the face of it, to lack any pretense of authority given the 
established context. Besides, I think it’s best to resist this more piecemeal approach to licensing, 
since, as Maitra suggests, it seems the authority in question is temporally extended in fuzzy way. 
As I see it, the clearer explanation is because Andy’s authority extends only as far as is 
determined by the social position he now occupies. The normative territory he enacted for 
himself and his audience is bounded in this more structured way. Even licensed authority is best 
understood as positional authority. And this makes sense since authority is a relation between 
two or more parties, where one party is granted more power than the other. Seeing speaker 
authority as positional makes this relation vivid. Yet, as Maitra does well to illustrate, this 
authority need not be tied to formally recognized positions, like that of a legislator. This, 
however, makes them much harder to spot and easily missed. 
How does this help with the two subway cases? I believe an analysis along these lines 
provides an entry point for the broader social facts that a pure licensing account misses. This is 
because the social roles that come with certain amounts of positional authority are, in many 
cases, closely related to the default interpretations backed up by a community. We see this when 
a white man’s opinions are more likely to be taken up as the concerns of the community at large, 
while a Black woman’s are often taken as indexed and fixed to her racial community.112 This is 
partly because, as Tirrell notes, “[f]or the oppressed, identity factors tend to limit uptake” 
 
112 Caroline West discusses this imbalance in terms of a “consideration failure,” where the opinions of marginalized 
persons do not receive the same consideration in the dominant society as would dominant speakers. See West (2012, 
244–45). West’s account is partly built off the work of Charles Lawrence III, who, on this subject, notes that: 
“Racist speech […] distorts the marketplace of ideas by muting or devaluing the speech of Blacks and other 
despised minorities. Regardless of intrinsic value, their words and ideas become less saleable in the marketplace of 
ideas. An idea that would be embraced by large numbers of individuals if it were offered by a white individual will 
be rejected or given less credence if its author belongs to a group demeaned and stigmatized by racist beliefs” (1993, 
78–79). 
101 
(2018b, 26). In this way, the social position of a white man seems to come with more authority to 
dictate what is and isn’t acceptable in public space, because in a racist society, it is taken as his 
space more than it is her space.113 This crudely simplifies matters quite a bit, of course, but I 
believe it gets us closer to understanding how ordinary instances of hate speech like the subway 
case can constitute subordination. In the original subway case, the man’s speech can be 
considered authoritative not simply because the passengers’ silence licenses some person to rank 
however he pleases, but because in (a) saying what he does, and (b) being who he is, he more 
easily moves into a role with the informal situational authority to say what is and isn’t accepted 
in the broader community. As an arbiter of community standards, say, his ranking may be 
thought to have originated from beyond the local speech situation, and thus carry real weight. It 
is therefore in taking up and giving voice to broader social views that an essential aspect of the 
ordinary hate speaker’s authority lies. 
I take it that a similar move is not—or at least less—available to the young man in the 
second case as his statement is less likely to function as a successful entreaty to an authoritative 
social position, and more likely taken as the angry tirade of a dissatisfied youth. And in the role 
of dissatisfied youth, he has no authority to determine the social statuses of others—save for 
maybe who is cool or not. In this way we can see how the licensed speaker authority that Maitra 
identifies is not independent of positional authority, but rather one way among others people may 
move into social positions of authority. 
However, even though I believe we have good reason to describe cases like ordinary hate 
 
113 As Tirrell puts it: “There are no universally neutral entrances, for the salience of identity factors is always in play 
and highly dependent on social context. Identity factors, historically entrenched in practices, often influence whether 
someone will even try to enter a game, whether others will try to keep her out, and how such exclusions would be 
achieved” (2018b, 25). 
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speech as cases of positional authority, they aren’t so simply described this way like the case of 
the South African legislator may be. That is, we must also aim to capture the dynamic process 
that Maitra describes occurring in licensing. This is important both to fully understand the 
mechanisms through which authoritative speech is enabled, and also to provide helpful guidance 
for how such speech acts should be resisted. 
 One of the substantial virtues of Maitra’s account of how ordinary hate speech gets 
licensed is how it holds the licensing audience responsible. If it is because of their silence and 
refusal to challenge the hate speaker’s speech that his ranking succeeds and therefore 
subordinates its target, then there is a clear moral obligation for the audience to speak up and 
block this attempted ranking. Silence is not a morally neutral response, and private disagreement 
does nothing to prevent subordination. In this way, she highlights the complicity that can be 
attributed to the audience of such an instance of ordinary hate speech (2012, 116–17).  
However, once we see how this authority is, pace Maitra, still positional authority, we’re 
led to a different understanding of what it means to challenge this act. To begin, I believe that 
Maitra underestimates what it takes to resist subordinating acts. If one’s moral complicity in 
subordination is constituted by their participation in licensing a speaker’s utterance, then it seems 
that one can discharge this responsibility rather easily. Recall, the feature that allows an audience 
to license a speaker’s subordinating ranking despite strongly held reservations is the fact that so 
long as these reservations remain private, they fail to challenge the utterance’s content being 
added to the conversational background. However, consider the situation had a single passenger 
in the original subway case spoken up, saying “That’s not very nice” to the ordinary hate 
speaker. To be sure, this is, given the context, a potentially brave thing to do and is much better 
than remaining silent. At the same time, though, I fail to see why this should render all of the 
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hate speaker’s subordinating authority null. Indeed, it seems plausible to me that even in a case 
where a passenger challenges the hate speaker’s words in this way, this act still constitutes 
subordination.114 
I believe the reason why this only goes so far as a response, and why it fails to challenge 
in the right way, is because it is directed at the hate speaker’s utterance at level of content, and 
not the speaker’s authority more directly. In their analysis of the pragmatic structure of how a 
speech act may be met with defiance, Lance and Kukla suggest that “defiances can be divided 
into responses that serve to challenge the speaker’s entitlement to the original speech act and 
those that do not” (2013, 470). On the one hand, the “That’s not very nice” response clearly 
challenges and resists the original speech act—it does not allow its unfair ranking to be added to 
the conversational background unobstructed. On the other hand, this response does not seem to 
challenge the speaker’s entitlement or standing to make a call of this sort. That is, what’s being 
challenged is the precise ranking that’s being made, and not the fact that this speaker claims to be 
in a position to issue a ranking at all. As such, it may be thought that by challenging the utterance 
in this way this response still “acknowledge[s] the force of the norm that [the passenger is] 
violating” (ibid., 471). That is, there is a disagreement about the content at issue, rather than the 
hate speaker’s standing to issue content of this sort. This would be similar to a tennis player’s 
disagreement with the umpire’s decision to call “Out!” when she believes it was ‘in,’ rather than 
if she wanted to challenge the umpire’s entitlement to even make a call at all, perhaps because 
she questions the umpire’s training, attention, neutrality, and so on. 
In order to fully challenge the hate speaker’s utterance, what’s needed is an act that 
 
114 I explore this potential problem for accounts licensing and accommodation more fully in Chapters Three and 
Four. 
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resists the speaker’s attempt to step into an unjust position of authority over others, or one that 
challenges the authority of the utterance directly, rather than simply challenging what he does 
with that authority (ibid.).115 Unfortunately, there cannot be any universal principles on how this 
may be accomplished in the varied contexts where ordinary instances of hate speech occur. In 
general though, acts that aim to reposition the ordinary hate speaker as someone who clearly 
lacks authority over his audience, either by blocking his attempt to raise his own status or by 
making one’s solidarity with the target of his speech clear, can help resist the subordinating force 
of his utterance. Moreover, once we understand that the subordinating force of ordinary hate 
speakers’ words come from their ability to situate themselves—and not just their words—in a 
distinct normative relation to their audience, we have a clearer target at which our defiant acts 




In this chapter I criticized Maitra’s account of licensing for focusing solely on the local 
facts of the speech situation at the expense of ignoring the broader social facts that are essential 
to understanding speaker authority in cases of ordinary hate speech. I argued that this misstep 
means that her account fails to distinguish between cases where a speaker does and does not 
successfully rank/subordinate his target. This is the case, furthermore, because Maitra’s account 
has difficulty fully capturing the pragmatic structure of hate speech. 
With Maitra, I share the intuition that ordinary instances of hate speech constitute 
 
115 More dramatically, there is what Lance and Kukla dub an “activist speech act,” that is, “one that does not merely 
draw upon but in fact functions to subvert or reconfigure the normative context in which it operates” (2013, 473). 
One possibility is that activist acts of this type may be supererogatory in some situations. 
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subordination, and also that subordination generally requires authority. Yet, I argued that 
authority of this sort requires occupying a particular position of authority. I suggested that the 
licensed speaker authority that Maitra identifies is not independent of positional authority, but 
rather one way among others people may move into social positions of authority. These positions 
can be ad hoc and informal, only emerging when particular utterances are attempted and given 
particular uptake but are still needed to help explain the domain of authority better than a pure 
licensing account. As I see them, cases of ordinary hate speech are cases where a speaker seeks 
informal positional authority via a speech act that functions both as meta-call aiming to give the 
speaker a novel authoritative standing and a ranking that enforces an unjust hierarchal civil 
status. Moreover, I claimed that positional authority of the kind that concerns subordinating hate 
speech often hides in plain sight, in the default interpretations backed up by communities. 
Who does or doesn’t have the authority to subordinate is not an easy question to answer. 
But it is not one that can be answered simply by looking at who holds the formal offices of 
authority. And it is equally not one that can be answered by looking solely at the local speech 
situation. Speech, and especially authoritative speech, must be seen to draw upon the social 
norms of the broader community. One way this might occur is by restructuring the informal 
positional roles that lay in waiting for speakers to take them up. And as with most positions of 
authority, they are often more easily accessed by some members of the community than others.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  





So far in this dissertation, I have sought to add depth to the claim that some speech acts 
are oppressive and harmful, accounting for the importance of both causal and constitutive 
interpretations. In doing so, I have also defended the claim that some of these speech acts require 
the speaker to possess a type of authority to accomplish this subordination successfully but 
argued that this authority can be much more ad hoc and informal than is usually recognized. This 
chapter continues to explore how speakers engage in oppressive speech and addresses the 
diversity of entitlements that make different subordinating speech acts possible. So, I ask what 
types of authority enable subordinating speech in addition to the type of licensed informal 
situational authority of subway hate speaker considered in Chapter Two.  
Below, I sketch a rough, non-exhaustive taxonomy of subordinating speech acts and their 
entitlement conditions. It is non-exhaustive because I do not presume to cover the whole terrain 
of subordinating speech in a single chapter. The language of bigotry is always evolving, and any 
analysis will always be but a snapshot. The rise of the internet and social media has led to many 
new developments in this terrain, including the use of spamming, mobbing, and doxing as 
weapon in the hate speaker’s arsenal. And so, I cannot hope to include everything here—though 
I do explore some of these notable aspects of online speech in more detail in the following 
chapter. 
And it is also rough, moreover, because I do not believe the distinctions to be drawn 
below admit of rigid boundaries. Rather this is a mixed bag of speech acts. Consider how some 
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target an entire group (e.g., all Muslims), while others target a specific individual belonging to 
several groups (e.g., a particular, identifiable, hijab-wearing Muslim American woman on the 
political left). But even in the latter case it’s clear that other Muslim women—and other non-
women Muslims, and other non-Muslim women, etc.—may be harmed as well. Identifying the 
direct target of a subordinating speech act does not exhaust those whom it harms, but I believe it 
is an important first step in understanding what speech act is being performed. 
In other cases, it is the speaker whose social position or identity is relevant to its status as 
a subordinating speech act. For example, when it’s the president uttering what is arguably hate 
speech, that is significant in a somewhat unique way. At other times, it is the speaker’s 
anonymity that lends their speech act subordinating power (e.g., a ‘White Power’ flyer posted on 
lamppost). In-between cases are prevalent here as well, where the speaker is not anonymous, but 
also does not occupy a unique position of authority (e.g., a group of male colleagues sharing 
sexist ‘jokes’ over company email).116  
Despite these many differences, the speech acts I examine all share the feature of being a 
tool of subordination, or at least the potential to function as such. They share the potential to 
cause or constitute the types of harms discussed in Chapter One. This is therefore their essential 
pragmatic effect. This is what they accomplish, and this is what binds these speech acts together, 
and unifies them under a single concept—subordinating speech. Yet, as I will show below, there 
are myriad paths open for speakers to achieve this effect, and these differences form part of the 
explanation of how these constitute difference acts. So, while the boundaries are unquestionably 
rough, I claim that acknowledging differences like these opens useful avenues of analysis. 
 
116 Or, for a recent real-life case, a group of United States Custom and Border Patrol (CBP) agents were uncovered 
to be sharing hateful content in a secret Facebook group. 
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I believe that reflecting on the diverse sorts of acts that together constitute the category of 
subordinating speech is useful for a few reasons. First, this chapter offers resistance to the idea 
that subordinating speech acts all collapse into one category—which we might call the 
‘subordinative.’117 While no theorist explicitly argues for this view (as far as I know), it is often 
implied in their discussions on the subject. For instance, Mary Kate McGowan rejects the 
necessity of speaker authority and argues for a view that, in barest form, holds that “speech must 
be exercitive in order for it to be an act of oppression” (2009, 392). Similarly, Rae Langton 
advances what I will call a “monolithic” account of speaker authority for analyzing 
subordinating speech. Though she’s helpfully added various elements of nuance with recent 
modifications, her account still operates with the fundamental assumption that speaker authority 
should be modeled on the paradigm case of the legislator. And so, unlike McGowan who deflates 
speaker authority altogether such that it appears everywhere, Langton sees speaker authority as 
always indexed to some specific person. While I will have more to say about each of these views 
below in section 4, here I only wish to note that they seem to imply that all (or most) 
subordinating speech act function in roughly the same way. For my part, I am skeptical of these 
reductionist moves, and aim to avoid both extremes represented by these accounts: overly 
fetishizing the speaker-authority-as-legislator model of Langton, or overcompensating with the 
speaker-authority-is-everywhere (and so plays little or no role) model of McGowan. Both, I 
argue, fail to properly account for the speaker’s role in subordination.118  
Second, there is the plain fact that we must understand these acts of subordination in 
order to combat them. As I understand it, the ultimate goal of an analysis of subordinating speech 
 
117 John Michael Ramsey also argues against such an approach, though his specific topic and arguments differ 
significantly from mine; see (Ramsey 2013, 76–88). 
118 Conversations with Matthew Shields were helpful in clarifying my views here. 
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ought to be to fully capture the complexity of this phenomenon, primarily as it is experienced by 
those who most often are its targets. A step I take towards that goal is to take stock of what has 
been left unexamined or under-examined in the dominant approaches.119 This chapter argues that 
the variety among subordinating speech acts is one such area left under-examined, especially by 
theorists following the narrow Austinean path that privileges the illocutionary act, represented 
below chiefly by Langton and McGowan. By identifying distinct subordinating speech acts—and 
different entitlements speakers draw on to accomplish these acts—we are in a better position to 
challenge and undo the harms of oppressive speech. Once we appreciate the different manners in 
which speech and language oppress, we understand better what we’re up against. 
Finally, one addition I make here that will be important going forward is to identify a 
type entitlement for subordinating speech acts that is distinctively collective, in that it draws on a 
status provided by a group of speakers. That is, these speech acts attain subordinating force by 
being a part of a broader group-practice, where the individual speaker and their utterance would 
have little significance apart from their participation in this practice. The point I aim to make 
here is distinct from—though certainly related to—the general one about oppression itself being 
a systemic set of practices. I drew on that feature to highlight the deficiencies of illocution-
focused accounts in Chapters One and Two, in that they tend to isolate speech acts from the 
broader practices within which they are a part. Here I point towards an entirely discursive 
version of this problem by considering speech acts that derive their distinct oppressive authority 
from being a part of a group of subordinating speakers. My aim is to show how the entitlement to 
 
119 This is not to say that philosophers have left this topic untouched. Alexander Brown, for example, has recently 
given a thorough overview of the different types of hate speech and the corresponding hate speech laws that various 
jurisdictions have enacted or considered (Brown 2015). However, his project was mainly couched in legal concepts, 
while I consider this topic using the lens of social philosophy of language. Specifically, I use the tools of speech act 
theory and pragmatics to examine differences at the level of entitlement conditions and pragmatic force for the 
language-based mechanisms of oppression. 
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subordinate is not always located in individual speakers, but often in their participation in 
harmful group practices of subordinating speech. Chapters Four and Five will then continue this 
analysis through two revealing cases: online harassment and protest, respectively. 
 
1.1. Methodological Foundations 
 
 In the introduction of the dissertation, I briefly described the role variance plays in the 
expanding philosophical literature on slurs. In short, the sheer variety of slurs themselves has led 
many theorists to consider differences across usages to be an important feature of slurs. This fact 
of variance can be considered a foundational piece of data that theories of slurs must account for 
if they are to be successful. Yet, in much of the literature on subordinating speech beyond slurs, 
the importance of variety plays no similar foundational role, and is often ignored. But, as I see it, 
the importance of accounting for variance with regard to slur use provides a prima facie case for 
a similar importance for subordinating speech acts beyond slurs.120 
And, to be sure, many theorists writing on subordinating speech do acknowledge variety 
in one form or another in their analysis. I am not the only writer making this point, by any 
means. Lynne Tirrell, for instance, has in recent work developed a conception of toxic speech, 
exploiting the metaphor of toxins and epidemiology in a fairly literal way. In doing so, she has 
done well to highlight the fact of variability. This is noted mainly in terms of harm in her 
 
120 It is somewhat odd that this stark difference could exist between philosophical approaches to slurs on the one 
hand, and philosophical approaches to subordinating speech on the other. However, it is a predictable result of the 
way how each subfield has grown largely independently of the other. Throughout this dissertation my focus remains 
for the most part on the subordinating speech subfield, which has its origins in Langton’s speech act approach to 
pornography and later hate speech. The literature on slurs differs in part because of the importance semantic 
analyses have played in its overall development, which took this subfield in a different direction in general. Despite 
these contingent differences, however, theorists of subordinating speech surely have much to benefit from 
engagement with theories of slurs, and vice versa. Taking stock of the importance of variety of oppressive 
utterances, I contend, is one crucial lesson the analysis of slurs can teach us all. 
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account. “We should not assume,” she cautions, “a one-size-fits-all conception of harm; 
variability is the norm” (Tirrell 2017, 149). And, because of the epidemiological model that she 
is working with, she takes these differences in harms to be analyzable in terms of differences in 
‘exposure.’121 In exploring this idea, Tirrell writes: 
Some speech acts are very potent, delivering harmful messages that undermine decent 
functioning nearly immediately, and some of these cases have long-lasting effects. Some 
speech acts with a seemingly milder level of disrespect (for example) gain their power 
from repetition, so that the person might not be much damaged by any single event, but 
mightily damaged by the deluge of these across her lifetime. Route of exposure would 
likely map onto one-on-one speech vs. public speech, written vs. oral, known speaker or 
anonymous. Dosage would include both quantity and frequency, so would overlap with 
potency to some extent. Susceptibility factors would help guide our understanding why 
uptake varies. (2017, 147) 
 
As this shows, the toxic speech model encourages an analysis where speech acts are understood 
to have a range of plausible effects, which are partly but not wholly fixed by the type of act it is. 
Different ‘doses’ and ‘routes of exposure’ produce different consequences in different 
populations. Tirrell uses an inferentialist approach to map these relations, with language entry 
moves, language-language moves, and language exit as the three (broad) types of speech acts 
used to categorize any instance.122  
This is a useful approach, and one I partly follow below.123 But my sketch of the different 
types of subordinating speech acts differs in a few respects. First, I dispense with the 
epidemiological analogy, and aim to speak literally about the harms of subordinating speech. The 
 
121 The importance of taking the idea of toxicity onboard is evident when Tirrell writes the following: “Medically, 
toxicity’s harm admits of degrees, and can be acute or chronic, depending on the number and potency of exposures. 
A poison’s impact and degree of hazard depends on its potency, route, dosage, and susceptibility or uptake. 
Susceptibility depends on the condition of the subject. Once exposed, some effects may last a lifetime, while others 
may be overcome” (Tirrell 2017, 147). 
122 This framework builds upon systems developed by Sellars (1954); Lewis (1979); and Brandom (1998). 
123 Other work that was influential in my thinking in what follows includes Sbisà (2002; 2018); Berdini (2013); 
Hanrahan and Antony (2005); as well as Butler (1997). For an illuminating critique of Butler, see Schwartzman 
(2002). 
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metaphor to toxicity is a helpful entry point to capture the seriousness and the diversity of 
subordinating speech, but as a metaphor it opens the door to critics who might question the dis-
analogies between literal toxins and speech. Second, I eschew the Sellarsian language of 
language-entry and language-exit moves. While helpful in certain contexts, here it has the 
troublesome implication that it runs the risk of implying that language and actions are two 
distinct modes of interaction; that the world of speech and the ‘real’ world are not the same one. 
I believe this implication ought to be avoided when discussing subordinating speech, as it risks 
playing into the ‘just words’ criticism. To be clear, though, this is by no means meant as a 
decisive objection. Rather, I am just laying my cards (preferences) on the table. 
Instead, I opt for thinking of speech acts in terms of inputs and outputs. In broad outline, 
this follows the account developed by Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance, where they maintain that 
“speech acts can be productively analyzed in terms of the normative statuses that enable them 
and the normative changes they effect through their performative structure” (2009, 13). This 
leads to a functional analysis of speech acts in terms of the normative statuses that entitle their 
performances, and the changes their performance tends to bring about. As they say:  
If speech acts function to bring about changes in normative status, then they take 
normative statuses as inputs and produce them as outputs. Specifically, we can 
distinguish between the norms governing the proper production of a speech act, which 
give rise to statuses that entitle its performance, and the changes in normative status that 
their proper production strives to make. (Kukla and Lance 2009, 14) 
 
In a similar spirit, I analyze subordinating speech acts according to what type of speaker 
entitlements they presume, and what type of uptake they (typically) generate. As I conceive of 
them subordinating speech acts all have the common goal of maintaining hierarchies of 
oppression. This is what they, as speech acts, strive to do, regardless of whether their speaker 
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shares this intention.124 ‘Innocent’ microaggressions, racist ‘jokes,’ and ‘just trolling’ misogyny 
are all examples of subordinating speech acts that entrench oppression without this being the 
putative intent of the speaker.  
Note, too, how the type of speech act is not always clearly indicated by its grammatical 
form. Questions, for instance, can have the subordinating pragmatic force of verdictives in the 
appropriate circumstances. Consider a recent tweet from the magazine The Economist asking, 
“[s]hould transgender people be sterilized before they are recognized?” (Levine 2019). This 
speech act combines a lack of (conscious) hostile intention with the grammatical form of a 
question, but nonetheless subordinates. Critics objected—rightly—to the question being 
presented so bluntly, absent any mention of its context regarding a decision from the Japanese 
Supreme Court. In doing so, The Economist implicitly legitimized the premise of the question, 
which casts doubt on the equal moral status of transgender people. This demonstrates how 
grammatical form is only a rough guide to subordinating force, as speech acts of likely any form 
can have the function of subordinating. 
But aside from simply entrenching subordination, these speech acts have other notable 
features in their output worthy of differentiation. Rather than looking at speaker intentions—as if 
that were even really possible—or grammatical form, I examine the output of subordinating 
speech acts in terms of three features: to whom is it primarily addressed; whom does it target for 
subordination; and what normative statuses it assigns, which is informed in part by the first two 
features, along with the specific entitlements it marshals. 
 
124 Here I follow Kukla and Lance, who note: “The function of a speech act should not be confused with either the 
intention of the speaker in uttering it or the standard use of that string of words in the community. Of course […] 
there has to be at least a defeasible concordance between function, intention, and standard use, and it is patterns of 
intention and use that serve to institute the contentful pragmatic structure of a language in the first place. But […] 
we reject any analytic identities between function, intention, and convention, even while acknowledging that there is 
a constitutive, defeasible connection between these things.” (2009, 13–14) 
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On the input side, authority, as I understand it, is a particularly important type of speaker 
entitlement, but it is not the only kind. The discussion of the previous chapter may then be seen 
as an analysis of one type of entitlement for subordinating speech. That was a first step towards 
my current goal of describing more distinctions to be made between the entitlements that enable 
subordinating speakers. In my eyes, we shouldn’t conflate the ad hoc informal situational 
authority of the man ranting on the subway with the quasi-epistemic authority of the quack-
academic who calmly promotes race-science. Similarly, we should recognize the entitlements 
afforded by specific relationships or social roles, like being a parent or partner, may also give 
rise to distinct subordinating speech acts available to different speakers in different contexts. 
That is, a difference in speaker entitlements explains why the utterance “the thought of you 
kissing another woman disgusts me”125 has a different subordinating force when spoken from a 
mother to her queer daughter than if that same daughter overheard Pat Robertson saying same-
sex kissing “makes [him] want to throw up” (Tashman 2013), though the content is very similar. 
In each case, the specific position the speaker occupies, including the distinct normative statuses 
these presume, enable subordinating speech acts with notably different forces. 
Acknowledging this type of variability is trivially true in the discussion of slurs. And 
while not flatly denied by any authors I’m aware of, it remains largely under-examined in the 
broader subordinating speech literature. I believe it is important to recognize these sorts of 
distinctions explicitly, and moreover, doing so in a way that does not endorse a rigid hierarchy 
among these acts, as this betrays the experience of those target by this speech (Gelber and 
McNamara 2016). After laying out some of these distinctions, I’ll argue that McGowan fails at 
 
125 Adapted from Ramsey (2013). 
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the former task (recognizing the distinctions), and Langton at the latter (rejecting a hierarchy of 
subordinating speech). 
 
2. VARIETY WITHIN SUBORDINATING SPEECH 
 
It’s useful take stock of the different sorts of utterances we’ve encountered so far, along 
with some new ones. With these in view, we can note a few rough, intuitive distinctions that 
demonstrate the different sorts of acts these represent. Doing so will help set the stage for the 
more in-depth discussion of the various entitlements and outputs that follows. 
a) A South African legislator, in the appropriate circumstances, says: “Blacks are no longer 
permitted to vote,” and therefore makes it the case that black South Africans can no 
longer vote (Langton 1993, 302–03). 
b) An older white man walks up to an Arab woman on a subway car crowded with people, 
and says, “F***in’ terrorist, go home. We don’t need your kind here.” He continues 
speaking in this manner to the woman, who doesn’t respond. He speaks loudly enough 
that everyone in the car hears his words clearly. All other conversations cease. Many of 
the passengers turn to look at the speaker, but no one interferes. (adapted from Maitra 
2012, 100–01) 
c) Outside a store in New Jersey are signs posted reading: “Muslims stay out!” and “We 
don’t serve Muslims!” (adapted from Waldron 2012). 
d) A Black man steps onto a bus filled with only white people, and a white man utters: 
“Turn around boy, you’re not welcome here” (McGowan 2012). 
e) A radio program in Rwanda broadcasts the message “All Tutsi are snakes and must be 
eliminated” 
f) A man yells from across the street, “I’m gonna kill you f——ts!” 
g) In the comments section on a news website for an article reporting on the shooting death 
of a young Indigenous man, someone posts: “All Indians are savages!!!” 
h) Late at night, a burning cross is hastily set up outside the home of the lone Black family 
who recently moved into the neighborhood. The commotion wakes them up. Terrified, 
they peek outside and see a car pulling away. 
i) Members of the Westboro Baptist Church protest outside the funeral of a soldier who was 
killed in Iraq, holding signs that say, “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “God Hates F-gs,” 
and “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11.” 
j) “… laziness is a trait in blacks. It really is. I believe that. It’s not anything they can 
control” (Donald Trump, as reported in Cassidy 2018) 
k) A man in the crowd at a football match yells, “Go back to Africa!” at one of the opposing 
players, who is Black. 
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l) A ‘White Power’ flyer is posted on a number of bulletin boards across a college campus. 
m) A passing car yells “White Power” to a group of young Black children playing outside 
n) A large group of (mostly) white men, marching in a street of US city, chant; “Jews will 
not replace us!” 
o) Steve and John are co-workers at a factory with very few female employees. They are 
eating lunch in the lounge and John asks, “How’d it go last night?” Steve responds, “I 
banged the bitch.” John, smiling, asks, “She got a sister?” (Adapted from McGowan 
2009, 399) 
p) Susannah says to Jolene, her daughter, “The idea of your kissing another woman is 
unimaginable and disgusting” (adapted from Ramsey 2013). 
 
As this list of examples helps reminds us, subordinating speech covers many different instances 
of hateful or otherwise bigoted speech. It can be delivered orally, in writing, on the internet, or 
even in tangible, highly symbolic form, as the burning cross example shows. It can be primarily 
ingroup speech, either as an explicit effort to strengthen animosity towards outgroups, or as 
casually bigoted banter. It can also be speech that crosses identity-lines, either intentionally or 
not. It can come from a speaker who is known to its target, whether as a personal relation, or as a 
public figure. And it can, as Delgado and Stefancic say, be “direct and indirect, veiled or overt, 
single or repeated, backed by authority and power or not, and accompanied by threat of violence 
or not” (2013, 11). For these reasons I believe it is a fundamentally diverse category, encasing 
many different types of speech acts. 
 
2.1. Rough Distinctions 
 
Before going into detail about differences in the entitlements and outputs, it’s useful to 
first note a few intuitive, though rough, distinctions available. First, there is the distinction, 
already covered earlier, between assaultive hate speech and propagandistic hate speech. 
Assaultive hate speech, occurs where the speaker directly accosts their target(s); often face-to-
face, but can also occur via phone, text, social media, etc. Propagandistic hate speech, in 
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contrast, is standardly ingroup speech about an outgroup. But, of course, outgroup members may 
indeed be part of the audience of this speech, so we should add: boundary-crossing 
propagandistic hate speech, which is ingroup hate speech that reaches outgroup members, 
whether directly at the time of utterance, or through other means, like general circulation in the 
media.126 
And in all these cases, a relevant difference lies in the fact that the speaker may either be 
known or unknown to their audience. Public figures are one kind of case, personal acquaintances 
are another. We can also distinguish between identifiable laypeople who are unknown to the 
target in one sense, and fully anonymous speakers who are unknown in a different sesne. A 
subordinating speech act uttered by an Identifiable public figure would include the South African 
legislator case, as well as the Donald Trump example above. We could also include the 
Westboro Baptist Church case here as well, as they are a well-known group, while not holding 
any official office like the legislator or Trump (eventually). One uttered by a Personal 
acquaintance captures the example of Susanna and her daughter, as well as the factory-lunch 
example. We can think of Identifiable layperson cases as capturing the Subway example, as well 
the case where a Black man is accosted while stepping onto the bus, and others. In these cases, 
the speaker does not occupy a relevant office and isn’t known to the target in any other sense 
either; these are the ‘ordinary’ instances of hate speech discussed at length in Chapter Two. But 
Anonymous speakers are relevantly different: Where “White Power” or “Muslims Out!” is 
plastered on a wall, there is no obvious speaker to whom we can attribute the speech act. And 
 
126 Gelber and McNamara (2016) refer to these as “generally circulated” instances of hate speech. That is, hate 
speech events that are reported—whether in the media or by word-of-mouth—to those outside of the original 
audience. 
118 
note how this can occur in direct assaultive hate speech as well, as online harassment 
demonstrates. 
Similarly, the speaker may be alone or part of a group, and this makes a difference for the 
type of subordinating act being performed. The subordinating effect of one person shouting on a 
corner seems intuitively than a large group chanting: “Jews will not replace us!” And, 
interestingly, it is within a large group that singularly identifiable individuals may achieve 
something close to anonymity. 
Finally, there is an intuitively relevant distinction is how these speech acts may be 
singular events, or part of repeating pattern. As Regina Rini argues in the case of 
microaggressions, a “relatively minor insulting event [is] made disproportionately harmful by 
taking part in an oppressive pattern of similar insults” (2018a, 332) As she says: “What makes 
microaggression distinctively harmful is victims’ awareness that each instance is not an isolated 
accident” (2018a, 335). What’s the case for microaggressions also seems to carry over to other 
types of subordinating speech, and I explore this more fully below. 
This quick roundup of some intuitive distinctions makes a prima facie case that there is, 
in fact, a multitude of speech acts with oppressive force(s), with relevant differences in terms of 
both the speaker’s role in shaping those forces, as well as how these utterances impact their 
targets. Going forward, my primary goal is to clarify some of these distinctions using the 
concepts of entitlement conditions and outputs of normative status. As will become clear by the 
end of the next section, I understand speaker authority as a subset of broader entitlements, and 
authority itself can be helpfully distinguished in a few ways. 
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3. A (ROUGH) TAXONOMY OF SUBORDINATING SPEECH ACTS 
 
As I said at the outset, a complete and precise taxonomy of subordinating speech is an 
elusive goal. But making some heuristic distinctions about speaker-entitlement can clarify what 
enables certain speech acts to have the subordinating force they do. Similarly, understanding the 
different outputs different speech acts typically strive for can reveal the interlocking way that 
subordination functions. The analysis of oppressive speech is improved when we keep both 




Authority has played such a large role in shaping the philosophical literature on 
subordinating speech, so it’s useful to dig into this concept first. To be useful however, authority 
must to be distinguished in more ways beyond just formal and informal. At the general level, I 
agree with Tirrell when she says, “[d]iscursive authority is a situational power to make felicitous 
speech acts and gain a range of appropriate uptakes. A speaker’s discursive authority renders her 
speech acts socially meaningful” (2018b, 15). And, as experience tells us, this situational power 
can be exercised in many ways. 
A conception of formal authority can easily explain why the current President has some 
significant powers, and why their (executive) orders have the force to compel action that they do. 
But even here the importance of recognizing domains of authority is necessary, as this explains 
why there are many areas outside of the domain of this authority.127 This is explained by 
 
127 Nearly all authority is limited to a domain, and so specifying its domain is a crucial task. The one exception is 
perhaps God’s authority in some religion. As Tirrell notes “Theists ascribe perfect authority to God, who, as the 
original speaker of performative utterances, has creative as well as absolute coercive power” (2018b, 16). 
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appealing to the formal process that grounds this authority. In the case of the President, there is 
an inauguration and the constitution, which explains both how one attains these powers, and 
what their limits are. This type of authority is properly recognized as institutional authority, and 
it is by inhabiting institutional roles that some speakers are authorized to perform certain kinds of 
speech acts (Tirrell 2018b, 17). Once we identify what role within a given institution a speaker 
occupies, we learn a great deal about their ability to make authoritative utterances. And, of 
course, this kind of authority can be used to subordinate. Therefore we should take note of: 
• Formal positional authority: The explicit, institutionally backed authority held by 
identifiable speakers in formal positions that grant them power to issue binding 
directives in a given domain.  
 
This is the type of authority demonstrated in examples such as the South African legislator, and 
others where the legal rights and permissions are at issue. The domain and jurisdiction of formal 
authority is, generally, explicitly codified. 
But when we’re considering informal, or non-institutional, conceptions of authority, 
things are much less clear cut. The mechanisms by which one gains authority, along with the 
specific contours of the scope of its domain or the strength of its edicts are much less obvious.  
One promising direction is to understand authority as something that an audience can 
bestow on a speaker.128 As we saw in the last chapter, speakers can make utterances whereby 
they attempt to move themselves into a position of authority over their audience, and how an 
audience responds can play a significant role in whether or not this move succeeds. So, one 
option for gaining informal authority may occur via what Ishani Maitra (2012) calls “licensing.” 
 
128 Maitra (2012) offers one account of how this can occur. Langton’s newer work (2017; 2018a; 2018b) also 
develops this and combines the notion of informal authority along with that of accommodation. Tirrell (2018b) has 
helpful insights on this topic, as do Ayala and Vasilyeva (2014). 
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While I raised some complications with her account of this process, I nonetheless agree with the 
general assessment that a speaker who seemingly lacks authority prior to speaking may gain it 
when their speech acts go unchallenged. Though, as I argued earlier, background norms play a 
significant role in determining who can attain this authority, and what the appropriate domains of 
that authority include. This gives us: 
• Informal situational authority: The authority that can arise when speakers stake out 
an ad hoc authoritative position in a given situation, and the audience grants the 
speaker authority over a specific domain (e.g., appropriate behavior in the local 
environment).  
 
This type of authority is situational, and as such is not stable across contexts. So, unlike the 
legislator who usually retains authority over their domain from one day to the next, speakers with 
situational authority might lose it soon after they acquired it.  
But, once we recognize the importance of domain in anchoring authority, we can notice a 
distinct type of informal authority that is nonetheless fairly stable. For a first pass at this idea, 
consider how something like authority seems plausible when there is a distinct lack of rivals in a 
particular domain. Utterances that occur within a relatively closed community, like online ‘incel’ 
forums, can seem to take place apart from the rest of the world. It is in these cases, Langton 
suggests, “a speaker may have authority relative to one field, where there are no rivals, but […] 
the speaker’s authority may be invisible to those looking from outside the bubble” (2017, 18). 
That is, in some contexts, a vacuum of authority may be exploited by otherwise non-authoritative 
speakers. Here, a “low type may be all one has, when it comes to authority (Langton 2018a). We 
may then note: 
• Informal stable authority: The authority a speaker can have in a specific domain 
despite lacking institutional sanction, arising from a complete lack of rivals. 
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Where there is a complete lack of sexual education in schools, pornography may take on 
authoritative status in the domain of sex, if only for a subset of its whole audience, who then 
form their beliefs and take their cues from this source. Absent rival candidates for authority, 
these speakers’ words have the performative force of authoritative judgments.  
However, appeals to domain only go so far. It may make some sense to claim that 
pornographers have informal authority in the domain of sex because of its near-monopoly status 
for many adolescents (Langton 2018a, 32ff). But it strains meaning to say that bigoted 
propagandists, like the white supremacist Richard Spencer, have authority in a domain like 
immigration because of an absence of comparative rivals. Here, there are rivals, and it’s simply 
not the case that his racist views are the only ones his audience has encountered. Indeed, it’s 
often because these views push back against what his audience sees as ‘the liberal orthodoxy of 
the elites’ that he—or speakers like him—are given uptake. And so, this explanation alone will 
not do, and we’ll need to add to it. Yet, since a not-insignificant portion of their audience treats 
them as authoritative in this way, there is clearly something to be said here.  
Note, though, how in both cases of informal authority speakers rely on their audience to 
recognize their authority and respond with the appropriate uptake to achieve this status. Thus, in 
informal cases we must note how “[a]uthority results in uptake, and uptake further entrenches 
authority” (Tirrell 2018b, 17). There is therefore a reciprocal relationship between uptake and 
authority. To get clearer on this, it’s necessary to examine in more detail exactly what we mean 
when we’re inquiring about authority for subordinating speech. This entails clarifying authority 
in a few key ways, namely, how it operates in a nonideal fashion, and how it may be relative 
along a number of axes. 
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3.1.1. Nonideal authority 
 
It’s useful to distinguish between practical and epistemic authority, as this helps to reveal 
the nonideal nature of the authority that concerns us. Practical authority is authority for action, 
while epistemic authority is authority for belief.129 The characteristic speech act of practical 
authority is the Austinean ‘exercitive,’ which is “a directive, or an enactment of status” (Langton 
2018a). What an exercitive does is alter facts about what is permissible and impermissible in a 
given contexts. It makes some future actions likely, and some improbable. “The law,” Langton 
says, “is a paradigm practical authority, and commands are its paradigm speech acts” (2018a). 
The characteristic speech act of epistemic authority is the ‘verdictive,’ which is an authoritative 
judgment that something is the case. Judges rendering their verdict is a paradigm example, as is 
an umpire calling a strike. 
While analytically separable, practical and epistemic authority are usually exercised 
together. When the judge gives her verdict, for example, this both declares that something is the 
case—the fact that the defendant is innocent—and also makes certain actions permissible—that 
she may now walk free.130 But the distinction between practical and epistemic authority helps to 
reveal the nonideal nature of the type of authority that concerns our topic. The conception of 
epistemic authority we’re interested in is more about credibility than it is about actual 
expertise.131 While one does not become an expert simply because some people take them to be 
one, being taken as credible is often enough to get others to believe and act on those beliefs. 
 
129 Tirrell, in a similar though distinct way, distinguishes between “positional authority,” which “grants the holder 
specific game-assigned powers” relative to “domain in which positions are allocated,” and “expertise authority,” 
which “derives from knowledge or skill” (2018b, 17). 
130 As Langton puts it: “doctor’s orders have their status as directives, in part because of what your doctor knows, or 
is taken to know: his practical authority has its source in his epistemic, or ‘theoretical’, authority” (2018a). 
131 This is therefore different that the account of “expert authority” developed in Tirrell (2018b). 
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Large swaths of the wellness industry would not exist were it not for the credibility—not 
expertise—of those who promote a variety of cures with little to no actual evidence. Similarly, 
for practical authority, we may recognize that “being put ‘in charge’ may be enough for being in 
charge” (Langton 2018a). This distinction between credibility and expertise helps to clarify that 
de facto authority is often enough to compel action, at least in this nonideal world.132 
This approach makes sense since our topic is not authority as it ought to exist, but 
authority as it works in the real world. This means moving away from the restrictive conception 
of formal speaker authority as it is depicted in Austin where, as Langton notes, “authority is 
often a formal matter: it is the authorized official who can name the ship, conduct the wedding, 
issue the sentence.” In contrast to this, Langton correctly notes “the workings of informal 
authority are more subtle” (2017, 33–34).  
As we’ve already noted, authority is most often relative to a certain domain. This simply 
means that there are some subject areas that fall within this speaker’s scope of authority, and 
some that fall outside of it. Authority being relative to a certain jurisdiction amounts to noting 
how it may be limited to certain audiences. So, some, but maybe not all who hear its call will 
properly feel its pull. This is what a more on-the-ground, nonideal conception of authority 
permits. It is, in a sense, a descriptive account of who takes some speakers to be authoritative, 
rather than a prescriptive account of who ought to be authoritative. So, while the law may be the 
official authority with the widest scope in a nation, within smaller communities there exists 
pockets of leaders with greater authority than the law among their enthusiasts. What the Pope or 
 
132 The conception authority at issue in cases of subordinating speech is therefore not the same as that which 
concerns political philosophers interested in the legitimate grounds of authority, that is, that which could morally 
justify the exercise of authority (particularly of a state), rather than mere de facto authority. As Langton says, and I 
concur: “Our topic is not idealized authority, but something closer to home: structures of social authority, relative to 
practices, which enable the enactment of norms and hierarchies that are socially real—whether or not they exist in 
Plato’s heaven, or the better neighborhoods of Earth” (2018a). 
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a local pastor says may have no grip on the atheist, but it can amount to a clear directive with 
clear authority to the devoted. 
As Langton says, appealing to the idea of a relativity to jurisdiction is helpful because it:  
explains how a low type relative to one hierarchy could be, so to speak, a high type 
relative to another. That might be because being higher in the one system makes you 
lower in the other, and vice versa. One would expect this to hold especially in contexts of 
conflict, and polarized hatred. Austin’s low type, who tries to name the ship after Stalin, 
may be a leader among his fellow revolutionaries. The ‘marginal’ figures despised by the 
majority may, for that reason, be esteemed figures among the minority. The higher one’s 
credibility in the fraternity of doctors, the lower one’s credibility in the fraternity of 
quack doctors, and vice versa. The lower one’s standing in the eyes of The Great Satan, 
the higher one’s standing on the side of the angels. (2018a) 
 
For this reason, appeals to the ‘fringe’ status of a speaker might not say much about whether that 
speaker is an authority in their community, as there is sometimes a sort of inverse relationship 
between competing communities. 
The type of authority at issue is more about how speech is received by its hearers—its 
uptake—than by objective facts about the speaker’s formal social position. It’s a type of 
authority that recognizes that an anti-vaxxer blogger can be authority for millions of parents, 
even though they lack all traditional markers of authority and expertise on the subject. The fact 
that it functions like traditional authority for a portion of its audience is the chief reason to still 
label this capacity authority. In other words, if some people take the “quack” doctor’s advice as 
credible, and shape their actions in accordance with their directives, we ought to understand their 
actions as responses to authoritative utterances, just like the person who takes the “legitimate” 
doctor’s words as sufficient reason for belief and action. In both cases, someone “grants 
authority to experts’ speech acts by taking up the licenses they issue, while deferring 
responsibility for justification back to them” (Tirrell 2018b, 19).  
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And what explains the authority of ‘quack’ doctors may also explain some speakers of 
subordinating speech. The authority the bigot sees in the white nationalist’s words may be as 
ineffective to some as the Pope’s words are to the atheist, and just as invisible. And yet, within 
the community of bigots, that speaker might have something close to absolute authority over 
these subjects. Combining our notions of nonideal authority being relative to a domain and 
jurisdiction, we’re led to a new conception of informal stable authority:  
• Informal stable authority: The authority a speaker can have in a specific domain, 
relative to a certain audience, despite lacking institutional sanction. This may arise 
from a complete lack of rivals, but also where there is competition among competing 
authorities, and the actions of some reveal that they defer to one more than another. 
 
This type of authoritative entitlement can be found in various forms of subordinating speech. It 
functions most clearly in propagandistic hate speech as it functions as ingroup speech. However, 
it may also apply to what I called earlier boundary-crossing propagandistic hate speech. Indeed, 
this speech is often harmful because marginalized people understand that there is a group to 
whom this speech is like the Gospel. And as the discussion in the previous chapter showed, 
authoritative speech is about shaping the normative landscape for one’s audience (and other third 
parties) and this can occur without total audience agreement. Rather than agreement, what it 
requires is an adjustment that takes on board what speakers presuppose. And while it is often 
only part of their community that does so, the factions that do say a lot about what hierarchies in 
the community are dominant, and thus, what kind of speech act the speaker performed—whether 
backed by authority or not. As Langton notes, “[t]he social world can sometimes be 
accommodating, especially when helped along by background expectations” (2018a, emphasis 
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added).133 Given background conditions of racism, sexism, and much more, the social world is 
often far too accommodating to subordinating speech, as many in its audience acquiesce to its 
authority. As the large and passionate following of many hateful speakers—like those of Richard 
Spencer, Alex Jones, Ben Shapiro, QAnon, etc.—show, there is often a significant portion of 
people who play the part of a willing, and submissive audience. By responding in this way—by 
giving this uptake—an audience can demonstrate how a hate speaker’s words are backed up by 
authority, as this authority is embodied in their uptake.134 
As a result, an updated, non-exhaustive list of the entitlements for subordinating speech 
acts would include: 
• Formal authority: The explicit, institutionally backed authority held by identifiable 
speakers in formal positions that grant them power to issue binding directives in a 
given domain. 
 
• Informal stable authority: The authority a speaker can have in a specific domain, 
relative to a certain audience, despite lacking institutional sanction. This may arise 
from a complete lack of rivals, but also where there is competition among competing 
authorities, and the actions of some reveal that they defer to one more than another. 
 
• Informal situational authority: The authority that can arise when speakers stake out 
an ad hoc authoritative position in a given situation, and the audience grants the 
speaker authority over a specific domain. 
 
 
133 As Langton clarifies: “Accommodation is only a tendency, as Lewis said. It does not always work, and whether it 
works is itself sensitive to background social hierarchies” (2018a). 
134 As Tirrell (2018b) puts it: “Authority is largely constituted by audience uptake, which is a matter of next moves 
(21); and she refers to Bourdieu (1991, 116) who explains: “The symbolic efficacy of words is exercised only in so 
far as the person subjected to it recognizes the person who exercises it as authorized to do so, or, what amounts to 
the same thing, only in so far as he fails to realize that, in submitting to it, he himself has contributed, through his 
recognition, to its establishment.” 
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3.1.2. Social (not local) accommodation: Collective speech acts 
 
As the preceding demonstrates, I believe the uptake given by the hearers of a 
subordinating speech act plays a significant role in constituting the authority of a speech act. In 
this, I am not alone. Langton considers audience accommodation to be the main mechanism for 
how informal authority is accrued by speakers of hate speech. “Authority,” she claims, “can be 
obtained by accommodation, a default adjustment that occurs, without fuss, when hearers take on 
board what speakers presuppose” (2018a).135 In this manner, accommodation “has the power to 
alter the illocutionary force of an utterance” and, “hearers routinely accommodate what speakers 
presuppose, and the hearer’s omission is a quiet engine of the speaker’s success” (2018a; 2017, 
4). 
However, I do not believe the specific mechanisms of accommodation that Langton 
describes are up to the task of explaining the authority of hate speech—or, at least not the bulk of 
it. In an effort to clarify the hearer’s role in helping the speaker, I will now point out the limits of 
her conception of accommodation. As I see it, it is much more active than Langton suggests, and 
much more social. 
The core idea of Langton’s conception of accommodation is that when a speaker says 
something that requires an adjustment in the shared presuppositions that guide the conversation, 
this occurs by default.136 For example, this sort of accommodation occurs when a hearer reacts to 
a speaker saying, “Even George could win,” by taking on board the presupposition that George is 
 
135 This builds on work by Lewis (1979), who argued that conversations follow a “rule of accommodation.”  
136 With some qualifications, these shared presuppositions form the “score” of the conversation, which can be 
thought of as “an abstract structure comparable to the score of a game, which tracks what has been done at a given 
point, and what it is legitimate to do thereafter” (Langton 2018a). 
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an unpromising candidate, and future moves within this conversation are explained by the fact 
that hearers passively accept this low ranking of George. 
She suggests, then, that this model may be straightforwardly applied to authority as well, 
including the authority of hate speech. “Speech acts,” she says, “including directives generally, 
and hate speech specifically, can acquire authority by an everyday piece of social magic: 
authority gets presupposed, and hearers let it go through, following a rule of accommodation.” 
(Langton, 2018b). But extending this idea to the accommodation of authority is more difficult 
than Langton suggests if we want to capture a wider set of cases.137 
In short, Langton’s model moves too quickly. What’s required is a more detailed 
understanding of the multiple audiences a speech act can have, along with greater appreciation 
for how an audience can itself actively aid in the construction of authority, and not simply 
passively accept it. Once we acknowledge these features and modify the conception of 
accommodation to properly capture what is occurring in these cases, we’re led to a novel type of 
speaker authority that I call collectively sustained authority. 
Consider Richard Spencer again, who rose to prominence by spearheading an unabashed 
white supremacist ideology. At the height of his popularity, he had legions of followers, some of 
whom he led in a Sieg Heil salute while he and the crowd chanted, “Hail Trump!” (Wood 2017). 
What’s at issue here, in my eyes, is not accommodation in the conversational sense as 
described by Lewis (1979) and taken up by Langton, but rather accommodation in a much more 
extended social sense. The type of accommodation that a willing audience gives authority to hate 
 
137 Langton does acknowledges differences between these two types of accommodation, but for her it is mainly a 
difference in effect (acceptability vs. truth), and the mechanism is largely the same: “Unblocked presuppositions 
tend to become acceptable rather than true: ‘George is an unpromising candidate’ may become acceptable, if 
unblocked, but that would not make it true. Authority is different. A presupposition of authority can become, not just 
acceptable, but true, because its existence, not only its acceptability, depends in part on what hearers do, or fail to 
do.” (Langton 2018b). 
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speakers is, I claim, significantly different than the accommodation that occurs within a single, 
relatively shorter conversation. It therefore demands a different explanation, specifically one that 
allows for the active participation of a willing audience to bolster its claims to authority, even in 
the presence of sustained attempts by outsiders (e.g., anti-racist activists) to quash these group 
through speech and other means. In other words, we must recognize that counter-speech doesn’t 
do the job of preventing authoritative speech in the way the conversation model describes.138 
I do agree with Langton, however, that it is largely because of the audience-participation 
that this type of subordinating speech can be called authoritative and has the specific 
subordinating force that it does. But rather than focus on the segment of the audience who let 
these utterances pass by without much notice—who either take on board their noxious 
presuppositions or at least fail to block them—I want to emphasize the role of those who take up 
these utterances willingly, and actively endorse them as authoritative, and in doing so expand the 
reach of these speakers even wider with their own speech acts.  
 First, it’s worth acknowledging that the rise to authoritative status of figures like these 
often takes time.139 And even when it is or feels sudden, it’s still much longer than a single 
conversation, and so is different than how the hike-planner or the restaurant-chooser attains 
authority in common examples of accommodation (Maitra 2012; Thomason 1990, quoted in 
Langton 2017). In this way it’s different than the situational authority of the hate speaker on the 
streets, and this makes sense, as the authoritative status of these figures is more stable.  
 
138 I take up this last idea in Chapter Four in more detail. 
139 One illustrative example is found in Jamie Bartlett’s The Dark Net, where the sudden rise of white nationalist 
groups in the UK is described to take place over the course of months and years, moving from the online to the 
streets and back again. See Bartlett (2014, esp. Ch. 2). For other accounts of real life events of the rise (and fall) of 
prominent speakers in hate movements, see (Strum 1999); (Hategan 2004); and Saslow (2018). 
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To capture this sort of accommodation we’re better off appealing to an idea like the 
shifting boundaries of the permissible as described by philosophers like Jennifer Saul (2017) and 
Lynne Tirrell (2012; 2017).140 Saul picks up on how accommodation enables a hearer to shift 
their understanding of what’s acceptable, for example, how “openly racist utterances effect 
significant changes to standards of conversational acceptability” (101). Saul draws on 
accommodation as it is described by Langton and McGowan, but she makes the crucial addition 
that this shift in permissibility standards can be effectively forced. Through the use of a 
“diachronic figleaf,” a speaker’s earlier explicitly racist utterance can be reconfigured as 
seemingly unproblematic (ibid. 105).141 In explaining how this works, Saul discusses how a 
speaker and their allies can work to undermine standard inferences about the problematic 
interpretations of an utterance. And, in doing so, they force the accommodation of new norms on 
an otherwise resistant audience. Furthermore, she notes how “what becomes permissible within 
one community will not be permissible in another” (108). In doing so, she pushes back against 
the notion that there is a single, shared score that all participants track. 
This sort of audience-contribution is more active than accommodation, and shows how 
the hearers and—crucially, in my eyes, repeaters142—of hateful utterances can play an important 
role in shaping the (discursive) norms of the wider community. They do so actively, not 
 
140 As Lynne Tirrell says: “Our speech acts also undertake a meta-level expressive commitment about the very 
saying of what is said. Expressive commitments are commitments to the viability and value of particular ways of 
talking, modes of discourse” (Tirrell 2017, 144). When these expressive commitments aren’t uniformly condemned, 
they can shift the boundaries of what counts as acceptable discourse in a community, opening the door to further 
harm (Saul 2017). 
141 As Saul explains, a “racial figleaf is an utterance made in addition to one that would otherwise be seen as racist 
[that] provides cover for what would otherwise have too much potential to be labeled as racist” (Saul 2017, 103). 
These are, in her view, tools that enable that provide cover to obviously racist statements, rendering then acceptable.  
142 Tirrell discusses a similar type of authority, briefly, when she mentions “parroting,” which she says, “has only 
deferred authority, derived from the expertise of the person who ultimately bears justificatory responsibility.” She 
also says that when “a speaker’s utterance piggybacks on the authority of another’s utterance but moves beyond 
parroting to extend the claim, this mixes position and expertise, and blends deferred authority with independent 
authority” (Tirrell 2018b, 19). 
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passively, with action rather than omission, and with intent, rather than unconsciously. In this 
way, this discursively forced accommodation is no “quiet engine of the speaker’s success,” but 
instead an often-loud assist. 
This, then, allows us to see how speech acts in addition to those from the original source 
are also backed up by a type of authority, such as those who chant along to a racist mantra, or 
who later repost similar messages on internet comment boards. This is a different power not 
explained by accommodation, as Langton understands it, as her account seems to focus on 
establishing single speakers as authoritative, rather than the mass of followers who often join in, 
with acts of repetition.  
Because of the reliance this type of subordinating speech on this part of its audience, 
whom I see as collaborators and promoters, I view these as collective speech acts, which rely on 
a type of collectively sustained authority. Its chief feature is the endorsement of a critical mass of 
supporters who do not so much passively accept the authority of the other speaker(s) as 
enthusiastically support it. In doing so, they take the speech beyond its environment, and flex its 
strength over outsiders. 
• Collectively sustained authority: Through repetition and endorsement, individually 
non-authoritative speech is made authoritative by signaling collective support and 
solidarity. A group of speakers have their authority secured through a repetitive 
process where each new utterance adds to the strength of the overall practice. 
  
This type of subordinating speech has not been fully addressed in the literature, and I examine it 
in more detail in the following chapters. 
Seeing these distinct types of subordinating speaker authority broadens our understanding 
of the actions and practices that sustain these speech acts. In marshalling these different types of 
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authority, speakers produce unique subordinating speech acts. This analysis allows us to see both 
what distinguishes these acts from one another, and what unifies them. 
Lastly, it is worth acknowledging how subordinating speech is possible absent any 
speaker authority. This runs afoul of the strict interpretation of subordinating speech acts require 
authority because it engages in illocutionary acts like ranking, legitimating, and prohibiting. 
However, once we broaden our conception of what it means for speech to subordinate and 
understand it more as speech acts that are part of broader practices of subordination, a wider 
range of utterances fall into view. 
• Non-authoritative entitlements: The sort of entitlements arising from direct 
relationships that enable a variety of types of subordinating speech. A direct 
relationship can be any relationship that allows a speaker to interact with the audience 
directly, which opens the door to the expression of subordinating speech. 
 
To be clear, these speech acts are not absent specific entitlements, but only free of what 
I’m understanding as authority. For example, a classmate might mock another student for their 
‘foreign’ name or disability; a sibling might express disgust at their gay brother; a random person 
on the street who stopped you to ask for directions might suddenly ask “where you’re really 
from.” In cases like these, the speech act has plausible oppressive force less from the speaker 
exercising any speaker-authority over their addressee, but in how these speakers bring the 
authority of oppressive ideologies to bear on their targets. 
Beyond adding to our collection of subordinating speech acts, recognizing the possibility 
of non-authoritative subordinating speech serves as an important reminder of the crucial role that 
oppressive norms and practices play in all instances of subordinating speech. In other words, 
background structures of oppression play an essential but under-recognized role in filling out the 
story for all these entitlements. It is not always the entitlement aspect of the speech act that 
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renders it most oppressive. This is only one element. I believe it is an important element, worthy 
of the sustained investigation I did above. But it is worth acknowledging that in some cases, it is 





I began by canvassing speaker authority for subordinating speech because this feature 
plays a significant role in shaping the output of these speech acts. As Tirrell points out, the 
“success of a speech act relies in part on the authority of the speaker to drive audience uptake. 
Speaker authority and audience uptake go hand in hand, and neither occurs in a vacuum” (2018b, 
13).143 We saw this in how the uptake of some either clarified or actively shaped the type of 
speaker authority in play. 
Turning now to the output side of subordinating speech acts, I will examine this output in 
terms of three features: to whom is it primarily addressed; whom does it target for subordination; 
and what normative statuses it assigns, which is informed in part by the first two features, along 
with the specific entitlements it marshals. 
 
3.2.1. Addressee vs. target 
 
It is helpful first to distinguish between subordinating speech acts in terms of where they 
are first directed, both in terms of whom they are addressed to and whom they target. Even 
 
143 Tirrell notes how she takes “uptake to be a matter of next discursive moves, moves either depending on or 
disregarding the original speech act” (Tirrell 2018b, 15). 
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though oppressive utterances ultimately target a marginalized group, some are addressed 
primarily at an individual within that group (e.g., a Black man on the street), others at a small 
subset of the larger group (e.g., a Black sorority), and still others at an entire group (e.g., all non-
white people). While an epithet directed at a single individual will still have reverberating 
oppressive effects on other members of that group, the way it achieves this effect is different 
than a hateful comment directed at all members of the group at-large. By noting to whom an 
utterance is directed, we’re in a better position to understand who the speech act calls upon for a 
response, and thus puts under distinct normative pressure. As Kukla and Lance argue, speech 
acts are essentially vocatives, insisting on recognition and response from their audience. Locating 
the addressee of subordinating speech is a first clue to identifying its pragmatic output.144 
Furthermore, it is useful here to return to the rough distinction between assaultive hate 
speech and propagandistic hate speech discussed above. Propagandistic hate speech is typically 
spoken by members of one group to fellow ingroup members (e.g., a white person to other white 
people). It is thus, most often, intra-group speech. Assaultive speech, on the other hand, is 
typically inter-group speech (e.g., a white man accosting an Indigenous woman). Assaultive 
speech can therefore address an individual in any of the three manners considered above, while 
intra-group propagandistic speech generally does not address the outgroup members it disparages 
at all.145 
 
144 In particular, they write: “Concrete normative relations among people are established and sustained through 
vocatives—that is through the Yo-claims that hold us in place in social space. We become and remain the types of 
beings that have specific, agent-relative engagements with others through an ongoing network of hails and 
acknowledgements. […] Vocative discourse plays a crucial role in constituting individuals as particular, normatively 
positioned persons” (2009, 181). 
145 I say generally, in part because issues of intersectionality inevitably arise in certain instances. For one example, 
consider that while a white supremacist speech will often reserve most of its vitriol for the non-white races, there is 
likely also much misogynistic content to be found as well. 
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But even when speech is intra-group, when it is subordinating, it also has the function of 
targeting outgroup members in some form, again possibly as individuals, subsets, or whole 
groups. Often, this targeting quite explicit. When ‘incels’—the misogynistic community that 
self-identifies as ‘involuntary celibates’—discuss women in their (usually online) semi-private 
communities, they use the derogatory and alienating term ‘femoids,’ making it clear whom their 
words subordinate without actually addressing any women.146 However, the reference need not 
be so explicit. The famous “14 words” recited by white supremacists does not refer to any other 
group besides white children. In such a case, non-whites are targeted for subordination largely by 
omission. Something similar occurs in some cases of assaultive hate speech too, as when “white 
power” is yelled from a passing car of white people towards a group of Black children. The 
content of this utterances makes no mention of its targets, but it is nonetheless specific in its 
oppressive effects. 
We can therefore note a distinction between the audience of a speech act (to whom it is 
directed at, as its primary listeners/readers) and the target(s) of a subordinating speech act (to 
whom it functions as a tool of oppression), while recognizing that the latter is not always 
identified in either as the direct addressee of an utterance or as part of its content. Putting things 
together, then, there are at least four ways a speaker can direct their speech towards their target 
(at an individual, at a subset of group, at the whole group, or not at them at all), and at least three 
ways in which the target of subordination might appear in the speech act (as its addressee, in its 
content explicitly, or by exclusion).  
 
146 For an informative overview of the ‘incel’ ideology, see ContraPoints (2018), the stage name of Natalie Wynn, 
on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fD2briZ6fB0; or Zack Beauchamp (2019). 
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Again, I consider this to be a heuristic rather than an exhaustive categorization, and some 
of its boundaries are more rigid than others. It is perhaps best to think of the 
Individual/Subset/Whole-Group markers as points on a spectrum. But this offers a more precise 
analysis of how marginalized individuals or communities are targeted by subordinating speech 
than the assaultive-propagandistic speech binary. It recognizes more fluidly how these categories 
may overlap and offers an initial answer for why subordinating speech acts might differ in their 
outputs. But it isn’t yet to discuss these outputs themselves; I turn to that now. 
 
3.2.2. Output as normative status 
 
Following Kukla and Lance, we can conceive of the output of a speech act as “the 
normative changes (in the status of the speaker, or of others in the discursive community) that 
the act strives to produce” (2009, 15). I understand these as the normatively-laden roles a speech 
act aims to impose, where these roles are constituted by a variety of expectations, obligations, 
and permissions of different strengths. When we’re considering specifically subordinating 
speech however, the roles distributed are hierarchical, with some given positions of dominance 
that others are denied. In other words, the normative changes produced via subordinating speech 
include the distribution of particular roles with unequal relations of authority, esteem, and 
status.147 This tends to occur via the assignment of ingroup and outgroup normative roles. These 
are the main outputs of subordinating speech acts, in all its varieties. But because oppression is a 
complex phenomenon, I maintain the ways that subordinating speech acts achieve this end, along 
 
147 Relational Egalitarians, and in particular Elizabeth Anderson, have persuasively argued that hierarchical 
distributions of authority, esteem, and status are the primary inequalities that ought to give us concern. See 
Anderson (1999) for an influential argument to this effect. 
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with the particularities of these expectations, permissions, and obligations, are similarly 
complex.  
My current concern is thus the distribution of hierarchical roles that subordinating speech 
makes possible, and how this occurs for the target, the speaker, and other parties as well. This 
focus on normative effects differs from the discussion of the (broader) range of harmful effects 
discussed in Chapter One. And while I argued there that an adequate account of the harms of 
subordinating speech must account for these in an important way—and therefore, not focus 
solely or even mainly on illocutionary effects—I do believe that this aspect of output can be 
fruitfully explored. That is, apart from the wide range of harms subordinating speech produces, it 
also puts its targets under distinct normative pressure, and this may be captured under the idea of 
output as a normative status.148 
While I aim to bring out a diversity of outputs, I should clarify this claim. On the one 
hand, of course different subordinating speech acts enact different statuses. As Tirrell says, 
“variability is the norm,” (2017, 149) and uniformity would be a surprising result. For this 
reason, it’s important to go beyond conceptions that lack the necessary nuance that this topic 
demands. However, on the other hand, no two events will be exactly alike, and so some 
generalizations are necessary. Yet, while necessary, they are fraught and must be approached 
carefully. This is especially true on what I’m calling the output side, as individual features play a 
 
148 Here, it is worthwhile to briefly note how I see speaker intentions coming into play in the output of subordinating 
speech. I believe intentions fit in here, on the output side, as they shape the extent of the derogation, which I take to 
be a feature of output. But they aren’t that important, as they do not fix output. Rather, intentions are one element 
that inflects the overall shape of the output of subordinating speech. A villainous intent, paired with a contemptuous 
tone, can render nearly any speech act subordinating (e.g., “Of course, you would say that.” But a non-oppression, 
even helpful intention is in no way a reliable guide to establishing the lack of subordinating force of a speech act. 
Attending to speaker intention does, however, allow us to categorize subordinating effects as either the aim of a 
speech act (e.g., assaultive hate speech) or as a misfire on the speaker’s part (e.g., news reports that amplify harmful 
ideologies). And so, they can be helpful for establishing what speech act occurred, and are not irrelevant. But the 
importance of intentions can easily be overstated, and I largely leave them aside. 
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large role in shaping how one interprets and responds to any given utterance. Moreover, given 
that I understand output in an open-ended way—where it is not fixed in the moment of the 
utterance but instead is constituted by its specific effects on the normative statuses of speaker, 
target, and others—further factors always have the potential to shape output in unexpected 
ways.149 My aim therefore is to make vivid a fairly basic point: subordinating speech is a 
complex phenomenon, and reductionist analyses are bound to erase important distinctions. When 
aiming to capture the lived experiences of real people, however, theorists like myself must differ 
to testimony of those most directly affected. 
With this in mind, my goal in the remainder of this section is to note the range of 
normative effects subordinating speech produces, first as this has been described by those 
targeted by it. To do so I rely on Katharine Gelber and Luke McNamara’s (2016) “Evidencing 
the Harms of Hate Speech,” which draws on 101 interviews with members of Indigenous and 
other minority ethnic communities in Australia about their experiences with hate speech. They 
give voice to those targeted by subordinating speech, and in doing so, provide a clarifying lens to 
the philosophical literature, which too often excludes those with personal experience with hate 
speech.  
It’s useful to note the distinctions Gelber and McNamara draw from these interviews. 
They categorize different “hate speech events” into two broad types—“face-to-face incidents” 
and “broadly circulated incidents.” This categorization roughly matches the assaultive 
speech/propagandistic speech distinction discussed above. At the same time, however, they are 
clear to note how these “two types of hate speech were not experienced as qualitatively different 
 
149 But this is no threat to the general claim that subordinating speech subordinates, since “not every instance of hate 
speech need result in all the harms elucidated for the argument to be sustained.” (Gelber and McNamara 2016, 336). 
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in terms of seriousness or harmfulness,” and thus claim we must give each equal attention (2016, 
336). They further divide each type with five further sub-categories (epithets [verbal and 
symbolic]; exclusion; negative stereotyping; transmission of racism; and threatening, harassing 
behavior). So, given this categorization, we’re led to ten different sorts of hate speech incidents, 
as derived from the target’s description of the experience.  
Their considered position is that “both [broad] types of hate speech events can incur harm 
constitutively, consequentially or simultaneously in both ways,” and so the divisions are 
somewhat artificial (2016, 326).150 One conclusion I draw from their analysis of these interviews 
is an appreciation for the equal seriousness and harmfulness of diverse forms of oppressive 
speech. And with Gelber and McNamara, I maintain that analyzing the distinctions among 
subordinating speech is useful for the purposes of understanding different hate speech events, 
rather than ranking them, in part since their boundaries are unquestionably blurry, and overlap is 
common. That is, the distinctions to be drawn are not—and ought not be—hierarchical. 
Even within these categories, important differences are to be expected at the level of 
output. Consider the normative effects a subordinating speech act might have when the direct 
addressee is the same as its target of subordination. These are categorized as face-to-face 
incidents by Gelber and McNamara, and this is the situation critical race theorists Mari Matsuda, 
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Richard Delgado, and Charles Lawrence III describe as assaultive speech, 
in their Words that Wound (1993). Beyond being assaulted, victims also describe these situations 
as ones in which they are embarrassed, humiliated, ambushed, terrorized, harassed, threatened, 
 
150 They explain this in the following: “We argue that the distinction between face-to-face encounters and general 
circulation hate speech is not always clear in the everyday experiences of racism endured by targets. For example, 
hate speech yelled at a target from a moving vehicle or on the street constitutes a face-to-face encounter, yet can also 
be experienced as targeted at the community to which the target is perceived to belong. Even if no-one else heard the 
hate speech at the time, others will hear of it through word of mouth, community events or the media. They thereby 
become informed that racism is alive and well, and that they may become its target.” (2016, 326) 
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scared, and so on. These are, on the standard framework, most often seen as perlocutionary 
effects. But these terms also imply the designation of a status, constituted by permissions, 
obligations, and expectations. And these can have varying strengths. 
We can see this when we examine incidents of ‘exclusion,’ as described by Gelber and 
McNamara’s interviewees. Many reported permutations of being told they were not welcome 
and should “go back to where you belong” (2016, 329). In their words, part of the harm consists 
in how “you feel ostracized”; another reports the pain of “that fear of being judged, of that fear 
of being sort of like prosecuted, being excluded from the nation’s society” (2016, 334). As I 
interpret these statements, part of the harm of these incidents seemingly results from being 
accused of violating an expectation—one that they could not ever meet. Whether it is because 
ethnic minorities are not assimilating ‘properly’ or are simply in the country at all, exclusionary 
hate speech expresses indignation at the perceived transgressions of marginalized people. They 
are thus second-personal calls, and it is in this way that they “institute and reconfigure normative 
statuses and relationships” (Kukla and Lance 2013, 457).  
Depending on the specific circumstances of the overall discursive context, different 
instances of direct exclusionary speech will shape a new normative status for its target in varying 
ways. In some cases, this may be as a literal target for violence, and so they will feel threatened, 
ambushed, and harassed—simply because of their existence. This can occur when the speaker is 
angry, in a physically aggressive pose, in a group, or otherwise intimidating their target.151 In 
other cases, the utterance may be less-than threatening, but nonetheless perform a clear 
 
151 Children are especially vulnerable to this sort of exclusionary speech. For example, Gelber and McNamara relate 
how one interviewee’s “child at school was told by another child ‘The fucking Indians, you can go back to your 
country’” (2016, 329). This demonstrates how the power a speaker can possess over the target is relative to the 
target in important ways—an eight-year old can seriously intimidate other children the same age or younger, but will 
likely have trouble accosting a fifteen-year old. 
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ascription of inferior qualities—marking one as an ‘unwelcome’ addition to the existing 
community. For instance, if a work-colleague makes a fuss about being unable to pronounce 
their addressee’s “weird” name.152 In either case, the speaker’s utterance has the force of 
assigning certain context-specific expectations and obligations of different sorts to the target, and 
this is achieved via the designation of a status. In the former it is as ‘unwelcome’ in an existential 
way, and so the only practical solution is to leave the situation. In the latter it is as an 
‘unwelcome’ and burdensome change to the status quo, and so there may be an expectation of 
deference to the speaker, to not make ‘any more of a fuss.’ So, even within the status imposed by 
exclusionary speech we see differentiations in how this may be experienced as a normative 
status. I maintain that similar points can be made about other forms of subordinating speech, like 
‘negative stereotyping’ speech, and more.  
My position, therefore, is that while differences at the level of form—to whom is the 
speech directed; who does it target for subordination—aid the analysis of determining who in the 
community may have their status impacted as the output of a subordinating speech act, there will 
nonetheless be idiosyncrasies that make a precise and deterministic analysis of output somewhat 
hopeless. This follows, I believe, from understanding oppression as a complex and multiply 
realizable phenomena.  
But this is not to say that useful analyses of output are entirely elusive. Just because we 
cannot give a precise analysis of the normative statuses imposed via subordinating speech is not 
to say there is nothing to be gained by examining the output of subordinating speech. We see this 
 
152 And, as is obvious to many already, what counts as ‘weird’ has undoubtable racial elements to it, as one 
interviewee makes clear: ‘So if a French pronounces in their French accent, that’s okay […] but when an Indian 
pronounces a word a bit differently to […] an Australian […] then it becomes a problem’” (Gelber and McNamara 
2016, 329). 
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clearly once we recognize that the target is not the only one whose status is affected by the 
speech act. And here, more precision is perhaps possible. As Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt note, “the 
speaker imposes not just one, but a complementary pair of discourse roles on the conversational 
score: the speaker takes on a powerful, dominant role, while assigning the target a subordinate 
role” (2018, 2894–95).153 That is, subordinating speech shapes the normative status of not just 
the target, but the speaker as well. 
We see this in the telling use of the verbs “judged” and “prosecuted” by one of Gelber 
and McNamara’s interviewees quoted above. It is telling in that it lends support to the view that 
hate speech has an authoritative dimension.154 But we cannot assume that this authoritative 
element is all the same sort. Nevertheless, the assignment of dual roles, with corresponding 
statuses, is a helpful conception of interpersonal subordinating speech acts and can be applied to 
other types of speech acts as well.  
For example, consider a case where the subordinating targets are not addressed directly. 
Here too, there is still an imposition of hierarchical roles. However, in this case it is not simply 
between speaker and addressee, but one where speaker and addressee are on one side, with their 
subordinating targets on the other—ingroup and outgroup.155 As Langton says, “propagandistic 
hate speech aggrandizes the hearer, often, as well as the speaker. Propaganda’s message of their 
‘inferiority’ […] is also a message of ‘our’ superiority, the superiority of a ‘we’ that includes 
 
153 Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt use the term ‘discourse roles’ to here, though I put that aside mainly to avoid having to 
explicate more of their framework than I think is necessary. Though I should acknowledge that Popa-Wyatt and 
Wyatt are speaking specifically about slurs and slurring acts. They claim: “slurs are constitutive of oppressive 
speech with respect to the discourse roles, because they have the illocutionary force of assigning a subordinate role 
for the purposes and duration of the discourse” (Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 2018, 2895). But I believe this is a helpful 
understanding, applicable to other subordinating speech acts as well. 
154 As Gelber and McNamara note: “the harms attested to by interviewees—as experienced, perceived and feared—
bear a close resemblance to the harms alleged in the literature, and are both constitutive and consequential” (2016, 
336). 
155 See Herbert and Kukla (2016) for a useful discussion of discursive practices of ingrouping and outgrouping. 
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both speaker and hearer” (2018a).156 Anti-immigrant speech offers a clear example of this, where 
the ‘threat’ embodied by (usually, and sometimes explicitly, non-white) migrants is that they will 
disrupt and otherwise undermine a stable, prosperous community. In this way, the targets of 
subordination are cast in an inferior role, while the ingroup addressees are reified alongside the 
speaker. This is the sometimes-seductive aspect of propaganda that we must keep in view, and 
that I believe the role-assignment conception of output does well to clarify.  
Seeing the output of subordinating speech acts as a distribution of hierarchical roles, we 
see how speech shapes the normative contours of relations between social groups. Whether 
directed at outgroup members in intergroup speech, or at ingroup members in intragroup speech, 
subordinating speech has the pragmatic effect of elevating the speaker’s status, while usually at 
the same time denigrating the status of those that it either explicitly targets or merely excludes. 
The distinctions uncovered here—different ways of being addressed; different ways of being 
targeted—are a useful clue in determining who is captured within the output of a subordinating 
speech act, and how. 
Moreover, recognizing the type of entitlement being put to use shapes the sort of output 
the speech act generates, and so offers insight into how these may be resisted. While practical 
and epistemic authority often come together, they each call for a different sort of challenge. That 
is, since they rely on different grounds they generate distinct effects, and “resistance or support 
may also involve distinct kinds of challenges” (Tirrell 2018b, 18). Practical authority is open to 
direct resistance through disobedience, while epistemic authority may require counterevidence to 
 
156 Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt acknowledge something similar when they not how “an act of assigning a new discourse 
role can be used to shape the power dynamics in a conversation. Discourse role assignment is thus a meta-move in 
the conversational game in that it changes the discourse rules. […] Discourse roles are not solitary. A role assigned 
to one participant typically presupposes complementary roles, to be adopted by other participants. Thus, by entering 
into a role, a speaker can invite or compel other participants to take on new roles” (Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 2018, 
2892) 
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undo. This, perhaps, offers a clue as to when and where ‘more speech’ may be useful, and where 
it is misguided. 
Along with the various entitlements speakers might possess, these distinctions in output 
lend credence to the claim that multiple types of subordinating speech acts are to be expected, 
and that a reduction to a single type is too simplistic to capture the reality of the phenomena in 
question. With that concern in mind, I next make explicit how alternative models offered by 
Langton and McGowan fail at this task. 
 
4. A HIERARCHY OF SUBORDINATING SPEECH 
 
Despite the apparent variety of subordinating speech acts, dominant approaches in the 
literature seem to neglect this fact. In place of recognizing a rich diversity, McGowan’s model 
takes all oppressive speech acts to be exercitives. And while Langton is careful to distinguish 
between different origins of a speaker’s authority to subordinate, her account nonetheless relies 
on an implicit and monolithic hierarchy of subordinating speech acts, flattening their differences 
into merely one of degrees. Both are worth considering, and ultimately rejecting. 
This latter approach is evident in Langton’s classic paper “Speech Acts and Unspeakable 
Acts” (1993), where she argues that the speech of pornographers itself constitutes a 
subordinating speech act, and she does so by analogizing it to the speech of a legislator in 
apartheid-era South Africa. Since it is only authoritative speech that can to subordinate in the 
way Langton discusses, she supports her claim by showing that the speech of pornographers is 
more like that of a legislator than that of dissident—more like the law than protest. Thus, her 
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strategy is to approximate authoritative speech. I’ll consider this in more detail in section 4.1 
below. 
A different strategy is found in the work of McGowan, who rejects the necessity of 
authority for subordination (2003; 2004; 2009; 2012). Rather than seeing the potential to 
subordinate (with speech) as something that resides in individual speakers, McGowan sees the 
ubiquitous nature of systems of oppression as generating an ever-present normative landscape, 
where individuals make moves that alter this landscape. On this view, the entitlement conditions 
required for oppressive speech are rather thin. It is the system itself where the power to 
subordinate resides, not the speakers. I believe there is something very insightful about this 
account, so it is worth considering in more detail.  
McGowan develops what she calls the covert exercitive to explain speech acts that 
function like Austinean exercitives without being fully explicit, and without requiring speaker 
authority. This has the benefit of explaining the widespread nature of oppressive speech, but, as I 
argue, this neglects the differences that exist between speakers and speech acts. In short, this 
model is appealing for explaining (part of) the oppressive force of utterances like 
microaggressions and other ‘casually’ bigoted comments. But it is lacking when it comes to 
accounting for the oppression-enhancing features embodied by some speakers and not others. I 
consider this framework for understanding oppressive speech in section 4.2 below. 
Despite their difference, I argue that both Langton and McGowan’s account are 
ultimately reductive, and that both see subordinating speech as derivative of other speech acts. 
Because of this, they therefore fail to properly acknowledge the variety of types of subordinating 
speech acts and collapse this rich category in unhelpful ways.  
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4.1. Approximating Authoritative Speech 
 
In “Speech Act and Unspeakable Acts,” Langton says the speech act of the apartheid-era 
South African legislator offers a “clear example” of what the paradigm for subordinating speech 
might be (1993, 310).157 In Chapter One I argued that this example is not, in fact, a particularly 
clear or helpful example of subordinating speech. This is the case because Langton leaves 
background conditions that enable this utterance to both cause and constitute subordination 
unexamined. Here, I want to address a different aspect of Langton’s use of this example that 
distorts our understanding of the broader field of subordinating speech acts, namely, its 
reification of a narrow conception of authority.  
The reason the apartheid-era legislator’s speech is a “clear example” of subordinating 
speech, Langton says, is that the legislator clearly occupies a position of authority within the 
formal South African legal context. It is this position, in this context, that provides the speaker 
with important powers over their targets.158 And because the connection between authority, 
formal social position, and subordinating speech is so apparent here, Langton uses this example 
to build a model of different forms of subordinating speech, such as pornography (1993; 2017) 
and—in later work—racist hate speech (2012; 2018a; 2018b). Given this methodology, the claim 
is that these forms of subordinating speech can only approximate the “clear example,” because 
their speakers can only approximate the paradigm of speaker authority embodied by a legislator.  
 
157 As I note in Chapter One, she does not explicitly call the legislators utterance the paradigm. Specifically, she 
writes: “I have not tried to say exactly what the paradigm for subordination is, but I have suggested that the speech 
acts of apartheid offer a clear example” (1993, 310). 
158 In Chapter One, I argued that the importance given to speaker-position here is over-emphasized at the expense of 
other, equally important background factors that are also necessary for the subordinating speech to function. 
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This idea of approximating authoritative speech is apparent in one of the main examples 
Langton uses in more recent work to analogize to hate speech. This is an “Alabama slave law” 
that, in 1861, said:  
that slaves are people and things: as ‘rational human beings, they are capable of 
committing crimes; and in reference to acts which are crimes, are regarded as persons,’ 
but ‘because they are slaves, they are incapable of performing civil acts, and, in reference 
to all such, they are things, not persons.’ (Langton 2018a, citing Caterall 1926, 247) 
 
As Langton notes, such a law performs some significant acts. It deprives enslaved persons from 
performing important civil acts, like testifying in court, in part by ranking them as inferior from 
the white population.159 Notably, these legislative acts are very much like what Langton 
describes as the main functions of hate speech. Yet, for Langton, the question “is not whether a 
law could be hate speech. It is “whether hate speech could be like a law: whether hate speech 
could have authority, and if so, of what kind, and from what source” (2018a).160 The implicit 
idea throughout Langton’s work is that subordinating speech will resemble subordinating law in 
a significant way, while not quite attaining the type of authority embodied in cases of the 
Alabama slave law, or the South African legislators pronouncement. 
For this reason, I dub this approach to subordinating speech the ‘approximating authority’ 
model. The main feature of this model is a combination of three claims: First, that authority is 
required for a speaker to be able to perform certain subordinating acts with their speech;161 
 
159 It’s important not to overstate the power of speech here. As Catherine MacKinnon would say, the law is an 
instance of “authoritatively saying someone is inferior,” which, along with “material supports,” she says is “how 
indifference to violence against those on the bottom is rationalized and normalized” (1993, 31). 
160 Langton takes a similar approach in another more recent article that addresses the authority of pornography. The 
topic of that paper is embodied in its title, “Is Pornography like the Law?” See Langton (2017). 
161 I say “certain subordinating acts” because I want to note that it is only for certain, possibly paradigmatic, 
subordinating speech acts that authors such as Langton say authority is required. She acknowledges that speech may 
harm in many ways absent authority, noting that “Unlike the law, the harm in hate speech dwells partly in factors 
independent of its authority.” She adds, however, that “Whatever else ‘the harm in hate speech’, it will be the worse 
when hate speech has authority,” as “authority would surely exacerbate” whatever problems hate speech presents 
independent of authority. See Langton (2018a) 
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second, that subordinating authority is located primarily in individual speakers; and third, that 
different speakers can approximate authoritative subordinating speech to differing degrees. 
Together, these claims constitute an account of subordinating speech that emphasizes the 
centrality of individual speakers of differing degrees of (subordinating) authority. When we’re 
wondering whether a given utterance is a case of subordinating speech, this model leads us to ask 
whether that speaker occupies an authoritative position in the domain under discussion. 
 
4.1.1. What Langton’s account leaves out  
 
The main problem with Langton’s (updated) model is that it nonetheless remains 
monolithic in certain ways and retains a hierarchical, individualist picture of authority. And I 
believe these features limit its applicability to a wider range of subordinating speech acts, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
I say this approach is still monolithic, despite its internal divisions, because it holds onto 
the idea that speech acts can be assessed in terms of their strength in a straightforward way. That 
is, for Langton, the issue comes down to whether an utterance is plausibly backed by authority. 
That authority may be practical or epistemic, and it may apply only to a particular domain or 
jurisdiction, and it may gain much of its authority simply by a lack of competitors, but the 
question remains one of asking whether it makes sense to attribute authority to an utterance or 
not. This approach retains an overtly hierarchal picture of subordinating authority. While there 
are a few new dimensions of authority, the overall picture remains the same. Some utterances are 
clear instances of authoritative speech—e.g., the law, expert testimony—and subordinating 
speech approaches these paradigms to greater or lesser degrees. In this way, it holds onto the idea 
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that subordinating speech is more harmful the more it approaches these paradigms of 
authoritative speech. And I’m not convinced this is the correct approach to take for subordinating 
speech.  
First, (as I claimed in Chapter One) we ought to reject the idea that there is a single 
paradigm of subordination, but this idea seems to be central to Langton’s model. Indeed, her 
touchstone examples—the apartheid-era legislator, the Alabama slave law, Nazi propaganda—
are positioned as themselves paradigm instances of subordinating speech. And while they are 
each horrific examples of the category, I worry that this reinforces an explicit hierarchy of 
subordinating speech, and therefore positions much of this category as less harmful and less 
significant. Seeing subordinating speech as a category that varies horizontally and not just 
vertically, as I propose, would do some work against the knee-jerk dismissal of ‘less severe’ 
forms of subordinating speech than outright legal rankings, and genocidal propaganda.162 
Second, the conception of authority at issue here remains located primarily in individual 
speakers, and, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, that fails to do justice to the force of 
subordinating speech. In other words, the connection between the speaker and the broader norms 
of oppression falls from view. Yet it is often this connection that permits the speaker to make a 
subordinating speech act. With that concern in mind, it is useful to turn to McGowan’s 
alternative account.  
 
 
162 In making this criticism, I acknowledge that Langton has available the response that her target of analysis is itself 
narrow. In other words, she (perhaps) is not making any claims about the large swath of subordinating speech acts 
that are beyond her (current) purview. 
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4.2. The No-Authority Alternative 
 
In this section, I consider an alternative framework for thinking about subordinating 
speech as presented by Mary Kate McGowan in a series of articles. This alternative is worth 
considering here for a few reasons. Most significantly because it eschews the necessity for 
speaker authority in oppressive speech. And since it was the reliance on speaker authority that 
poses problems for other models—namely, the Authority Problem considered in Chapter Two—
the idea that discarding this concept might liberate the framework is compelling.  
However, as I’ll argue below, this framework comes with significant costs. Most 
significantly for my purposes is that it flattens the terrain of subordinating speech. It does so by 
viewing the capacity to alter permissibility facts (that oppress) as the hallmark of oppressive 
speech. That is, McGowan sees the Austinean illocution of exercitives—which set and change 
facts about what is permissible and impermissible—as the principal, apparently singular type of 
oppressive speech act. In this way, and unlike Langton, McGowan does seem to be making 
claims about subordinating speech as such.163 For this reason, this view stands in stark contrast to 
my own approach.  
Beyond this difference McGowan’s account also has further, internal problems. Most 
notable it elides an important distinction between enacting new norms and engaging pre-existing 
norms. In this way, it is not unlike Maitra’s account discussed in Chapter Two, where both seem 
to mischaracterize the relationship between individual subordinating speech acts and the broader 
systems of oppression that gives these speech acts their force. Before developing these 
 
163 For example, consider the following: “Since oppressive speech enacts permissibility facts (that oppress), speech 
must be exercitive in order for it to be an act of oppression. In other words, in order for a particular utterance to be 
an act of oppression, that utterance must have exercitive (illocutionary) force” (McGowan 2009, 392). 
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criticisms, I’ll first explain McGowan’s approach to oppressive speech, focusing on its 
development of the exercitive. 
 
4.2.1. Standard exercitives 
 
Austinean exercitives—which McGowan also calls “standard exercitives”—are speech 
acts that enact policies and rules, issue commands and directives, and make some actions 
permissible or impermissible. They are authoritative speech acts, where one of their felicity 
conditions is that the speaker possess the appropriate authority over the domain in question. 
Without this authority, the resulting speech act is “unhappy,” or a misfire.  
For example, if a college professor says, “your papers are due on Friday,” they make it 
the case that students must turn in their papers by that time or receive a penalty. It is an 
exercitive speech act that sets what is permissible and impermissible for some course of action. 
If, instead, one of the students had said, “I declare that our papers are due Monday, everyone,” 
no change in permissibility facts would follow, and this is straightforwardly because the student 
lacks the authority that the professor possesses to do this action with their words. 
Notice also how exercitives also contain the new rule enacted as the content of the 
utterance itself. Taken together, then, standard exercitives (a) require the speaker to hold an 
authoritative position, and (b) include the norm-shaping command as part of their explicit 
content. Before moving onto McGowan’s adaptations of this concept, it’s worth pausing to note 
how this speech act does capture at least some instances of subordinating speech. Notably, some 
of the ‘paradigm’ examples fit this model well, such the South African legislator case, the 
Alabama slave law, and instances of “White’s Only” signs posted in the Jim Crow South. Each 
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case involves an authoritative speaker enacting a policy—an oppressive policy, no doubt—via a 
speech act whose content matches the policy being enacted. 
Though this model fits some cases, it is nonetheless inapplicable for the bulk of 
subordinating speech. Much of what we intuitively take to be oppressive speech still requires 
elaboration. As Ramsey puts it, “the main problem with the [standard] model is that much 
oppressive speech is not obviously exercitive” (2013, 38–39), at least not so long as we stick to 
standard exercitives. 
 
4.2.2. Covert exercitives164 
 
Because of the limitations of the standard exercitive model, McGowan considers a 
different type of norm-shaping; cases where no explicit authority is present and where the 
semantic content of the utterance and the rule enacted is less clear cut. But because they still 
enact permissibility facts,165 she calls these utterances “covert exercitives” (2009; 2018). 
What distinguishes covert exercitives from standard exercitives is their ability to enact 
permissibility facts without requiring (a) the speaker to hold a position of authority or (b) 
containing the content of the rule-change as part of the content of the utterance.166 Instead, covert 
exercitive enact changes to what is permissible by triggering the rules of a norm-governed 
 
164 I should note that McGowan sometimes uses the concept of ‘conversational exercitives’ to bridge the gap from 
standard exercitives to covert exercitives, in part by drawing explicitly on the idea of accommodation in 
conversation, as explained by Lewis (1979). It is with this idea in tow that McGowan then takes her view beyond the 
norms of conversations, to include wider practices—like oppression. 
165 McGowan writes most often of ‘permissibility facts,’ and ‘rules,’ and is most concerned with how these are at 
work in ‘norm-governed practices,’ like conversations, games, or systems of oppression. I will use sometimes follow 
her terminology, and sometimes use the language of norms, as each term seems equivalent in the sense required. 
166 McGowan’s understanding of the contrast between ‘standard’ and ‘covert’ exercitives seems to shift slightly 
throughout her work. For example, in her (2012) she marks the distinction almost entirely on the idea that standard 
exercitives are an exercise of speaker authority, while noting that they may be ‘implicit’ and ‘indirect’ standard 
exercitives, which do not wear their exercitive force on their sleeves—that is, as part of their semantic content. In 
other work she builds in identity between content and enacted norm as a requirement of standard exercitives. 
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activity within which the utterance constitutes a move.167 This is the case because “any 
contribution to any rule-governed activity changes what is subsequently permissible in that 
activity [and] most collective human activities are rule-governed in the relevant sense” 
(McGowan 2009, 395).168 In this way, covert exercitives help explain how an utterance like, “my 
child’s tutor is amazing,” makes other new conversational moves now permissible, such as 
asking for the name of the tutor, or how old their child is.169 
So far, this has simply touched on the norms that guide conversation, but more is at play. 
Notice that some speech acts are part of activities that go beyond the scope of that particular 
conversation. A wedding invitation, for example, triggers norms not only related to conversation 
(e.g., once being invited, a response is now called for) but also the norms of the relationship 
within which it occurs (e.g., do the engaged really expect you to fly to Aruba for this?), as well 
as the norms of etiquette (e.g., is a gift now called for?), and likely much more besides. These are 
the broader activities that are also at play in a simple utterance, but each has its own unique 
norms that govern appropriate moves going forward. It is by being a move in another normative 
activity that speech “triggers the rules of that activity and thereby enacts facts about what is 
subsequently permissible in that activity” (McGowan 2009, 396).170 
 
167 “When speech constitutes a move in a norm-governed activity, it has exercitive force in virtue of enacting new 
permissibility facts for the activity in which it is a move” (McGowan 2012, 134). 
168 McGowan explains her conception of ‘rule-governed activity’ as follows: “By rule-governed, I mean any activity 
governed by norms. The ‘rules’ in question need not be explicit, formal, exceptionless or even consciously 
recognized. If at least some behaviours (as contributions to the activity in question) would count as out of bounds or 
otherwise inappropriate (as contributions to the activity in question) then that activity is rule-governed in the 
relevant sense. Conversations, dancing, playing music, walking, chess, checkers, and baseball are all rule-governed 
in the appropriate sense.” (2009, 395). 
169 Conversely, it makes it impermissible for someone to respond with: “So, do you have any kids?” Impermissible 
not in the sense that it is impossible for this to be said, but impermissible in the sense that it goes against the norms 
that constitute conversation, including the near-seamless accommodation of presuppositions. 
170 McGowan further clarifies what counts as a move: “A move in a rule-governed activity is a contribution to, and 
thus a component of, that activity” (2009, 395). So not every action that occurs within a rule-governed activity is 
itself a move. As she notes, when a baseball player scratches their nose, it has no effect on what is subsequently 
permissible within the game. 
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 The final pieces to add to this story are to note (1) that oppression itself is a rule-
governed or normative activity, and (2) that speech acts can be contributions to this activity. 
McGowan supports the former point by noting that “oppression ranks people according to their 
membership in socially marked groups and […] involves treating persons in some categories 
differently than persons in other categories” (209, 396). A sign posted with the words “Whites 
Only” would be a clear example of linguistic contribution to oppression, lending support to this 
second claim. The sign is a (linguistic) contribution to oppression, in part because it enacts the 
discriminatory rule that non-white people are not permitted in the establishment.  
But McGowan wants to examine much more besides explicit directives like “Whites 
Only,” which functions like the authoritative—and thus, standard—exercitive. To illustrate the 
potential of the covert exercitive model, she provides the following example: 
Steve and John are co-workers at a factory with very few female employees. The 
following exchange takes place in the factory’s employee lounge: 
John: So, Steve, how’d it go last night? 
Steve: I banged the bitch. 
John: [smiling] She got a sistuh? (McGowan 2009, 399) 
 
Here, a few moves occur simultaneously. Steve’s utterance is a conversational move, making one 
woman salient in the conversation, allowing John to refer to her with ‘She.’ But it is also, 
McGowan claims, “a verbal means of mistreating women.” By this she means that “it is a 
contribution to, and thus a component of, a system of gender oppression. As a result, it covertly 
enacts permissibility facts […] in this system of gender oppression” (2009, 399). What 
permissibility facts are these? As a hypothesis, McGowan suggests this speech act “makes it 
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acceptable, in this immediate environment and at this time, to degrade women. [Steve’s] 
utterance makes women second-class citizens (locally and for the time being)” (2009, 400).171  
Taking all this together, we’re led to the conclusion that the utterance constitutes 
oppression because it enacts (local) norms that discriminate and subordinate women. It is 
therefore a speech act with exercitive force, and a contribution to an oppressive institution. And 
through this we’re led to the idea that, on this view, speakers “need not possess the positional 
authority required of standard exercitives because the [broader norms] of the oppressive practice 
supply the needed authority” (Ramsey 2013, 47). 
Speaker authority thus falls out of the picture as a requirement for the type of speech act 
that constitutes oppression. “The power to enact the permissibility facts resides,” McGowan 
claims, “not in the speaker (as with standard exercitives), but in the rule-governed activity in 
question. When one performs a covert exercitive, one enacts permissibility facts, not by 
exercising one’s own authority or power, but by triggering the rules of the system” (2009, 402 
emphasis added). She thus has a blunt answer to the Authority Problem that vexes others. “It 
matters little,” she claims:  
whether we say that conversational exercitives are authoritative (and that all 
conversational participants have the requisite authority) or that they are not (since no 
peculiar authority is required). Either way, the authority condition is either met or 
inapplicable and thus poses no challenge. (2003, 180)  
 
 
171 McGowan continues: “If Steve’s utterance does this, then it is akin to a sign reading: ‘It is hereby permissible, in 
this local environment and at this time, to treat women as second-class citizens.’ Such a sign would surely be an act 
of gender oppression. The hypothesis suggested here is that, perhaps, Steve’s utterance is too” (2009, 400). 
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Therefore, the power to enact new permissibility facts is not bound up in speaker authority.172 
And since it is through enacting oppressive permissibility facts that McGowan defines 
oppressive speech, it is then as covert exercitives that speech oppresses. 
 
4.2.3. Criticism of the covert exercitive model 
 
Having explained McGowan’s account of oppressive speech, I will now argue that it is an 
inadequate model for the bulk of subordinating speech. This matters because it is—or ought to 
be—a constraint on accounts of subordinating speech that they be able to explain a wide variety 
of examples as instances of subordinating speech. McGowan’s model, I argue, either lumps 
assorted acts into a single type, or excludes recognizable cases. 
John Michael Ramsey thoroughly explores McGowan’s model in his “How We Do Bad 
Things with Words” (2013, esp. Ch. 1). Ramsey argues that speech acts like those McGowan 
draws our attention to engage existing oppressive norms, rather than enact new ones (2013, 48). 
That is, the main examples McGowan uses to motivate her account “blur the distinction between 
engaging rules and enacting rules” (Ramsey 2013, 40). As he notes, oppressive speech often 
succeeds as a contribution to a conversation and to wider practices of subordinating because the 
norms are already well-established and accepted within a community. To use an example 
Ramsey draws on, when in 2012 Rand Paul made a (bad) joke saying he “didn’t think [President 
Obama’s] views on marriage could get any gayer,” his utterances does not make it newly 
permissible to disparage gay people. The ‘joke’ works in that context—if it does at all—because 
 
172 “Since our words often are contributions to such activities (e.g., conversations, games or systems of oppression), 
they are often covertly exercitive. Consequently, our utterances routinely change what is permissible for those 
around us” (McGowan 2009, 406). 
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his audience at the Iowa Faith & Freedom event already accept that norm (Ramsey 2013, 50). Or 
at least we can assume so much based off their raucous laughter.173 Consequently, it’s a 
misrepresentation to characterize the oppressive force of Rand Paul’s comment as one that enacts 
a new norm concerning homophobia. We do better to acknowledge how his comment engages 
this existing norm, and in doing so contributes to oppression overall. 
To engage a norm is different than to enact one. Recall the motivating example of a 
(standard) exercitive is something like a parent saying, “your bedtime is 9pm,” or “no games 
after dinner.” If it already was a standing rule that the child’s bedtime was 9pm or that games 
were not permitted after dinner, then it’s hard to see how the parent’s utterance is exercitive. The 
fact that the norm is already established undermines the idea that a new rule is being uttered into 
existence. And this makes sense, as we routinely engage existing norms. While sometimes new 
rules are enacted by fiat, “for the most part social practices […] and the norms constituting these 
practices are performed and normalized in such a way that creates certain, standing permissibility 
facts” (Ramsey 2013, 51). When a person uses subordinating speech, they engage these standing 
permissibility facts, and in doing so express a commitment to these norms. This is, at least 
intuitively, a contrast to the practice of enacting a norm. 
We see this contrast again in McGowan’s example of ‘Whites Only’ signs. Given that in 
this context, this law was widespread and widely known, it makes better sense to say the sign 
describes or expresses the rule, rather than enacts it. While the person who posts the sign likely 
endorses the policy, it’s unclear to what extent they are best described as the one who makes it 
the case. And this makes sense, since in most cases—e.g., unless they are owner with the power 
 
173 For video of the original comment, see Lavender (2012). 
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to make discriminatory policy stick in this jurisdiction—they lack the authority to make new 
policy of this sort. 
The covert exercitive model is supposed to explain how oppressive speech constitutes 
oppression. According to the model, speech is oppressive when it enacts oppressive 
permissibility facts. And this occurs when a speaker subtly alters the existing norms that are 
salient in a given context. A sexist remark like Steve’s in the example above makes it the case 
that sexist comments—and behavior too, maybe—are now acceptable, at least in the here and 
now, and so long as the comment doesn’t receive substantive challenge from anyone. To be sure, 
McGowan clarifies that the norms being enacted are often highly local and may evaporate a short 
time later. But what this model has difficulty acknowledging is how antecedently existing norms 
are (often) already established in that context. While it makes some sense to see these speech 
acts as further entrenching background norms and making them vivid in a new, more specific 
context, this analysis seems to collect to much under one concept. 
Where McGowan’s model makes the most sense is in diagnosing how initial utterances 
can make certain norms more salient—creating new permissions in the here and now—but it is 
less effective in representing subsequent utterances as doing the same thing. That is, it is odd to 
say that John’s utterance, which also engages sexist norms, is also enacting these same norms 
once again. But his utterance is also sexist and, we can assume, also a subordinating speech act. 
According to McGowan, however, this would mean that it ought to be covertly exercitive. While 
it surely contributes to the ongoing sexist norms that Steve’s utterance first made salient, to say it 
enacts these norms seems to suggest that he is working from scratch, rather than building upon 
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an existing edifice.174 If we were to imagine Steve and John bantering in this way, back and 
forth, for ten minutes, it would be strange to characterize the last utterance as newly enacting 
sexist norms. But this is what (covert) exercitives do. The model therefore loses its appeal once 
we consider subordinating speech in contexts where oppressive norms are already established 
and have a strong grip on social relations—that is to say, nearly everywhere. 
So, one problem with the covert exercitive model is how it represents utterances as 
enacting new norms when they more properly are described as engaging or maintaining these 
norms. In this way the covert exercitive model “does not adequately explain how speech acquires 
oppressive force” (Ramsey 2013, 53).  
A related problem is how the model fails to acknowledge the variety of subordinating 
speech acts. It does so by (1) mischaracterizing them all as exercitive, when at least some are 
better seen as engaging existing rules. But it also does so by (2) mischaracterizing the different 
speech capacities of different speakers.175 That is, by dispensing with the need for speaker 
authority, and instead claiming that all speakers are suitably positioned to enact oppressive 
norms, it fails to note that different speakers have different speech capacities in front of them. In 
doing so, it incorrectly sees all subordinating speakers as doing roughly the same thing—
enacting oppressive permissibility facts. In this way it mirrors Langton’s ‘approaching 
authoritative speech’ model, discussed above. But unlike Langton, McGowan takes herself to be 
analyzing oppressive speech in general.  
 
174 In this way again, McGowan’s approach has similarities to Maitra’s discussed in Chapter Two. This is no 
surprise as they both are using an Austinian framework to model oppressive speech. In this way, they both tend to 
focus on isolated, individualized speech acts, while either bracketing or ignoring other relevant features of 
subordinating speech. In other words, both accounts carefully attend to the pragmatics of singular speech acts, but 
this focus obscures the specifics of how the broader, structural features of oppressive systems make subordinating 
speech acts unlike other speech acts. 
175 By ‘speech capacities’ I mean the different speech acts available, at a given time, to speakers occupying different 
social locations. See Ayala (2016), though she uses the term ‘speech affordances.’ 
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For this reason, it’s useful to see why her account goes wrong. In short, McGowan sees 
any conversational contribution as exercitive.176 In doing so, she loses sight of what makes 
exercitives an interesting category of speech acts. Since, if everything is an exercitive, then there 
is nothing notable about this category of illocutions, and labeling speech acts as exercitive loses 
its significance.177 While McGowan is correct to note than all contributions to a conversation 
alter what is permissible to occur following that contribution, this fact alone is trivial rather than 
the hallmark of oppressive speech. We notice this most explicitly when we take note of exactly 
what McGowan pushes aside: differences in speaker authority and entitlements. 
While all speech has the potential to alter the normative landscape it occurs in, not all 
speakers have equal speech capacity (Ayala 2016). This idea is familiar and underwrites the 
common feminist observation that women’s comments are routinely ignored,178 and only taken 
up when uttered by a man. In other words, people in different socially-relevant positions are able 
to do different things with their words. This point was significant in the previous chapter. 
To be sure, McGowan does acknowledge that “there is nevertheless a sense in which 
covert exercitives require that the speaker have a certain status” (2009, 402 emphasis added). 
But, on her view, this is a status we all share, as being participants in the rule-governed activities 
of conversations, etiquette, oppression, etc.179 Of course, this leaves open whether we are all 
 
176 Consider: “I argue that any conversational contribution invoking a rule of accommodation changes the bounds of 
conversational permissibility and is therefore an exercitive speech act” (McGowan 2004, 169). 
177 Herbert and Kukla (2016, 578) note how it is only in “a rather forced sense” that we could say that many speech 
acts enact new norms or rules—in their case: ingrouping and outgrouping. 
178 Social epistemologists have discussed this under the rubric of “testimonial injustice” (Dotson 2011) and 
“epistemic injustice” (Fricker 2007). Tirrell (2018b) offers an analysis of this problem using the tools of a 
philosophy of language approach, as does Kukla (2014). 
179 McGowan elaborates as follow: “Of course, there is a trivial sense in which such speakers have such authority. In 
virtue of being a participant in the rule-governed activity in question, each participant has authority over how that 
rule-governed activity evolves in the case at hand. The baseball player may not have authority over the rules of 
baseball as such but he does have authority over how this particular baseball game is played. He has such authority 
in virtue of being a participant in the game in question” (2009, 402n). 
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equal participants in specific normative activities. In baseball, the catcher can’t just grab a bat 
and hit a home run. Differences in status delineate the moves available to each participant, and I 
argued above that something similar occurs within oppression’s implicit rules. 
But McGowan’s account of how individual oppressive speech acts connect to broader 
systems of oppression is unhelpful, mostly because it is so binary. Either a speaker is saying 
something that participates in the system of racism, or they are not. It therefore doesn’t admit of 
the nuances I believe are necessary to draw out. What’s needed is a fuller depiction of how 
individual speech acts draw from and contribute to systems of oppression and domination. 
McGowan is clearly open to this understanding, as she says that “it seems reasonable to suppose 
that who can make which sort of move (in a rule-governed activity) is sensitive to one’s position 
in that activity” (2009, 403 emphasis added).180 However, her exploration of this idea is brief, 
and is focused more on the idea of undoing certain norms. So, what we’re left with on the covert 
exercitive model is a limited understanding of what subordinating speakers do with their words, 
and how different speakers have differing potential. This offers a blunt connection between the 
individual acts and oppressive norms, which leaves no room to identify different kinds of 
oppressive speech acts that are importantly distinct.  
I believe that we must go beyond the models offered by both Langton and McGowan and 




180 She adds: “it may be that men are in a privileged position (with respect to the ability to make various sorts of 
moves) in a system of gender oppression. If this is correct, then it may be especially difficult for women to reverse 




My goal in this chapter was to demonstrate existence of multiple types of subordinating 
speech acts. I wanted to show that there are many different sorts of speech acts that oppress, and 
these do so in different ways, drawing on different entitlement conditions on the speaker’s side 
of things, and plausibly generating different outputs on the target’s side. This should be an 
obvious and trivial fact. However, as I argued in section 4, dominant models of oppressive 
speech have a hard time recognizing it. Langton’s “approximating authority” model depicts 
authority as primarily a feature of individual speakers, and I argue that this presents a monolithic 
understanding of subordinating authority. On the other hand, Mary Kate McGowan’s “no-
authority” model offers an intriguing account of how these background norms supply oppressive 
force in lots of circumstances. But, by only conceiving of a blunt connection between speakers 
and these norms, it flattens the terrain and does not allow for the nuances that animate varieties 
of subordinating speech. 
Instead, I opted for a bottom-up approach, and endeavored to catalogue a diversity of 
subordinating speech acts. From this grouping I pulled out a variety of distinct types of 
subordinating speaker authority and entitlements, along with an account of how to delineate 
differences in pragmatic output. Using this approach, I identified a type of subordinating speaker 
authority that is, in an important sense, collectively-sustained. These collective speech acts, as I 
call them, reveal instances of subordinating speech where the entitlement—indeed, subordinating 
authority—speakers draw on is not reducible to an individual position. Instead, these speech acts 
draw power and mutual support from taking place within a group practice. I believe this 
conception helpfully opens new avenues for discussing real cases of subordinating speech, and in 
the following chapter I apply this idea to the under-analyzed case of online harassment.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
WHOM DO YOU SPEAK FOR? AND HOW?  
ONLINE ABUSE AND COLLECTIVE SPEECH ACTS 
 
 “Internet trolls, predominantly anonymous posters, realized they could work together to try to 
destroy the lives of people who disagreed with them.” 
 - Ian Sherr and Erin Carson (2017) 
 
“I don't think Facebook changed the way people are in any negative or positive way. It just 
showed how people are.” 




The main topic of this chapter is online abuse. I have two goals in directing our attention 
here. First, I want to show that this is a serious, but neglected, area of subordinating speech, and 
that social philosophers of language have good reason to pay more attention to the harms of 
online discourse. Second, I will argue that accounting for the realities of online abuse shows that 
speaker authority is dynamic and emergent, and often depends on the community in more ways 
than standard theories of licensing and accommodation are equipped to explain. I argue that 
much of online abuse is best understood as a type of collective subordinating speech act. Overall 
my hope is to show that attention to online subordinating speech is useful for illuminating both 
the harmfulness of that phenomena itself, but also for clarifying features of IRL (in real life) 
speech that regularly go under-emphasized in the existing literature. 
It's not controversial to say that a lot of subordinating speech now occurs online. Yet 
much of the philosophical work in this area has focused on offline life. This immediately raises 
several questions for philosophers. Can current accounts of oppressive speech adequately capture 
digital hate? How does the anonymity of online harassers contribute to the force of their speech? 
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To answer these questions, I address the varied roles of identity in online abuse—for both its 
targets and its speakers—and argue that the combination of anonymity and shared language offer 
online abusers a path to a type of group-authority that lends more power to their speech than they 
might first appear to have.  
By exploring the management and attribution of identity in online abuse, I argue that 
online abuse is best understood as a type of collective subordinating speech, rather than speech 
acts originating from individual speakers. Even where there is an identifiable single speaker and 
they address a single person, because the speech is semi-public181 and because these tropes and 
messages are used widely and repeatedly, we miss something important when we focus too 
closely on any one interaction apart from its wider context. Online abusive speech is speech 
where the ‘speaker’ of these messages is better conceived as a collective. 
To make this argument, I return to the model that claims speakers can come to gain the 
authority they lacked prior to speaking through processes like licensing and accommodation. The 
basic idea is that while the hate speaker can lack the necessary authority to subordinate before 
they make their utterance, because of the silence of bystanders, the audience fails to block the 
speaker’s assertion, imbuing it with subordinating force. This approach has proven quite popular, 
and yet I argue that it fails to explain the dynamics of online abuse, and that this failure reveals a 
more widespread tension in the concept. 
I begin in section 2 I by noting a few ways online subordinating speech is importantly 
different than IRL subordinating speech, especially with regards to online propaganda. It’s useful 
to begin here, as this is the area that has received the most philosophical attention (that I am 
 
181 As Regina Rini (2018b) has remarked, the design of social media platforms themselves promote the manner in 
which speakers speak to a larger audience even when engaging in direct interpersonal exchange. 
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aware of). Next, in section 3, I describe some the key features of online abuse, and I explain how 
these features pose a problem for some existing accounts of the force of subordinating speech, 
particularly around the notion of accommodation. This leads me develop an alternate conception 
of the subordinating authority at work in online abuse, and section 4 is devoted to developing 
this idea. By focusing on (1) the role of anonymity and (2) the use of shared language, I claim 
that much of online abuse is best understood as a collective speech act. As I argue, accounting 
for the realities of online shows that speaker authority is dynamic and emergent, and often 
depends on the wider community in more ways than simple accommodation. 
I argue throughout that much of online abuse challenges existing accounts of 
subordinating speech, and it therefore represents in some ways a distinct phenomenon. At the 
same time, though, I believe that it can also shed some light on IRL subordinating speech. That 
is, I aim to show throughout how online speech makes explicit many features that it shares with 
IRL hate speech, but which tend to be ignored or de-emphasized in existing accounts. Despite 
the internet offering bigots and abusers new tools and strategies, for the victims, the experience 
of being targeted of such abuse is remarkably similar in some key ways. The examination of 
online abuse therefore helps to reveal key features of subordinating speech across mediums, and 
I summarize these in my conclusion. 
 
2. BACKGROUND: THE INTERNET AND ITS PROBLEMS 
 
As the work cited in this dissertation shows, philosophers have been writing about 
subordinating speech for a few decades now. And while the internet have been around almost as 
long, much of the philosophical work on hate speech, propaganda, and subordinating speech in 
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general has focused on offline life.182 In-person hate speech like what you might see in public 
spaces (Maitra 2012; Langton 2018a; 2018b; McGowan 2012), propaganda as it is disseminated 
in print or on the radio (Stanley 2015; Tirrell 2012; Smith 2012), and more recently 
microaggressions as they occur in say, a workplace or college classroom (Liebow 2017; Rini 
2018; Saul 2018b), are the main examples. This has remained the case even as more and more of 
our lives have migrated online.  
These ‘real world’ phenomena are still worthy of philosophical analysis. But online 
speech raises many new issues for social philosophers and philosophers of language, and these 
are only beginning to be explored. Fundamental questions like who or what should count as a 
‘speaker,’ or how retweets, ‘likes,’ ‘favs,’ and emojis fit into an account of utterances, all need to 
be re-examined. As does my current question: how has the internet changed subordinating 
speech? 
How much the internet has changed the way we use language is subject to disagreement. 
One tempting answer is to say that the internet has radically changed everything! And there is at 
least some truth to this, even for more familiar speech acts, like apologies, retractions, quotes, 
etc.183 We may think this is especially likely of subordinating speech—in part, since if you give 




182 For a quick and non-decisive example, consider that the index for the (2012) anthology Speech & Harm: 
Controversies over Free speech, edited by Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan has no entries for the terms 
‘internet,’ ‘website,’ ‘online,’ or other specifically online communication mediums. A few noteworthy exceptions 
include: Barney (2016), Cherry (2015a), Frost-Arnold (2016), Herbert (2018b), Levmore (2010), Manne (2017), 
Nguyen (2018), Nussbaum (2010), Rini (2018b), and Technau (2018). 
183 For one example, see Norlock (2017a) on apologies. 
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2.1. Epistemic Problems 
 
Take propaganda. One initial thought might be that all that the internet has done is made 
it easier to spread hateful propaganda to more people, more quickly.184 And if this were all it did, 
that would be problem enough. However, recent analysis suggests things are more complex, and 
more insidious, than that. Writing for Wired, Issie Lapowsky notes that “[t]he long past of 
propaganda blended with the communication channels of the present and future form a toxic 
mix” (2017).185 
The reach and speed of the internet is but one concern. These, along with other new 
technologies that have their home online point to a difference in kind, rather than only degree. In 
addition to potentially reaching millions of people in mere seconds, photo-, video-, and audio-
editing tools offer new tools in the propagandist's toolbox. These have profound effects on the 
epistemic dimension of propaganda, with the potential to make otherwise unbelievable things 
frustratingly credible. For example, researchers at Stanford University have developed software 
capable of “manipulat[ing] video footage of public figures to allow a second person to put words 
in their mouth—in real time” (Solon 2017; and see BBC News 2017 for a video demonstration). 
More generally, “deepfakes,” that is, videos created using machine learning to create the illusion 
that someone has said or done something they never did, are becoming more widely available as 
the technology improves.186 
 
184 See Ellul (1965) for an argument as to why propaganda will “leave no part of the intellectual or emotional life 
alone. [and will] surround [one] on all sides […] by all possible routes” (quoted in Lederer 1995, 133). 
185 On this toxic potential, two philosophers quoted in the Wired article seem to agree: “‘I think this is real 
dangerous shit,’ says David Livingstone Smith, a professor of philosophy at the University of New England, who 
specializes in the history of dehumanization and who authored a book on the topic called Less Than Human. […] 
‘This is scary shit,’ echoes Jason Stanley, a professor at Yale and author of the book How Propaganda Works, 
whose father fled Nazi Germany in 1939 (Lapowsky 2017). 
186 As Rini (2019) describes them: “Deepfakes are fabricated video or audio recordings created through machine 
learning technology. A computer program uses a large data set of real recordings to build a model of the facial/vocal 
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The above capture cases where someone is willing to put the effort in to create an 
elaborate fake; often, this is unneeded. While the norms here are still evolving, many of us are 
still disposed to think that images, and especially video, give us a less-filtered version of reality 
than mere testimony. And this has clear repercussions for the type of propaganda produced. As 
Lapowsky notes: 
It’s not simply cartoons and phony headlines filling people’s minds. Doctored photos and 
misrepresentations of real footage, like the video the President shared [of supposed 
‘Muslim violence’], are a dangerous new development in the history of propaganda, 
experts say. “Everyone knows caricatures exaggerate,” says Claudia Koonz, a historian at 
Duke University and author of The Nazi Conscience, “but gullible viewers, including 
probably Trump, see videos as reality.” (Lapowsky 2017) 
 
In other words, sometimes even small changes to photos and videos—like the simple technique 
of slowing video down to make speech sound slurred, as occurred for House Majority Leader 
Nancy Pelosi (see Harwell 2019)—can be just as effective as an elaborate fake.187 
The epistemic problems online go deeper when we consider how testimony functions on 
social media. Even as testimony, it is, as Regina Rini (2017) sees it, a “bent” form of testimony 
whose features exacerbate the pre-existing problems posed by something like fake news, which 
is plausibly an old sub-branch of propaganda. For Rini, fake news is not limited to online 
communications, but there is, as she says, “a strong contingent relationship between fake news 
and social media” (2017, 45), making the one ripe for the other. As she says: 
I suspect that the two bent features of social media testimony are related to one another. 
Perhaps people are less inclined to subject ridiculous stories to scrutiny because we have 
unstable testimonial norms on social media. A friend posts a ridiculous story, without 
comment, and maybe they don’t really mean it. But then other friends ‘like’ the story, or 
 
characteristics of a person, then superimposes this onto recordings of another person. The effect is an apparent 
recording of a well-known person doing or saying something they never did.” 
187 It is worth acknowledging that a common and effective technique to suppress dissident views is simply to flood 
the information channels with irrelevant and sometimes contradictory content. The thought being that it is easier to 
drown out ‘unwanted’ information than to censure it. Zeynep Tufekci (2017) describes this aspect in relation to how 
networked communication has changed things for both revolutionary social movements and repressive regimes. The 
philosophy Michael P. Lynch (2016) makes a similar point. 
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comment with earnest revulsion, or share it themselves. Each of these individual 
communicative acts involves some ambiguity in the speaker’s testimonial intentions. But, 
when all appear summed together, this ambiguity seems to wash away. Perhaps the 
implicit thought is like this: could it really be that all these people aren’t really testifying 
to this? A thought like that might overwhelm ordinary skepticism about ridiculous 
testimony. (2017, 49)188 
 
Rini’s analysis shows how fake news can spread originally, given the unstable norms of social 
media (as they relate to testimony, in particular). This means that little to no malicious intent is 
needed. But, as Zeynep Tufekci (2017, 241) notes, “social media’s business model financed by 
ads paid out based on number of pageviews makes it not just possible but even financially 
lucrative to spread misinformation, propaganda, or distorted partisan content that can go viral in 
algorithmically entrenched echo chambers.” And, of course, there is little incentive for the 
private companies that own and operate these social network platforms to eliminate this type of 
content. 
In sum, the internet—and social media in particular—not only amplify the reach and 
speed of propaganda, but also increase its credibility in several distinctive ways.  
 
2.2. Non-Epistemic Problems 
 
All the above cases all involve deception, though perhaps sometimes unwitting. But 
another development flips the direction of fit and instead aims to make the world as the 
propagandist wants it, and then captures that for distribution. ProPublica reported on a new 
white-supremacist group called RAM (the Rise Above Movement) responsible for some of the 
violent assaults in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017. They note how RAM members have 
 
188 Chloé Bakalar (2018) offers a different analysis of the epistemic features of social media testimony that focuses 
on the problems posed by Automated Content Moderation Algorithms (ACMAs). 
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teamed up with Vincent James Foxx, “a 31-year-old video blogger and livestreamer with a 
fondness for white supremacists and radical right-wing politics” who operates as their unofficial 
propagandist (Thompson, Winston, and BondGraham 2017). Writing about one violent rally in 
Berkeley, California, they note that: 
Foxx wasn’t just documenting the violence at the rally—he was inciting it. On video 
Foxx posted to YouTube, he can be heard repeatedly encouraging RAM members and 
others to assault people. “Get that fucking cuck!” he screamed when a RAM member and 
four or five other men grabbed a counter-protester and began beating him. “Charge!” 
Foxx yelled as a mob of right-wingers went on the offensive. (Thompson, Winston, and 
BondGraham 2017, emphasis added) 
 
Here, rather than affecting the reach, speed, or credibility of propaganda, social media is itself 
providing the impetus for physical violence—the ability to document violence for the purposes 
of spreading propaganda online served as motivating cause of his incitement. I call attention to 
this since violence is usually thought of as the downstream ‘mentally mediated’ consequence of 
propaganda. But here, rather than propaganda begetting violence, we have violence begetting 
propaganda. At least in a sense. 
Indeed, the crossover between online hate and real-life violence is hard to deny. After the 
New Zealand Mosque shootings, in a piece titled, “Mass Shootings Have Become a Sickening 
Meme,” New York Times writer Charlie Warzel (2019) wrote: 
it’s becoming increasingly difficult to ignore how online hatred and message board 
screeds are bleeding into the physical world—and how social platforms can act as an 
accelerant for terroristic behavior. The internet, it seems, has imprinted itself on modern 
hate crimes, giving its most unstable residents a theater for unspeakable acts—and an 
amplification system for an ideology of white supremacy that only recently was relegated 
to the shadows. 
 
And the connections aren’t only there for one-off events, but also for broader cultural 
shifts. For example, New York Times reporter Kevin Roose speculates that the violent events in 
Charlottesville in 2017 wouldn’t have occurred had Discord—a chat app meant for gamers but 
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also a home for the ‘alt-right’—and other platforms shut them down earlier (Barbaro 2017). And 
some take the combined presence of Twitter and Facebook to have been necessary conditions for 
President Trump’s 2016 election win (for one example, see Sherr and Carson 2017).189 Whether 
or not this is true, it has led to much soul-searching among the tech giants, as demonstrated by 
Facebook’s recent “Hard Questions” series (see Harbath 2018).  
In sum, these issues lead many to think, reasonably, that online hate is substantially 
different from what we’ve seen before, and it changes the game compared to more traditional 
forms of propaganda. In short, there is therefore good reason to think the rise of the internet—
and social media in particular—make online hate speech different from what we’ve seen before 
and is a cause for alarm. The worldwide concern for fake news demonstrates this well. We are 
only now beginning to see the effects of these developments, and some analyses are quite 
damning. Violence arguably caused by online propaganda and fake news has been reported in 
countries ranging from the US, Myanmar, Germany, India, Canada, and others.190  
It is noteworthy, however, that the bulk of this analysis focusses on subordinating speech 
as it functions in its propagandistic mode—as outreach—rather than cases where it is directly 
targeting and harming particular individuals.191 This has led to discussions of the ‘potential’ 
harms of online hate and have focused on abstract values ‘democracy’ as its main victim. But 
this ignores those who have already been victimized by online hate and minimizes the harm 
they’ve experienced—this is no surprise, as most of these victims are not white men. In what 
 
189 That is, how a fringe online movement comprised of angry gamers and angry racists—what some have called 
‘the Chanterculture’ after the notorious online forum 4chan—played a key role in elevating Trump to the 
presidency. 
190 Indeed, as I mentioned in Chapter One, the Quebec City Mosque shooter was partly inspired by online extremist 
content, and then the final straw was a tweet by Prime Minister Trudeau. See Cecco (2018) for details. 
191 Note that a single speech act can play both roles at once, though. I discussed these differences and where they 
overlap in the previous chapter. 
173 
follows, I will examine online abuse as a topic worthy of serious philosophical investigation. I 
consider it as a structural problem, but I want to draw attention to how it is experienced by those 
targeted by online abuse. 
 
3. ONLINE ABUSE 
 
To being, we need a better idea of what online abuse includes.192 Media studies professor 
Emma Jane (2014) articulates the breadth of the problem well in her (aptly titled) paper, “‘Your 
a Ugly, Whorish, Slut’: Understanding E-bile.” Jane coins the term ‘e-bile’ to capture what she 
describes as the “extravagant invective, the sexualized threats of violence, and the recreational 
nastiness that have come to constitute a dominant tenor of Internet discourse” (532).193 As Jane’s 
investigation shows, ‘e-bile’ is found in nearly all corners of the internet and displays impressive 
flexibility in terms of functional use. She writes that: 
hyperbolic vitriol—often involving rape and death threats—has become a lingua franca 
in many sectors of cyberspace. It is a commonsensical, even expected, way to, among 
other things: register disagreement and disapproval; test and mark the boundaries of on-
line communities; compete and create; ward off boredom; prod for reaction; seek 
attention; and/or simply gain enjoyment. (ibid., 542) 
 
And yet, despite being so ubiquitous, and despite being put to many uses, “the rhetorical 
constructs of individual e-bile texts are strikingly similar in terms of their reliance on profanity, 
ad hominem invective, and hyperbolic imagery of graphic—often sexualized-violence” (ibid., 
533). So, ‘e-bile’ is found in all corners of the internet, is used to perform a variety of speech 
 
192 For some recent first-person accounts that touch upon the varied features of online abuse in detail, see Koul 
(2017), La (2017), Quinn (2017), Valenti (2016), and West (2016). For more, see Adler (2018), Bartlett (2014), 
Bernstein (2015; 2018), Jeong (2018), Kakutani (2018), as well as Ronson (2015) for a vivid account of online 
shaming, and Norlock (2017) for a philosophical analysis of the same. 
193 The topic under discussion goes by a few names: “e-bile,” “cyber-bullying,” “online harassment,” and more. I go 
with “online abuse,” partly to follow internet safety activist Zoë Quinn, who suggests: “the term ‘online abuse’ is far 
more accurate because it perpetuates the dynamics of real-life abusive situations” (2017, 50). 
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acts, but at the same time is strikingly similar across these usages, with expressions of sexual 
violence being a prominent trope.  
Notably, Janes says in many cases “e-bile appears to be a pleasurable—albeit 
competitive—game, in which players joust to produce the most creative venom, break the largest 
number of taboos, and elicit the largest emotional response in targets.” For this reason, Jane 
concludes, “what looks like hate speech might better be classed as “boredom speech” or “gaming 
speech” (ibid., 534). However, as Jane is quick to note, the effects are very serious for the targets 
of e-bile. She reports that “women who have been targeted by e-bile generally report […] 
emotional responses ranging from feelings of irritation, anxiety, sadness, loneliness, 
vulnerability, and unsafeness; to feelings of distress, pain, shock, fear, terror, devastation, and 
violation” (536).194  
What Jane, along with others like Zoë Quinn (2017), notes here is that the functions and 
motives behind abusive rhetoric are more diffuse than might be expected. And this is true both 
when the utterances are directed towards ingroup members, who are likely ‘in on the joke,’ but 
more importantly also when directed at outgroup members, what I have been calling the targets 
of such speech. This leads many to dismiss online abuse as mere joking around, not worthy of 
much attention, or moral outrage. And sometimes this fact is taken to mean that there is simply 
nothing to be done about the problem.195 The thought seems to be, so long as these utterances are 
not motivated purely by hate then they can’t and shouldn’t be thought of as on par to in-person 
 
194 Further research backs up these claims. See the Women’s Media Center Speech Project for a brief overview of 
relevant survey data (www.womensmediacenter.com/speech-project/research-statistics/) And as all this shows, 
while there is a lot of variety in terms of what motivates speakers to use invective of this sort, along with countless 
ways in which it is put to use, so is there variety in terms of how targets response. As Quinn reminds us, “[t]here is 
no one story of online abuse” (2017, 69), and this must be kept in view as we develop an analysis. 
195 Lindy West (2016) sums up this view as boiling down to: “The Internet’s a cesspool. That’s just the Internet. We 
all get rude comments. Can’t make an Internet without getting a little Internet on your Internet!” 
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hate speech—though those who say so much are often skeptical of the importance of IRL hate 
speech as well.196 And since they aren’t really engaging in hate speech, best to just ‘ignore the 
trolls,’ which is the standard advice given to victims of online abuse.197 
While this may appear to mark an important difference between online and IRL hate 
speech and is sometimes touted as such; it really isn’t. And here is where I’d like to first claim 
that online subordinating speech helpfully reveals aspects of IRL subordinating speech that, 
while present, too often fall from view. What is often obvious for cases of online hate speech is 
obfuscated in cases of IRL hate speech, distorting our understanding of both. 
Many emotions besides hate motivate hate speech. Love, even, as in the love of one’s 
community or traditions—or say, of the white race—serve equally well as the affective 
underpinning of hate speech (MacKinnon 1991;198 Smith 2017). As Jeremy Waldron puts it, 
“hatred is relevant not as the motivation of certain actions, but as a possible effect of certain 
forms of speech,” that is, what this speech aims at or is likely to incite (Waldron 2012, 35, 
emphasis in original).199 But, too often, people see underlying hatred as the definitive mark of 
 
196 See Manne (2017, esp. Ch. 1) for a critique of this psychological view of misogyny. 
197 Worth pointing out that the catchall term ‘troll’ is not always helpful in itself. Over a few decades, it has 
undergone a fairly significant chance in meaning, initially referring to someone who insincerely askis obvious 
questions for laughs, to now meaning an outright hateful speaker who regularly utters death and rape threats. See 
Quinn (2017, 49) for one account of the history. 
198 Consider: “Hatred rationalizes and impels genocide, certainly, but so do some things far colder, like self-interest, 
sense of superiority, or fun, and something far more banal like indifference or system. In the case of women and 
men, love deals at least as much death, and so does something hotter, like pleasure. The fact that pornography so 
often presents itself as love, indeed resembles much of what passes for it under male dominance, makes its 
construction as hate literature a challenging exercise in demystification, to say the least. The concept of 
discrimination aims not at what is felt by perpetrators or victim or what is said as such, but at what is done, 
including through words” (MacKinnon 1991, 808). 
199 He elaborates: “Many statutory definitions of what we call hate speech make the element of ‘hatred’ relevant as 
an aim or purpose, something that people are trying to bring about or incite. For example, the Canadian formulation 
[…] refers to the actions of a person ‘who, by communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred against 
any identifiable group.’ Or it is a matter of foreseeable effect, whether intended or not: the British formulation refers 
to speech that, in all the circumstances, is ‘likely to stir up hatred.’” (Waldron 2012, 35). 
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hate speech.200 And in doing so they misrepresent the variety of motives that serve to animate 
hate speech. 
For whatever reason, though, this occurs less often with online abuse. People tend not to 
assume hatred is the main motivation. Instead, the deflections of its seriousness turn to the 
potential non-hateful motives of the speaker—or, poster, to be more accurate. This is why it is 
supposed to matter that they were ‘just trolling,’ or ‘being ironically racist,’ etc. It is, therefore, 
the recipients who are at fault for not being able to take a joke. (If they only knew what was 
really going on in the heads of their abusers, they wouldn’t be so upset!) 
In order to address either variant, it’s necessary to recognize that subordinating speech, in 
both its online and IRL modes, is often directly motivated by attitudes other than hate, but this 
doesn’t make it less dangerous. This is a basic point, but one that deserves attention, and one that 
I believe the analysis of online abuse helpfully clarifies. While its motives and superficial 
purposes might vary—one-upping, building solidarity, expressing love for one’s own culture—a 
more insidious function sits just below the surface: the intimidation of outsiders in order to 
exclude, and the reification of existing hierarchies of domination.  
By recognizing the red herring that is the speaker’s underlying psychology, and in 
particular the irrelevance of their (stated) motives, we’re led to put the focus back on the 
illocutionary act the speech performs, along with its expected perlocutionary effects. This raises 
the question, though, of what authority, if any, renders these speech subordinating. In the next 
section, I return to the philosophical literature on subordinating speech to demonstrate why it is 
not up to the task of assimilating online abusive speech into its apparatus. 
 
200 This is unfortunate, in part, because it seems to suggest that legislation that aims to tackle hate speech looks to 
correct these ‘bad’ attitudes—and worries of ‘thought crimes’ slip in (Waldron 2012). 
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3.1. The Authority Problem: Redux 
 
 As we’ve seen, the authority conditions that enable subordinating speech is one topic that 
has received sustained philosophical analysis. And as we’ve also seen, many compelling answers 
to explain this authority have been developed, ranging from the claim that, in fact, speakers do 
not require any special authority to subordinate with their words (McGowan 2012), or if they do 
all that’s needed is a type of informal authority within a given domain (Langton 1993; 2017b), to 
models that show how speakers can come to gain the authority they lacked prior to speaking 
through processes like licensing and accommodation (Maitra 2012; Langton 2017a; 2018). 
This last approach has proven quite powerful, though, as I explored in Chapter Three, it is 
not without its inadequacies. Recall: the basic idea of licensing or accommodation is that while a 
speaker can lack the necessary authority to subordinate before they make their utterance, because 
of their silence, the audience fails to block the speaker’s speech act—along its presupposition of 
authority—and its subordinating content is therefore successfully added to the speech situation, 
understood as the ‘score’ and/or the ‘common ground.’ As we saw in the last chapter, the thought 
is that speech acts, “including directives generally, and hate speech specifically, can acquire 
authority by an everyday piece of social magic: authority gets presupposed, and hearers let it go 
through, following a rule of accommodation” (Langton 2018).201 
Some initial roadblocks make all these accounts unsatisfying for online abusive speech. 
First, while an account that relies on informal conception of authority—e.g., one that picks up on 
parameters of privilege like race and class—has intuitive plausibility to account for the authority 
of IRL hate speakers, it will have a harder time explaining how an anonymous speaker, whose 
 
201 See Ayala and Vasilyeva (2014) for a fuller account of the specific harm that bystander silence can contribute. 
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only physical presence might be a cartoon avatar on the target's screen, still retains the authority 
that's akin to an in-person confrontation. While it is probably safe to assume the person hiding 
behind the Nazi anime character is white and male, convincing the police to take flesh and blood 
Nazis spewing hate seriously is hard enough; anime Nazis are, unfortunately, even more easily 
dismissed, and it seems to me this dismissal arises in part from suspicion around the speaker’s 
power over the target.202 
Moreover, according to the standard picture of licensed authority, blocking—where an 
audience member rejects or challenges the speaker’s utterance—should be sufficient to cancel 
the subordinating content from being accommodated. As Langton describes it: “a hearer who 
blocks what is presupposed, also blocks the speech act to which the presupposition contributes. 
[…] That is why blocking a presupposition can make the speech act fail” (2018). And it is worth 
emphasizing that Langton is here referring primarily to the illocutionary success of a speech act, 
not its perlocutionary effects (though it can affect this too),203 and this is because blocking 
prevents—or rather undoes—the acquisition of authority. “A successful blocker,” she says 
“changes a past utterance from the unactualized way it would have been, to the way it actually is. 
If a speaker’s presupposed authority is blocked by a hearer […] that blocking changes the past” 
(2018).204 
 
202 This is not to say police actions are in any way a reliable indicator of speaker authority or illocutionary force. 
Nonetheless, I think this attitude is fairly widespread, though it does seem to be waning. Both are evident in an 
infamous tweet written by musician Tyler, the Creator (2012), along with some of the response it received. The 
tweet, posted on December 31, 2012, read: “Hahahahahahahaha How The Fuck Is Cyber Bullying Real Hahahaha 
Nigga Just Walk Away From The Screen Like Nigga Close Your Eyes Haha.” A casual glance at the replies shows 
both agreement and condemnation. 
203 To see both sides of this, Langton says that “Besides interfering with persuasion—with ‘perlocutionary’ success, 
in Austin’s terms—blocking can interfere with the speech act itself, its ‘illocutionary’ success.” And later: 
“Blocking prevents illocutionary accommodation, tracked by score, and perlocutionary accommodation, tracked by 
common ground, achieving the latter, because it achieves the former.” (Langton 2018). 
204 As she further explains this: “Blocking can disable, rather than refute, evil speech. It can make speech misfire, to 
use Austin’s label for a speech act gone wrong. It offers a way of ‘undoing’ things with words (to twist his title)—
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But in cases of online abuse, this does not seem to be what happens, or so I argue.205 
Consider how in cases of online abuse, a target might receive hundreds of messages, including 
some that are supportive right alongside others that encourage suicide or worse. Here, there is no 
single, linear conversation to map a conversational score or common ground onto. This makes it 
is obvious, in my mind, that counter-speech standardly fails to render these situations or these 
speech acts non-subordinating. While it can help,206 it doesn’t do the job of “blocking” or 
“cancelling” a move in a language game that philosophers sometimes attribute to it.207 
Why is this the case? One answer emerges from considering the speech acts being 
performed here in more detail. As Jane notes about ‘e-bile,’ “the point is rarely about winning an 
argument via the deployment of coherent reasoning, so much as a means by which discursive 
volume can be increased—e-bile is utilized, in other words, to out-shout everyone else” (2014, 
534). Seen in this way, it becomes clearer why more speech—blocking speech—won’t work.  
Recognizing that its point is not to add new content to the conversational score—content 
that might be contested—but instead to inundate its targets with a barrage of hurtful words and 
imagery208 shows the limits of this standard approach when the assailants number in the dozens, 
hundreds or even thousands. Seeing this speech for what it is thus explains the question about 
 
and this ‘undoing’ has, I shall suggest, a retroactive character, which Austin himself described. It offers a ticket to a 
modest time machine, available to anyone willing and able to use it” (Langton 2018). 
205 I should acknowledge that Langton is perhaps not addressing this more direct type of subordinating speech, as her 
concern is more with what she calls ‘back-door’ speech acts. Consider: “We are asking whether evil speech could 
itself misfire, could itself be disabled, when hearers exploit blocking, as counter-speech. I shall suggest a special role 
for blocking as a response to ‘back-door’ speech acts, as we might call them: low profile speech acts, enabled by 
presuppositions and their ilk, that tend to win by default” (2018). 
206 As Lynne Tirrell says (about IRL speech): “Challenges tend to push the game backward—they cannot undo the 
move but they can revoke a license. […] Over time, enough challenges or challenges of the right kind might kill the 
viability of the move, depending on how local or global the challenge becomes” (2017, 143). 
207 Langton (2018) does list a number of ‘handicaps’ on blocking. Some making blocking impossible, others just 
making it difficult. But what she addresses here are unlike the problem I am posing here. 
208 The important role of graphic sexual and violent imagery in online abuse is, unfortunately, one aspect I mainly 
leave aside for this chapter. 
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blocking online—that is, why counter-speech can’t effectively do the blocking work it is 
supposed to do.  
Beyond showing the limits of counter-speech in this case, this also demonstrate how the 
accommodation model relies, implicitly, on an overly rational and psychological picture in 
considering how content gets added to the common ground. But taking note of the red herring 
that psychology offers is a first step to seeing the problems with that account. This is not to say 
that psychology doesn’t matter. My point is rather that when we take seriously the psychological 
state of those targeted by online abuse, we see that ‘blocking speech’ doesn’t effectively block 
what it claims to block. And this is true of those doing the harassing as well, who often don’t 
even acknowledge that any counter-speech even occurred, and instead carry on as if it hadn’t, as 
is demonstrated in the conversational moves they continue to engage in.209 
Again, this is not to say that counter speech is pointless or serves no purpose. It is simply 
to show its limits, and how those limits expose conceptual problems with the accommodation 
approach, especially with regards to online abuse. Moreover, this lays bare another common 
misconception shared between online and IRL subordinating speech, namely, that the right 
response is either the cliché about ‘more speech,’ or to simply ‘ignore the trolls.’ While these 
recommendations may seem at odds—one calls for a response while the other cautions against 
it—what they share is that each offers an individualistic solution that puts the onus on the victim 
of abuse.210 More to the point, we can see how both are ultimately dismissive because both 
ignore the actual function of these speech acts. As Quinn puts it, “[s]ilence in the face of abuse is 
 
209 For further evidence of this, I again refer the reader to any one of the number of first-personal accounts of living 
with online abuse, referenced above. 
210 In truth, the ‘more speech’ recommendation need not be individualistic, though it often is. See Gelber (2012) for 
a non-individualistic option. 
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not a solution; it’s what abusers want” (2017, 50). Seen in this way, to ignore the trolls is to let 
the loudest voices win.211 But to treat this speech as if it were a more standard conversational 
contribution is just as likely to fail. Whether it is online or IRL, trying to respond with a reasoned 
argument is unlikely to change hearts and minds (Nielson 2012), and can in fact be quite 
dangerous (Delgado and Stefancic 2004). 
So, considering the apparent inability of these existing accounts to easily explain the 
subordinating force of abusive speech performed online, I believe we need to look elsewhere. 
What’s needed is an alternative account that can explain how seemingly non-authoritative and 
often anonymous speech can attain authority. As I argued in the last chapter, I believe a much 
more active process explains how some speech acts attain subordinating authority than the fairly 
passive model accommodation offers. These are cases I call collective speech acts as they are 
backed up by a collective authority attained by a chorus of speakers. Online abuse, I will argue, 
demonstrates this well.  
 
4. ONLINE ABUSE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVE AUTHORITY 
 
Online abuse can seem to capture a lot of different instances, and it’s necessary to specify 
what’s included under this concept. And intuitively, not every instance of online abusive speech, 
considered on its own, is of equal seriousness and harmfulness.  Replying to a tweet with 
“Wrong!!! #MAGA” is one thing, and uttering death and rape threats is something else entirely. 
But there is a continuum and a pattern of escalation that connects the two.212 And these patterns 
 
211 See Cherry (2015a) for a short argument as to why those harassed online ought not to go silent. 
212 After distinguishing between the ‘content’ of online harassment and it’s the ‘behavior’ it constitutes, Sarah Jeong 
(2018) gives a useful analysis of this spectrum, along with why we should think of it this way: “On one end of the 
behavioral spectrum of online harassment, we see a drive-by vitriolic message thrown out in the night; on the other 
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reveal illuminating facts about when and why a person’s offline identity becomes relevant to 
their online persona. Like other forms of harassment, online abuse tends to pick out and objectify 
an individual based on markers of identity, and thus enables the coercive reduction of a person to 
(only) some aspect of their public presentation. It can be somewhat striking, then, in what ways 
an individual’s offline identity matters, or doesn’t, to the harassment they receive.  
There is the plain fact that if one is a member of an oppressed group offline, then that 
matters for how likely they will suffer abuse online, and, of course, what form that abuse will 
take. As research from the Women’s Media Center Speech Project confirms, women are more 
likely to be victims of online abuse, and the content of that abuse is overtly misogynistic.213 Men 
and women of color often receive racist comments in response to mundane posts, especially if 
they are public figures. This, itself, is not that surprising. Those who are already targets of 
oppression find themselves targeted even more. And, as Quinn writes about her experience 
running a crisis line for victims of online abuse: “For all the promises of meritocracy and the 
internet allowing minds to transcend our floppy meat bodies, it’s exceedingly rare to see a case 
of online abuse that doesn’t tie back to the client’s offline body” (2017, 203). That is to say, the 
advent of the digital age has not led to the irrelevance of identity, as some early advocates 
predicted. 
 
end, we see the leaking of Social Security numbers, the publication of private photographs, the sending of SWAT 
teams to physical addresses, and physical assault. Saying that these behaviors are all on the same spectrum does not 
mean that they merit the same kind of censure and punishment. […] I don’t think that placing these behaviors side 
by side means it’s impossible to differentiate between one act and the other for the purposes of post hoc punishment. 
Seeing these behaviors on the same spectrum becomes illuminating because it teaches us not how to punish, but how 
to design environments to make targets feel safe.” 
213 See the Women’s Media Center’s Speech Project report for the data, including “an 11-year analysis of online 
harassment cases found that women made up 72% of victims and men 47.5% of perpetrators.” And see Manne 
(2017) for an account of misogyny that takes seriously this victim-centered form of online abuse. 
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In these cases, a person’s identity is what marks them for abuse, at least in part, and no 
doubt for what kind of abuse they receive. Something different, though related, occurs in cases of 
doxing (publishing private and identifying information online without consent) and swatting 
(calling in fake reports of a crime to the police with the intention that they send a SWAT team to 
a target’s address)—and dead-naming in the case of trans targets of abuse—where harassers use 
a target’s offline life as a weapon against them.214 The details of their offline identity are stolen 
from them. Private facts quickly become much too public.215 So here we see two roles a target’s 
identity can play in online abuse: first, as a factor that either motivates the harassment or informs 
the type of harassment; second, as something to be exploited by harassers. 
Yet this pairs somewhat uneasily with another common feature of online abuse, a feature 
it shares with another old act with an interesting rebirth in the digital age—online shaming. In 
both online shaming and online abuse (two distinct acts with a clear overlap), there is an implied 
need to build up target’s status in order to justify the importance of taking them down. Many 
victims of online abuse, and especially in cases that ‘go viral’ and bring in anonymous abusers, 
report similar false claims about their social status—like being secretly rich (Quinn 2017; 
Ronson 2015). In practice, claims like these are taken as reason enough for the toxicity now 
coming their way. As Kathryn Norlock (2017b) explains: “The target of the shame is the one that 
needs to be ‘taken down,’ a phrase that implicitly indicates the comforting narrative that the 
 
214 It may seem odd to include doxing—disclosing personal information online against a person’s will—here. 
However, as Sarah Jeong (2018) suggests, “like online verbal abuse, doxing is a tactic to dominate the voice of the 
internet,” and so fits in alongside other forms of online abuse. 
215 Privacy is the focus Levmore and Nussbaum’s edited collection, The Offensive Internet, in the introduction of 
which, they note: “a spotlight on privacy clarifies the novelty of the Internet. A bit of information once thought 
confidential may now blanket the globe with the help of the Internet; a false and defamatory accusation about a 
person may become a constituent part of that person's Internet identity, where it affects relationships and 
employment opportunities for all time.” (2010, 9). For the threat to privacy represented not by abusers but by 
government and big business, see Schneier (2015). 
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target of shame is up high, in a position of power that deserves to be brought down a peg.” And 
an important corollary of this is, as Norlock says, that “the shamers see themselves as the 
disempowered.” 
What I want to suggest unites much of the above—targeting members of oppressed 
groups, making them feel unwelcome in online communities, and the invasion of privacy into 
someone’s “real” life on the one hand, along with the complete disregard for what that “real” life 
actually entails on the other—is the construction of ingroup and outgroup status. In these cases, 
online abusers are targeting someone who is, in brief, not like them—or at least constructed as 
such. 
And, of course, this is all the more frightening as the perpetrators of this sort of online 
abuse are often anonymous. As we saw above, though, anonymity in online abuse represented 
one point of departure from IRL hate speech and posed problems for existing accounts of the 
force of such speech. In the next section I argue that anonymity is used by harassers to construct 
the image of group solidarity in the target’s mind. 
 
4.1. Anonymity and the Force of (Veiled) Threats 
 
As everyone knows, threats of physical and sexual violence are not rare online. Indeed, 
one of the common tropes of e-bile that Jane highlights is the ubiquity of violent misogyny:  
E-bile targeting women commonly includes charges of unintelligence, hysteria, and 
ugliness; these are then combined with threats and/or fantasies of violent sex acts which 
are often framed as “correctives.” Constructions along the lines of “what you need is a 
good [insert graphic sexual act] to put you right” appear with such astounding regularity, 
they constitute an e-bile meme. Female targets are dismissed as both unacceptably 
unattractive man haters and hypersexual sluts who are inviting sexual attention or sexual 
attacks. (Jane 2014, 533) 
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And while direct threats do occur, more common is violent aggression expressed in the form of 
“hostile wishful thinking, such as ‘I hope you get raped with a chainsaw’” (Jane 2014, 533).216 
While this indirect phrasing allows abusers to avoid legal trouble and skirt Terms of Service, it 
doesn’t make these statements any less threatening to their targets. If anything, it is often an 
escalation, as it seems to imply a coordinated group-effort with a division of labor. 
That is, veiled threats of this sort are only properly understood when we consider them in 
their fuller context, where they tend to imply a larger network of abusers. First, if the threat 
comes from an anonymous or unknown account—a non-follower, for instance—that often 
implies they were likely directed there by others, as the coordination of abusive campaigns with 
a sort of division of labor is not uncommon. As Sarah Jeong reports,  
[the] examination of sustained harassment campaigns shows that they are often 
coordinated out of another online space. In some subcultures these are known as ‘forum 
raids,’ and are often banned in even the most permissive spaces because of their toxic 
nature. In the case of the harassment of Zoë Quinn, Quinn documented extensive 
coordination from IRC chat rooms, replete with participation from her ex-boyfriend. 
(2018)217 
 
Second, given that this abuse commonly occurs on a public platform, where it is viewable 
by anyone, the way these utterances are given uptake reveals something important about the 
speaker and the wider community. As Lynne Tirrell argues “our speech acts also undertake a 
meta-level expressive commitment about the very saying of what is said. Expressive 
commitments are commitments to the viability and value of particular ways of talking (Tirrell 
 
216 Sarah Jeong (2018) calls this “Colorably Threatening Harassment”, which is: “Harassment that is not overtly 
threatening, but is either ambiguously threatening such that an objective observer might have a hard time deciding, 
or is clearly intended to make the target fearful while maintaining plausible deniability.” 
217 While this is only one instance, further evidence suggests this practice is not as uncommon as some presume. 
Tufekci (2017) discusses a coordinated harassment campaign she discovered against her, and Gray-Donald (2018) 
discussed the case of Nora Loreto. As Whitney Phillips notes however, “Harassment campaigns and other 
coordinated attacks are particularly challenging to report on responsibly, as the entire purpose of these attacks is to 
generate oxygen, draw more people into a story, and create the biggest public spectacle possible” (Phillips 2018). 
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2017, 144). When these expressive commitments aren’t uniformly condemned, they can shift the 
boundaries of what counts as acceptable discourse in a community, opening the door to further 
harm (Tirrell 2017; Saul 2017). I discussed one aspect of this in the previous chapter as I made 
the initial case for the more active role an audience can play in collective speech acts. In the case 
of online abuse, given that harassing speech in this medium often receives ‘likes’ from other 
users, these features—commitments to the value of this discourse and shifting boundaries of 
permissibility—take tangible form. 
What might at first glance seem like a one-off message from a single individual can, in 
fact, reveal a group of like-minded people whose ‘real’ identities, and thus their relationship or 
proximity to the target, are hidden from view. It is in this sense that it is a mistake to view the 
speech acts typical of online abuse in an individualistic lens, separate from their wider context. 
This is not too difficult either; it simply amounts to listening to those who have experienced this 
harm. As Jeong (2018) says, “targets of harassment, particularly members of marginalized 
groups, may view a single comment differently than an outsider might, because they recognize it 
as part of a larger pattern.” 
For those targeted by such speech, then, it can understandably be read as a glimpse into 
the ingroup speech of others, where marching orders are being given, well-received, and which 
might then be carried out by any one of the many anonymous figures on the other end of 
internet.218 This takes a very real toll on its targets. As Lindy West writes about her experience:  
online harassment is not virtual—it is physical. Flooding in through every possible 
channel, it moves and changes my body: It puts me on the phone with the FBI, it gives 
me tension headaches and anxiety attacks; it alters my day-to-day behavior (Am I safe? Is 
 
218 The increased attention given to ‘incel’ violence against women shows how this notion of ‘marching orders’ is 
not too far from reality. In these cases, it’s not unfair to say that some of these killers were persuaded to murder 
within online communities—indeed this is the meaning of the ‘incel’ term “going blackpill.” For more, see 
ContraPoints (2018); Beauchamp (2019). 
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that guy staring at me? Is he a troll?); it alienates my friends; it steals time from my 
family. The goal is to traumatize me, erode my mental health, force me to quit my job. 
(West 2016) 
 
As this makes clear, while anonymity poses challenges for the description of online abuse—
namely, by foreclosing the standard explanations for the authoritative force of subordinating 
speech—it in fact provides a powerful tool for those who wish to inflict harm on their targets.219  
It is the combination of anonymity and apparent group solidarity—‘likes’ instead of 
condemnation—that is a dangerous mix for targets of abuse, and I claim an important source of 
the authority these speech acts rely on to subordinate. This is evident in Quinn’s description of 
her own experience with online abuse, “I read many of the threats in my ex’s voice,” she says. 
“But this was somehow more insidious—he wasn’t just continuing his abuse; he was 
crowdsourcing it (2017, 51).220 This vivid account is supported by media researcher Eden Litt, 
who notes that “without being able to know the actual audience, social media users create and 
attend to an imagined audience for their everyday interactions” (2012, 333). That is to say, when 
we can’t directly perceive our audience, we create it in our minds. 
Norlock adapts Litt’s insight to the case of online shaming. “Recipients of shaming, like 
Justine Sacco,” she says: 
are also living in the web of imaginal relationships. And imaginal relationship literature 
suggests that her shamers also live in her head, as she too may be forced to rely on her 
imagination and mentally conceptualize her detractors. In such situations, advising a 
victim of shaming to “ignore the trolls” is beyond pointless. […] The advice to ignore the 
social community as it lives in one’s head is more than ineffective—it’s missing the 
force. We are unable to control the extent to which intangible words in cyberspace take 
 
219 Ronson suggests this is the case for online shaming as well: “‘Social media shamings are worse than your 
shamings,’ I suddenly said to Ted Poe [a former Judge who often used public shaming as part of his sentencing]. He 
looked taken aback. ‘They are worse,’ he replied. ‘They’re anonymous.’ ‘Or even if they’re not anonymous, it’s 
such a pile-on they may as well be,’ I said” (Ronson 2015, 88). 
220 Though, it’s worth noting that neither Quinn or myself is claiming that anonymity is the source of harmful speech 
and therefore ought to be prohibited in all online spaces. As Quinn says: “Online anonymity isn't responsible for the 
prevalence of horrible behavior online. Shitty moderation is” (quoted in Jeong 2018). For more on anonymity’s role 
in online speech, see Belmont (2018). 
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the form of imaginal relationships that burden or brighten our self-perceptions. (Norlock 
2017b, emphasis added) 
 
Even though anonymity forecloses some standard accounts of speaker authority—like those 
afforded by race and gender—by seeing how anonymous avatars can become a monolith in one’s 
mind we can add a bit more detail to a conception of group-authority that in fact requires 
something like anonymity. In leveraging the target’s own cognitive resources—namely, their 
capacity for imaginal relationships—large-scale online abuse campaigns become more than the 
sum of their parts. Anonymity creates the semblance of cohesion where there might not in fact be 
any, uniting different speakers who might not have anything in common or prior relationship 
aside from their hostile speech directed at the same individual.221 
 Furthermore, it is through this speech that they become united (at least in the mind of the 
target). I therefore claim this is a case of collective speech, whose authority is sustained by the 
active participation of a community. Recall from Chapter Three: 
Collective authority: Through repetition and endorsement, individually non-authoritative 
speech is made authoritative by signaling collective support and solidarity. A group of 
speakers have their authority secured through a repetitive process where each new 
utterance adds to the strength of the overall practice. 
 
In online abuse, ‘likes,’ ‘retweets,’ hashtags, and more play the role of active community 
endorsement, adding some authority to speech that otherwise lacks it. Like accommodation, 
audience uptake secures authority for speech that, absent that uptake, would have a different 
pragmatic force. But as I have emphasized, in these cases, the practices that do the heavy lifting 
here are active, not passive. This makes sense, moreover, as the process I am attending to is not 
 
221 It is also revealing how, in some cases, when anonymity is removed, so is some of the speaker’s power. The story 
of the anonymous poster who created the ‘Trump Slams CNN’ gif, and his subsequent apology after his ‘real’ 
identity is uncovered one interesting example of this dynamic. For context, see North (2017). 
189 
primarily psychological, but social. It is the active construction of ingroups and outgroups. And 
while these can occur passively—for example, when it slowly dawns on someone that they are 
now in a committed relationship—more common are active process of initiation. And even in the 
more passive cases, as Herbert and Kukla point out, there is nonetheless an active, social 
component that occurs when one is recognized as an insider. As they say: 
being recognized as an insider by insiders is not just the recognition of a separate fact; 
rather, this recognition plays a constitutive role in having that insider status. Part of being 
an insider is being recognized as one. Crucially, the relevant sort of recognition is not 
mere passive, conscious acknowledgment, but the kind of recognition that is built into 
practice. (Herbert and Kukla 2016, 584)222 
 
In online abuse, this takes the form of harassers cheering on other harassers, directing them to 
new targets, sharing information, one-upping one another; etc. In all these cases, speech plays an 
active role in solidifying the collective authority that strengthens their words, turning it into the 
genuinely subordinating speech that it is. 
 
4.2. Shared Language and Solidarity 
 
Above, I argued that in cases of online abuse, anonymous speech is not, in fact, identity-
free speech. Indeed, anonymity can contribute to the active construction of a group-identity that 
may be wielded to inflict great harm. But anonymity is only part of the explanation; shared, 
insider language is the other. In this section I strengthen the argument that shared language plays 
a vital role in constituting the type of collective authority at issue in online abuse. 
 
222 For more, see Herbert and Kukla, who argue that “ingrouping, outgrouping, and displaying, negotiating, and 
constituting community boundaries are among the important pragmatic functions of language” (Herbert and Kukla 
2016, 579). 
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To start, it’s useful to note that the affordances of social media make it clear how a 
person’s speech is always tied to their (ever shifting) socially constituted position—even when 
its anonymous. Whether via a profile picture, a short bio, a hashtag, or an emoji, social media 
brings new means of signaling or reading one’s identity, along with one’s membership or 
allegiance to broader social groups. I want to emphasize however, how this just amplifies what is 
also the case offline. My favorite articulation of this comes from Mary Louise Pratt, who wrote: 
once you set aside the notion of speech acts as normally anchored in a unified, essential 
subject, it becomes apparent that people always speak from and in a socially constituted 
position, a position that is, moreover, constantly shifting, and defined in a speech 
situation by the intersection of many different forces. On this view, speaking “for 
oneself,” “from the heart” names only one position among the many from which a person 
might speak in the course of her everyday life. At other points, that person will be 
speaking, for instance, as a member of some collective, or as a rank in a hierarchy, and so 
forth. Nor is there any guarantee that these positions will be internally consistent or 
consistent with each other. Everyone has had the experience of being situated among 
complex and contradictory forces, as, for example, press secretaries stationed between the 
revelation demanded by their addressees and the concealment demanded by those for 
whom they speak, or the underling required on the one hand never to correct superiors so 
that they will not look stupid, and required on the other hand always to correct superiors 
so that they will not look stupid. (1986, 63) 
 
On social media, these implicit features made fully explicit, often purposely so. What’s true of 
offline speech becomes heightened in online speech in illuminating ways. A profile picture can 
reveal aspects of a person's identity that alter how their speech is interpreted, along with what 
speech act they are performing. Including a Pepe emoji or #MAGA, for example, can instantly 
communicate one’s broader allegiances and provide all the necessary context an audience needs 
to decipher something important about the speaker and their utterance, like whether it was 
intended as constructive criticism or an insulting dismissal. These aspects of online speech can 
be like wearing a pin or a badge and allows individuals to actively construct and manage the 
version of themselves they present to (one segment of) the world. This allows for a lot of variety, 
freedom, and play, including the inconsistencies that Pratt describes—e.g., concealing or 
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emphasizing distinct parts of oneself for different platforms, speaking as an x on one account and 
as a y in another, going fully anonymous for personal safety, or using ‘alts’ for whatever reason.  
All this is simply to say that a major component of the discourse on social media is 
structured around actively constructing a persona that is (a version of) ‘you’ and interacting with 
other, similarly self-constructed others. And as Michael Lynch points out, if we conceive of the 
self as constituted through narrative construction, this suggests, then, that “we are stories that are 
increasingly constructed online in social networks” (2016, 74). Thus, the management of one’s 
own identity, along with the interpretation of others, sits at the foundation of nearly all online 
discourse, fixing a lot of facts about how a discourse will unfold before any claims are even 
uttered. 
What’s relevant for my purposes is how, on social media, this type of signaling often 
occurs by citing the speech acts of another. “Speaking for oneself,” in this context, often means 
speaking with the voice of another. This is in part how one builds their chosen identity. While 
this is not an uncommon feature of speech, it is heightened and made explicit online. For 
instance, in its early days, Facebook used to ask for your favorite quotes that it would then 
display prominently in your profile. While that specific practice is dated, similar tropes are still 
common. Large and powerful social movements can galvanize around a hashtag that, in essence, 
consists in joining with the voices of others. As examples like #BlackLivesMatter, #NeverAgain, 
#MeToo, #ICantBreathe, and even #MAGA demonstrate, a chorus of online (and offline) speech 
acts can be a rallying call that affects real change—though, not always the specific change we 
would hope for.223 At societal level, this can bring out both good avenues for effective 
 
223 See Tufekci (2017) for an analysis of the impact of social media and other digital communication technologies on 
progressive activism, as well as how repressive regimes have learned to clamp down on these groups. And see 
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solidarity—where people are able to amplify and signal-boost others in productive ways—and 
bad ones, as practices like the co-opting and appropriation of the words and voices of the more 
marginalized are all too common.224 And at the interpersonal level, this is relevant for the case of 
online abuse because, as Quinn (2017) puts it, “the same techniques that people have used to 
organize important grassroots movements like Black Lives Matter can be used by people trying 
to destroy someone” (52). 
Here, I want to focus on one technique that is crucial to the development of the group 
authority at issue in online abuse. Namely, the use of hashtags and other similar rhetorical 
constructions to unify the voices of many into an ad hoc collective. As I will describe it, hashtags 
are explicit ventriloquisms, and so are a vivid example of language’s role in constituting a group 
identity. 
In the course of building his account of slurs, the linguist Geoffrey Nunberg (2018) 
describes ventriloquisms with the following: 
In a particular context, a speaker pointedly disregards the lexical convention of the group 
whose norms prescribe the default way of referring to A and refers to A instead via the 
distinct convention of another group that is known to have distinct and heterodox 
attitudes about A, so as to signal his affiliation with the group and its point of view. 
  
That is, when a speaker uses a ventriloquism, they are pointedly disregarding the standard term 
or terms that the convention dictates and are instead pointedly using the voice of another. In 
doing so, they signal their allegiance to a specific community, at least in that moment. Nunberg 
 
Khan-Cullors and bandele (2018) for the story of how social media played a key role in the growth of Black Lives 
Matter. 
224 The phrase and hashtag ‘Black Lives Matter’ has been taken up, twisted, and put to use for all sorts of ends, 
including opposing forces (e.g., #AllLivesMatter, #BlueLivesMatter) and clueless vegans (e.g., 
#AnimalLivesMatter, #ElephantLivesMatter). I discuss some of these dynamics in the next chapter. 
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uses the example of a university dean using ain’t in place of isn’t to implicate that the knowledge 
being communicated was more folksy than academic.225 
While Nunberg’s main goal is to argue that slurs are cases of ventriloquisms, I don’t want 
to commit to anything like that. But I do want to suggest that his analysis clarifies the pragmatic 
force of hashtags (and other uses of identical phrasing) in online abuse. As I will put it, hashtags 
function as explicit ventriloquisms, and in doing so serve to strengthen shared group identity for 
harassers. And as I suggested above, this group identity is a crucial element of online abuse, as it 
aids in the construction of the collective authority at issue in online abuse. 
What I am pointing to is part of a larger phenomenon where non-slurring terms are 
thought to mimic to some degree how slurs are deployed, especially in online discourse. This is 
what leads Jonathan Chait to claim ludicrously that ‘neoliberal’ is a slur.226 To me, that is a bit of 
a joke. But the function of terms like ‘SJW,’ ‘feminazi,’ ‘cuck,’ ‘globalist,’ ‘lib,’ ‘elite,’ ‘TERF,’ 
‘deplorable,’ ‘lanyard,’ and more demonstrate some interesting flexibility in language, and in 
particular how quickly a rigid sentiment can galvanize around a term online—especially ones 
used to label outsiders. Whatever you may think about these cases—and, to be clear, I don’t 
think any amount to being slurs—my basic point that that there is something noteworthy 
occurring in the use of things like hashtags in online discourse, and one way to examine this is 
via the analysis of slurs in terms of ventriloquisms that Nunberg puts forward. 
According to this account, slurs have the force they do not because of any semantic 
properties, but because of what the choice to use them says about their speakers. As he puts it, 
 
225 As Nunberg explains the case of a “dean at an Eastern university [who said]: ‘Any junior scholar who stresses 
teaching at the expense of research ain’t gonna get tenure.’ In the dean’s mouth, the use of the demotic ain’t rather 
than isn’t implied that his conclusion wasn’t based on expert knowledge or a research survey; it was as if to say, 
“You don’t need an advanced degree to see that; it’s obvious to anyone with an ounce of sense.” (2018) 
226 To be precise, he claimed it is a “term of abuse.” See Chait (2017). Or more recently Howard Schultz suggested 
the same of the term ‘billionaire,’ saying that ‘people of wealth’ is a better, less divisive term. 
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“To use a slur is […] to signal one’s affiliation with a group that has a disparaging attitude 
towards the slur’s referent” (2018). “In a nutshell,” he says, “racists don’t use slurs because 
they’re derogative; slurs are derogative because they’re the words that racists use” (Nunberg 
2018).  
That is to say, the crucial piece of information that a speaker communicates when they 
use a slur, according to Nunberg, is that they willingly wish to be associated with a group of 
other’s speakers whose attitudes about the slur’s target they share. In other words, slurs say more 
about the group of people who use them than the group to whom they refer. Crucially it is not 
just shared attitudes that are implicated, but shared group membership.227 This matters for an 
account of slurs according to Nunberg because: 
As [Langston] Hughes tells it, the force of n****r goes beyond anything the speaker 
believes or feels about blacks, or for that matter, beyond anything that others who have 
used the words have thought or felt about blacks. It also evokes the things such people 
have done to blacks—with the speaker pointedly affiliating himself with the perpetrators. 
The word can turn a bigot from a hapless, inconsequential 'I' into an intimidating, 
menacing 'we.' (Nunberg 2018, emphasis added) 
 
While I am not willing to commit to this account of slurs, I do see something importantly correct 
here in the analysis of subordinating speech acts. Namely, the construction of a collective 
identity through shared language and tropes. Renée Bolinger (2017) develops a similar pragmatic 
account of slurs that can add to this story.228 In particular, Bolinger explains the (varying) 
offensiveness of slurs via a contrastive choice account. This adds to the idea of ventriloquism by 
further explaining how marked expressions can carry important signals about their speakers. 
 
227 This, according to Nunberg, distinguishes his view from a similar one offered by Elisabeth Camp. See (Camp 
2013). 
228 I see it as similar to Nunberg’s in part because it is a pragmatic account where the semantics do little in 
explaining the relevant features of slurs. 
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As Bolinger puts it: “when we use slurs, we communicate information about ourselves 
and our attitudes towards the targets” (2017, 439). This information is signaled, moreover, 
through a speaker’s decision to a particular term over a non-marked alternative. As she explains: 
For signals based in contrastive choice, the relevant behavior is the free selection of a 
marked expression, and performance signals that the speaker endorses a cluster of 
attitudes associated with the term (or, more precisely, a high probability that the speaker 
shares some or all of the attitudes in this cluster). (Bolinger 2017, 447) 
 
Consider the use of the term ‘SJW,’ particularly as it occurs online. This is, in most cases, used 
pejoratively, referring commonly to individuals who promote socially progressive views like 
feminism, anti-racism, etc. Importantly, this term is used almost exclusively by those who 
oppose these goals, or at least as they promoted by the SJWs. In using this term then, whether 
prefixed by a hashtag or not, speakers pragmatically convey information about their own group-
membership. Again, as Bolinger explains: 
The information content of signals based in contrastive choice is linked to how marked 
the term is: if α is a term that is used almost exclusively by speakers who embrace φ, and 
this fact is well-known, then a contrastive preference for α is a high-information signal, 
raising the probability of the speaker’s endorsing φ nearly to 1. The more well-known the 
association between α and φ is, the higher the information content of the signal, and thus 
the more strongly the contrastive choice signals the speaker’s endorsement of φ. (2017, 
447)229 
 
Since ‘SWJ’ is used mainly by its detractors, and since this is well-known, using it carries a 
high-probability signal that the speaker endorses the views too. That is, what terms like this do, 
is to express and solidify group membership. This is a dynamic process performed primarily 
through speech acts. And it is through this process, moreover, that the targets of online abuse 
come to recognize that they are being addressed not by a single speaker, but by a mob. This 
 
229 Moreover, on Bolinger’s view, this is not reducible to speaker intentions: “Signaling on this framework is factive: 
a speaker signals some content φ when her use of an expression satisfies the conditions, regardless of whether she 
intended to communicate φ, and independent of whether hearer uptake occurs” (Bolinger 2017, 447). 
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interpretation makes sense, since it is often exactly what is occurring. And as Jeong reports, it is 
this interpretation that makes of the “really bizarre phenomenon” of “all the low-level mobbers, 
who have little-to-no real investment in going after the target, and would not manifest any 
obsessions with that particular target without the orchestrator to set them off.” As she explains:  
Here they resemble the zombie nodes of spam botnets, right down to the tactics that have 
been observed to be deployed—rote lines and messages are sometimes made available 
through Pastebin, a text-sharing website, and low-level mobbers are encouraged to find 
people to message and then copy/paste that message.  
 
Here again we see how in online abuse, the implicit is made fully explicit. Speakers are literally 
copying and pasting their utterances from one another, and in doing so adding strength. More 
importantly, this shows vividly why an individualist approach to online abuse is inapt for 
describing the force of these speech acts. 
It is only when we see these speakers as part of a collective, and a collective, moreover, 
that is constructed in part through the active use of shared speech acts, that we capture the 
pragmatic impact of these speech acts. They are, in an important sense, collective speech acts, 




In this chapter I have considered some of the key features of online abusive speech. I 
argued that anonymity plays a key role in building a type of collective authority for online 
abusive speech acts, and moreover, that the endorsement of a group identity through shared 
rhetorical constructs like hashtags further adds to the targets’ sense that they are being addressed 
by a collective rather than individuals. I argued that this combination of anonymity and apparent 
group solidarity—shared phrases and hashtags, ‘likes’ and retweets—is a dangerous mix for 
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targets of abuse, and I claim an important source of the authority these speech acts rely on to 
subordinate. That is, it is in this way that online abuse becomes more than the sum of its parts. 
These and other features build collective authority for seemingly isolated speech acts and, as I 
will now suggest, reveal aspects of subordinating speech that are often overlooked.  
In her analysis of online shaming, Kate Norlock suggests that in addition to the unique 
problems brought on by anonymity, the “speed and volume of online affirmation outmatches 
what the human mind evolved to manage.” From this she argues that our online interactions give 
rise to important new responsibilities (2017b). While I agree that some features of most online 
abuse make it unique to an extent, I believe that greater attention to similar features could help to 
highlight under-emphasized aspects of IRL hate speech. I’ve emphasized the role of anonymity 
in cultivating the appearance of coordination and a division of labor in online abuse—even if 
they’re in fact is none—but the same can be said about IRL hate speech. Racist graffiti spray-
painted on college campuses, slurs yelled from passing cars, white-nationalist flyers and rallies 
proudly displayed in public all invoke anonymity and group-authority in a similar way to create 
an overall environment of exclusion. It is for this reason that I think that collective speech acts 
are a broader phenomenon worthy of investigation across mediums. Accounting for the realities 
of subordinating speech both online and IRL shows that speaker authority is dynamic and 
emergent, and often depends on the wider community in more ways than simple accommodation. 
Finally, seeing hate speech for the group activity it is reveals the limitations of the ‘more speech’ 
/ ‘don’t feed the trolls’ paradigm in both online and IRL contexts. Focusing on individual 
instances isn’t enough, and rejecting this individualistic lens is also necessary for devising 
solutions to the harm they present. As Max Fisher and Amanda Taub report:  
It is becoming increasingly common for groups of people, whipped into a rage by 
influential people on social media, to single out targets for mass campaigns of online 
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harassment and threats. […] The main problem seems to be that social media companies’ 
guidelines tend to focus on content in isolation. Because the accounts that instigate the 
hatred and rage don’t necessarily participate in the mass harassment directly—often their 
followers are the ones who send the death threats or do the doxxing—this problem is a 
poor fit for that approach.” (Fisher and Taub 2019) 
 
As this shows, tackling this problem properly requires addressing the collective from which the 
speech draws its power, whether it is an organic ad hoc group, or, more commonly, a pre-
existing community with a clear (if informal) hierarchy. Seeing this bigger picture is helpful in 
explaining the damage it can do to a community. Online abuse reveals this group-based authority 
well, but this is a feature shared by IRL forms of subordinating speech, and one that must be kept 
in mind. And yet, given that the dominant mode of understanding subordinating speech both 
online and IRL is individualistic, this is too often obscured from view. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
THE PRAGMATICS OF PROTEST AND POSITIVE PROPAGANDA 
 
 
“I think it’s silly when people want to add things to [the phrase ‘Black Lives Matter’] or feel 
worried that it’s too divisive. What’s divisive is cops killing black people. What’s divisive is 
vigilantes shooting up churches. That’s divisive.” 




In this final chapter, I take up another instance of what I’m calling collective speech acts: 
the speech acts of protest. But rather than focus on the hateful protests of bigots like the 
Westboro Baptist Church, I will turn to specifically egalitarian, liberatory protest, using Black 
Lives Matter protests as my main example. I do so, in order to show how this is also a case we 
should understand as a collection of disparate utterances combining to produce a distinctive type 
of group-based speaker-authority, opening powerful avenues for collective action—as the history 
of social movements show. 
Without question, the phrase ‘Black Lives Matter’ has cemented itself as a political 
speech act of great importance. Media discussions on Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests often 
focus narrowly on the slogan that gives the group their name. It therefore offers a unique route to 
a greater understanding of the pragmatics of protest as a speech act.  
By reflecting on the significance of BLM, I argue that it is the distinct pragmatic features 
of protest—its entitlement conditions, and the uptake it aims at—that best reveals its moral, 
political, and epistemic significance. In short, I claim that, much like some forms of 
 
230 See Bell and Kondabolu (2017). 
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subordinating speech, protest is a clear example of socially located, collective speech. And this is 
because an essential aspect of protest is its function of foregrounding the moral authority of the 
speakers. The conception authority here, moreover, must account for the basic moral status of the 
speakers, their situated knowledge, as well as the contextual and interpersonal relations that 
inform the “total speech situation,” as Austin (1962) would say. These elements shape the 
pragmatic force of protest. 
To better approach these issues, I consider Jason Stanley’s account of “positive 
propaganda,” which he takes to be an important avenue of anti-oppressive resistance. I evaluate 
his suggestion that some instances of protest—such as the 1964 march on Montgomery—are 
paradigmatic examples of positive propaganda (2015, 113). I argue that Stanley’s model is an 
unhelpful tool to apply to most forms of protest, and an examination of BLM protests illustrates 
why. This is because, as I argue, we lose sight of what makes protest distinct if we think of it as 
engaging in argument. But, a focus on content, even unarticulated content, leads us to evaluate 
the claims of protesters separately from the context that produced them. Stanley’s model 
encourages this abstraction, as does the greater attention it gives to the audience in place of the 
speakers. On his account, the crucial role of the speakers is obscured, as is the relationship 
between speakers and audience. In this way, by using Stanley’s account of propaganda as a 
starting point, I consider what protest is from a pragmatic point of view, and how it relates to 
propaganda and subordinating speech more generally. 
One guiding idea for this chapter is that we need to examine the interaction between the 
protests of social movements on the one hand, and counter-protest speech that arises in response 
on the other. I’m concerned with how these two phenomena occur in tandem and want to show 
how we get a better understanding of each type of act by looking at them together, rather than in 
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isolation. I argue that seeing each of these acts as collective speech acts, and furthermore as 
interacting with each other, helps to reveal their differences more effectively than does analyzing 
each independently of the other. I locate the differences between these speech acts not only in 
their content, nor the ends they seek, but in their whole social situatedness. My goal, therefore, is 
to distinguish the righteous moral protest of the indignant from the dismissive and reactionary 
counter-protest speech it inevitably generates. And as I argue, it is by seeing these acts in their 
proper context that we’re led to appreciate the details and dynamics of both subordinating speech 
and liberatory protest. 
  
2. PROPAGANDA: POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE 
 
In How Propaganda Works, Jason Stanley examines a sometimes subtle, but nonetheless 
dangerous type of subordinating speech. According to Stanley, propaganda is dangerous because 
of how it can erode important political values in liberal democracies (Stanley 2015, especially 
Chapter Three). To get a firmer grasp on this claim, let’s consider some useful distinctions and 
examples. 
Stanley discusses propaganda as it is a “contribution to public discourse that is presented 
as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to erode those very ideals” (ibid., 
53). Climate change denial campaigns provide a useful example (ibid., 60). When oil companies 
promote the views of the few climate scientists who deny anthropogenic climate change, they 
engage in this type of undermining propaganda, because they appeal to a worthy ideal—
scientific objectivity—in the service of a goal that tends to undermine that ideal. 
202 
An illustrative example of this is offered by the author Michael Crichton (of all people) 
who apparently once said in a speech:  
Let’s be clear: the work of science has nothing whatever to do with consensus. Consensus 
is the business of politics. Science, on the contrary, requires only one investigator who 
happens to be right, which means that he or she has results that are verifiable by reference 
to the real world. In science consensus is irrelevant. […] The greatest scientists in history 
are great precisely because they broke with the consensus. There is no such thing as 
consensus science. If it's consensus, it isn't science. If it's science, it isn't consensus. 
Period. (Crichton 2003) 
 
How a statement like this, which on its surface seems to embody the ideal of scientific 
objectivity, can actually serve to undermines this ideal, is clear. The mistrust it aims to generate 
in scientific practice erodes trust in science, and fuels an unhealthy skepticism about climate 
change research. 
When the ideals are specifically political values, Stanley calls it “demagoguery,” which 
is:  
A contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of a worthy 
political, economic, or rational ideal, but is in the service of a goal that tends to 
undermine that very ideal. (Stanley 2015, 69) 
  
Demagoguery is always antidemocratic because “it wears down the possibility of democratic 
deliberation” (ibid., 82). Arguments for racist voter ID laws that exploit “ideals like ‘one man, 
one vote,’ together with the appeal to voter fraud,” are a clear example of this type demagoguery, 
as well as its undemocratic effects (ibid., 68–69). 
One political ideal that Stanley discusses in detail is the ideal of reasonableness in the 
realm of public reason—that is, the norms and standards that ought to guide public discourse. 
Following the ideal of reasonableness here means that debate and discussion about matters of 
public interest are “guided by equal respect for the perspective of everyone subject to the policy 
under debate” (ibid., 94). At the heart of this norm of reasonableness is the capacity for 
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empathy—the ability to imaginatively position oneself in the situation of another. According to 
Stanley, to say that public discourse is guided by reasonableness is to say that public policy 
discussions don’t exclude the voices anyone who might be affected. 
On the assumption that something close to reasonableness is an operative ideal in a 
democracy, cases of propaganda will then typically look to make the appearance of being 
reasonable, while actually serving to make debate on a topic biased and unjust. It will do so by 
making it harder for some members of the community to participate on fair terms, in part by 
diminishing the capacity for empathy within dominant members of that community. As Stanley 
puts it, “paradigm cases of propaganda will be ones that represent it to be reasonable not to take 
certain perspectives into account” (ibid., 108). This can occur, he suggests, when propaganda 
presents “the perspectives of some of our fellow citizens as unworthy of consideration” (ibid., 
122).  
One method that makes this erosion of empathy possible is the prevalence of persistent 
negative stereotypes about certain social groups. Negative stereotypes of Black Americans, 
abetted by the use of terms like “superpredator,” can have the effect of eroding empathy and set 
the stage for anti-Black policies (ibid., 123). And this can occur alongside or even as part of 
seemingly reasonable contributions to a debate, in part by the foregrounding of ‘reasonable’ 
topics like public safety. 
Here is a good place to note that while Stanley defines propaganda in terms of its effects, 
the mechanism of propaganda that he elaborates most clearly focusses explicitly on the expressed 
content of utterances. That is, according to the main mechanisms that Stanley’s account 
describes, propaganda works by communicating propositions that strengthen or weaken certain 
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ideologies.231 On Stanley’s model, utterances contribute new propositional content to the shared 
conversational background—the “common ground”—that then inform future linguistic and non-
linguistic moves.  
Crucially, utterances can contribute new propositions to the common ground covertly and 
indirectly. This often occurs through the careful use of presupposed or “not-at-issue content,” 
which enables the addition of new material to the conversational participants’ common ground 
without their conscious assessment of this material. For example, when a speaker says: ‘I spent 
part of every summer until I was ten with my grandmother, who lived in a working-class suburb 
of Boston,’ the location of the grandmother’s home is the not-at-issue content, while the 
summering habits of the speaker are the at-issue content. We see this by considering what 
someone would typically be denying if they challenged the speaker’s statement (2015, 134).232 In 
this example, it would be where the speaker spent her summer, rather than whether her 
grandmother lived in a working-class neighborhood.  
As Stanley says, the not-at-issue content of an utterance “is not advanced as a proposal of 
a content to be added to the common ground. Not-at-issue content is directly added to the 
common ground” (2015, 135). For example, Stanley argues that repeated associations of the term 
“welfare” with images depicting Black Americans as lazy has made the generic claim “Blacks 
are lazy” part of the not-at-issue content of the term “welfare” (ibid., 138). This means that a 
contribution to political discourse may be presented as an embodiment of reasonableness, but 
due to the use of the term “welfare,” it will also communicate not-at-issue content that erodes 
 
231 These mechanisms are discussed more fully in Chapter Four of Stanley (2015), while the general definition of 
propaganda appears in Chapter Two. It is worth nothing however, as several reviewers have, that Stanley’s stated 
definition of propaganda seems to be inconsistent with his general use of the term throughout the book. See Wolff 
(2016); or Brennan (2017). 
232Stanley takes this example from Potts (2005). For a criticism of the implications Stanley draws from this to the 
case of propaganda, see McKinnon (forthcoming). 
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reasonableness, further reducing empathy for Black Americans. This is what makes the skillful 
deployment of not-at-issue content fertile ground for propagandists and explaining this process in 
detail is Stanley’s main project in the book. 233 
 
2.1. Positive Propaganda 
 
Let’s turn now to what Stanley calls “positive propaganda.” These, on the other hand, are 
contributions that strengthen democratic ideals. Following W.E.B. Du Bois (1926), Stanley calls 
this “civic rhetoric”, and describes this type of political speech as:  
A contribution to a debate [that] can improve the subsequent reasonableness of the 
debate, even though the contribution itself is not a rational contribution, in the sense that 
its informational content contributes to the debate’s resolution. (Stanley 2015, 112) 
 
This type of speech is, according to Stanley, structurally the opposite of demagoguery, that is, 
negative political propaganda.234 Both are nonrational contributions,235 and both have an effect 
on the subsequent reasonableness of a debate within a political culture. That is, both have an 
impact on the level of empathy within a community. But where demagoguery results in less 
empathy and less reasonableness, civic rhetoric increases empathy and therefore 
reasonableness.236 This positive propaganda is a type of “speech that uses ‘haranguing, cajoling, 
 
233 I won’t say much more about Stanley’s analysis of negative propaganda here. Though, for interesting critiques 
that I am in broad agreement with, see McKinnon (2018), and Táíwò (2017). 
234 Stanley presents positive propaganda as “structurally, precisely the opposite of demagoguery” (2015, 112) and 
makes this parallel explicit in later comments, where he says that “The distinction between civic rhetoric and 
demagoguery has solely to do with its ends, and not its form” (2018, 506). 
235 Because of space limitations, I am unable to raise my concerns about this commitment of Stanley’s, which carves 
up speech acts in terms of them being ‘rational’ or ‘nonrational’ contributions. 
236 Whether increasing reasonableness—especially via increasing empathy—is the proper goal is a question I put 
aside in this paper. Though, it should be noted that there may be significant drawbacks to dominant members 
attempting to themselves occupy the perspective of oppressed people, as the aspiration to empathy can itself 
backfire, as Iris Marion Young (1997) and others, have noted. One worry is the temptation to speak for another, and 
in doing so undermine their own (moral) authority. Thanks to Philip Yaure for pushing me on this. 
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threatening, or supplicating’ as a method to force a dominant majority to expand the domain of 
respect and empathy to include a persecuted and ignored minority (2015, 114).237 
Beyond this functional similarity between demagoguery and civic rhetoric, Stanley also 
says there is a “structural problem in certain imperfectly realized liberal democracies that 
necessitates civic rhetoric” (ibid., 115). If a group lacks political power and has no say in a 
policy that affects them, their perspective is illegitimately left out, and—because of the 
prevalence of flawed ideologies—cannot easily be included through rational debate.238  
There is a structural reason why this species of propaganda is a necessity in treating 
failures of liberal democracy. There are many times in which the perspectives of a group 
are invisible from the rest of the citizens. […] In such a situation, there is no obvious 
deliberative way to make that group visible, no method that appeals to reason to bring 
members of that group into equal political standing. (2015, 114–115) 
 
In short, inequality creates conditions where positive propaganda is necessary, in that it 
offers a path towards a more reasonable politics. It is in this way that Stanley describes the entire 
book as an argument for equality and says that much of Chapter Three “constitutes an argument 
that the aim of social movements should be civic rhetoric to expand empathy” (2018, 507). 
Drawing on an example from Du Bois, Stanley suggests civic rhetoric can play this role by 
employing liberal democratic ideals “against a certain understanding of their application”: 
freedom, solely for whites; or democracy, only for men.239 
 
237 Stanley is here building off the ideas of Du Bois (1926) and Alain Locke (1928). “In this sense,” he says, 
“’propaganda’ refers to a method of appealing to emotions to increase reasonableness” (2015, 111). 
238 In a similar fashion, Elizabeth Anderson (2014b) notes that biases in moral thinking lead people holding powerful 
positions to “confuse their own power with moral authority,” and “to misread challenges to their orders from below 
as signs of vice.” In short, inequalities in power lead to arrogance and ignorance in the powerful. 
239 For example, he suggests we understand Du Bois as “employing the liberal democratic ideals themselves, against 
a certain understanding of their application. His goal is to undermine a conception of liberal democracy that only 
extends freedom to whites. His method is to appeal to freedom itself, that liberal democratic ideal that is so 
cherished even among a nation in which it is restricted to whites. His rhetoric undermines an understanding of those 
ideals thus restricted, by calling attention to the fact that those ideals are deeply cherished among nonwhites as well. 
[…] “He is eliciting empathy by employing the problematically restricted ideals, and calling upon whites who 
cherish them to empathize with the plight of those who also cherish them, but to whom they have been consistently 
denied. The mechanism he is using is therefore a certain kind of undermining propaganda, one that targets the ideal 
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One example Stanley uses to explain this potential for positive propaganda comes from 
the Civil Rights Movement. The 1964 Selma to Montgomery March, Stanley says, “is a 
paradigm case of democratically acceptable propaganda: manipulation of the media to draw 
attention and empathy to the predicament of an otherwise invisible group.” What kind of 
manipulation is this? Stanley answers: King “manipulated white Southerners into revealing their 
hatred on national media, thereby turning the opinion of the country against them. (ibid., 113–
114). 
While this sounds to me like a roughly true description of historical events, this is where I 
will criticize Stanley’s application of positive propaganda to protest. First, it’s clear that 
Stanley’s main linguistic model of propaganda won’t apply, as it’s not obvious what utterance is 
expressed via the march, or how we could begin to demarcate the at-issue versus not-at-issue 
content.240 Second, this description centers the discussion on King’s manipulation of white 
Southerner’s cruelty—and the reactions of the white population more generally. While King and 
others certainly utilized this method to great effect, this ignores other core tenets of the 
movement that concerned the character of the resistor’s themselves, and how the anti-hierarchal 
and democratic ethos of nonviolent direct action are virtues in and of themselves.241 Stanley’s 
model focuses mainly on the audience of the protest rather than the protesters themselves, and I 
believe there is a significant cost to this. 
 
freedom just for whites. […] In this way, the liberal concepts can be used against restricted understandings of their 
proper application” (2015, 116–177) 
240 The content of utterances at protests are, of course, relevant, in part because they can help up distinguish 
egalitarian protest from bigoted protest, and so could perhaps play this role. Rather than take this route, I’m 
interested here in how content contributes to the pragmatic structure—who it’s calling on and how. That is, how the 
speech acts of protest function as a second-personal transactions. For more on this, see (Kukla and Lance, 2009; 
Lance and Kukla, 2013; Herbert and Kukla, 2016). 
241 See King (1963, especially Chapter Two) for this argument. 
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As I will suggest, then, there is more that distinguishes positive and negative propaganda 
at the structural level than their effects—at least when discussing protest as a form of positive 
propaganda.242 To make this more explicit, and to demonstrate what is left out, I now turn to a 
contemporary example: BLM. 
 
2.1.1. Black Lives Matter as positive propaganda 
 
A lot has been written about the Movement for Black Lives in general, and Black Lives 
Matter protests in particular,243 and to be clear my aim here isn’t to in any way give a definitive 
analysis of an ongoing phenomena. Rather, what I aim to show is that analyses of protest that 
focus at the level of expressed content—like Stanley’s mode of positive propaganda—encourage 
obscure important aspects of the pragmatic of protests. Namely, it obscures protest’s function to 
foreground the moral authority of the protester in a way that challenges the unjust authority of 
powerful. Discussions of Black Lives Matter protest are an illuminating example of this in part 
because so much attention has been given to the phrase that serves as both the group’s name, and 
their main slogan. To see why, consider two fairly popular—and in my eyes, representative and 
revealing—discussions of BLM protest. 
The first comes from comedian and activist Franchesca Ramsey’s video titled “4 Black 
Lives Matter Myths Debunked” (2016). There, Ramsey makes the point that the phrase “Black 
Lives Matter” is not a racist statement directed against non-Black people and should be 
interpreted as saying “Black Lives Should Matter.” She says: 
 
242 I’m not sure we should think of protest as a form of propaganda. But I’m interested in following Stanley down 
this path, if only to see what we might learn. 
243 See Taylor (2016), and Lebron (2017) for examples of some recent academic analysis. 
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This movement isn’t saying black lives matter more than anyone else’s. It’s saying that 
Black lives should matter, but the way that our justice system, our media, and our police 
have been operating suggests that they do not. (ibid.) 
 
This tries to clarify a surprisingly common (among whites) misconception about the origins and 
meaning of these protests. And it does so by uncovering the meaning—that is, semantic 
content—of the slogan. 
Law School professor Patricia Leary takes this approach a bit further in her viral letter 
written in response to anonymous student complaints about her wearing a BLM pin to class. 
Leary carefully analyzes the claims of her student detractors and points out that their argument 
rests on a false premise, namely, that “there is an invisible ‘only’ in front of the words “Black 
Lives Matter.’”244 As Leary goes on to say, while this assumption is false, she suggests that:  
there are some implicit words that precede ‘black lives matter,’ and they go something 
like this: ‘Because of the brutalizing and killing of black people at the hands of the police 
and the indifference of society in general and the criminal justice system in particular, it 
is important that we say…’ 
 
This, as she points out however, doesn’t nicely fit on a shirt. 
These analyses suggest that the phrase “Black Lives Matter,” and the protests of which it 
symbolizes, fit the model of positive propaganda that Stanley articulates and may be 
productively analyzed as such. Through their provocative slogan, BLM deploys nonrational 
means of persuasion that aim to extend empathy to an oppressed group. We can see this because:  
(1) the message “Black Lives Matter” embodies a cherished moral ideal—moral value, 
civic equality;  
(2) by extending this ideal to group that has been unjustly excluded from the dominant 
interpretation of that ideal this reveals how it is, in practice, restricted to whites; 
(3)  in doing so, it undermines the existing, restricted ideal of moral value; and 
(4) this has the effect—or aims—of increasing empathy for the excluded group.  
 
 
244 See Jaschik (2016) for the letter and context. 
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We see this, moreover, when we engage in the kind of excavation of hidden meaning that 
Stanley’s account encourages, searching for the unarticulated constituents that reveal the true 
power of the slogan.  
A similar analysis could be provided for the counter-slogan “All Lives Matter” that 
explains how, given the context in which this phrase emerged—that is, in direct response to 
Black Lives Matter protests—the expressed content of “All Lives Matter” contains implicit 
associations that function to silence black protest, and ultimately reduce empathy. A worthy 
political ideal—moral and legal equality—is appealed to in a fashion that in fact serves to 
undermine that very ideal, by presenting Black Lives Matter protestors as racially partisan, and 
therefore ignorable. And, without that context, it’s so abstract to be meaningless. Something Paul 
C. Taylor (quoted in Talisse 2017) recently called “the race to the trivial.” 
 
2.1.2. What’s missing 
 
While I don’t necessarily disagree with the analyses discussed above,245 I do worry that 
this type of analysis, with its focus on semantic content—including implicit or presupposed 
content—comes at a cost. When considering slogans as they’re used in political protest, I agree 
with Elliott Colla (2013, 45), who argues that “the context of performance demands that we 
consider slogans not just in terms of semantic meaning or as discursive genre, but also as 
embodied actions taking place in particular situations.”246 He elaborates: 
 
245 And in the case of ‘All Lives Matter’ I think this analysis is illuminating. 
246 Colla, focuses on the further non-semantic features of the protest slogans of 2011 Egyptian revolution. While I 
don’t want to suggest all protest are the same, I think this lesson is generalizable. Furthermore, in considering the 
minor literature on slogans, Colla notes that “the tendency is to treat the slogan primarily as a semantic text” (2013, 
38). And it is exactly this that I want to move away from. 
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slogans and chants may be composed of words, but they are not merely linguistic texts. 
Rather, they are part of something that can only be called public performance. Thus the 
meaning of revolutionary slogans cannot be reduced to any semantic content, nor can it 
be translated as a set of linguistic statements. (Colla 2013, 38) 
 
This is good reminder about the context and performative aspect of protest—most 
notably, how protest slogans are (usually) spoken by a group of people. When we lose sight of 
this and ignore these elements, and instead stick to the semantics, we tend to push the analysis 
and subsequent discussion in a specific direction. Namely, this presents the speech acts of 
protests as though they are moves in a debate. That they, and the counter-speech they generate, 
are competing claims deserving of equal attention. This is, I will argue, an inadequate approach 
to take for protest. As Bernard Boxill (1976) states: 
Typically, people protest when the time for argument and persuasion is past. They insist, 
as Du Bois put it, that the claim they protest is “an outrageous falsehood,” and that it 
would be demeaning to argue and cajole for what is so plain. Responding to a newspaper 
article that claimed “The Negro” was “Not a Man,” Frederick Douglass disdainfully 
declared, “I cannot, however, argue, I must assert.” 
 
As Boxill might put it, treating “Black Lives Matter” and “All Lives Matter’” as claims 
competing in a debate obscures some of the central features that are inherent in protest, namely, 
that moral protest involves a demand. A type of demand, moreover, that asserts the protester’s 
moral entitlement to make such a demand—that is, their authority to demand.  
While there are claims being put forward by BLM that ought to be evaluated and 
debated—e.g., their policy proposals—the act of protest itself is not something that deserves to 
be argued over.247 The call of “Black Lives Matter” is not put forth as a claim to be contested, as 
if it were a premise in an argument in a seminar room. Recognizing it as protest means 
 
247 And compare this focus on unarticulated constituents to the comments made by Patrisse Khan-Cullors, quoted in 
the epigraph to this chapter. This, of course, is not to say that the founders of Black Lives Matter did not think long 
and hard about their choice of phrasing; they did. For more, see Khan-Cullors, and bandele (2018). 
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recognizing it as a speech act to be heard. As I see it, this is a difference in the uptake the speech 
act aims at, and this is obscured when we focus on the proposition being expressed. Speech acts 
like assertions seek uptake “in the form of agreement or rational challenge from others” (Kukla 
2014, 452). But protest calls for a different type of uptake, and this is closer to the imperatives or 
orders than assertions, because they call “for is obligations as their upshot” (Lance and Kukla 
2013, 459). Recognizing as much is the first step towards seeing the speech act of protest for 
what it is.  
Beyond this difference in uptake, the entitlement conditions that the speech act of protest 
presumes are another area worthy of attention. That is, one contribution that protest makes to a 
political culture concerns not simply what’s being said, but who gets to say it. From what 
perspective, or social-location is the protest being asserted?248 In their work, Herbert and Kukla 
(2015) point out the existence of “community-specific speech,” which has both community-
specific input and uptake. On the input side, they note how “speech acts that have community-
specific inputs are of a sort that are felicitous only when performed by insiders” (580). I want to 
show how this is an important feature of the input of protest,249 one that I explain in terms of 
collective authority. Recall my description of the authority at issue in collective speech acts from 
Chapter Three: 
Collective authority: Through repetition and endorsement, individually non-authoritative 
speech is made authoritative by signaling collective support and solidarity. A group of 
speakers have their authority secured through a repetitive process where each new 
utterance adds to the strength of the overall practice. 
 
 
248 As Khan-Cullors and bandele (2018) note about BLM: “We have centered and amplified the voices of those not 
only made most vulnerable but most unheard, even as they are on the front lines at every hour and in every space: 
Black women—all Black women.” 
249 Though, because it is (most often) directed at outsides, it is not itself community-specific speech in Herbert and 
Kukla’s (2015) sense. 
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To build towards a conception of protest that employs a similar type of collective authority, I 
first turn to Elizabeth Anderson for a helpful analysis of the function of social movements. 
 
3. THE MORAL-EPISTEMOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 
In her analysis of the British Abolition movement, Elizabeth Anderson notes that social 
movements tend do three things to correct for the biases of the powerful:  
(1) They inform the powerful of the needs and interests of the less powerful.  
(2) They express what is required to respect these needs and interests as claims or 
demands on the powerful. 
(3) they enable the less powerful to display their worthiness, so that they can assume 
some moral authority to contest the counterclaims of the powerful, and put authority 
behind their own claims. (2014b, 8, emphasis in original) 
 
It is features like these, which are informed by elements such as speaker, audience, context, etc., 
and cannot be captured in impersonal propositional terms that I believe an analysis of protests 
must address. 
The protest of social movements, according to Anderson, function to reject the authority 
of the unjust norms of the dominant. In their place, they foreground the collective authority of 
the protesters themselves. They position their own voices as voices in need of being heard. And 
this act, when performed by oppressed persons, directly threatens an unjust hierarchy. Note, 
moreover, how this is in some ways aside from the specific content they express. As Judith 
Butler remarks: 
To speak truth to power is not fundamentally an individual act. Before we ask what it 
means to speak truth to power, we have to ask who can speak. Sometimes the very 
presence of those who are supposed to remain mute in public discourse breaks through 
that structure. […] So although we can think about parliamentary assemblies as part of 
democracy, so too can we understand the extraparliamentary power of assemblies to alter 
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the public understanding of who the people are. Especially when those appear who are 
not supposed to appear. (2017)250 
 
Failing to recognize this aspect of protest and focusing too closely on content, then, tempts us to 
mischaracterize protest as argument. This threatens to make us lose sight of the concrete social 
context that produced the protests, along with its embodied performance. We should, in contrast, 
see protest as type of speech that foregrounds the collective authority of its speakers. And so, as 
instances of positive propaganda—where they aim to or manage to increase the empathy of their 
audience—it is through a distinct and more direct means than those highlighted by Stanley.  
To offer a clearer picture of what I mean by the ‘moral authority of the protester,’ I first 
turn to how a similar concept is discussed in a different context: the (meta)ethics of moral 
demands. Then I return to the main topic of this dissertation: the pragmatics of hate speech. By 
looking to these two areas, we will find a clearer and richer picture of the authority—the 
entitlements—protesters are calling upon in their (speech) acts. 
 
3.1. Egalitarianism, Protest, and Second-Personal Calls 
 
To better approach the role of authority in protest, it’s useful to turn to a branch of 
egalitarianism known as “relational egalitarianism.”251 What makes relational egalitarianism 
 
250 Butler (2017) continues: “Although demonstrations and assemblies are often not enough to produce radical 
change, they do alter our perceptions about who the people are, and they assert fundamental freedoms that belong to 
bodies in their plurality. There can be no democracy without freedom of assembly, and there can be no assembly 
without the freedom to move and gather. When the undocumented assemble, or when those who have suffered 
eviction assemble, or those who suffer unemployment or drastic cuts in their retirement, they assert themselves into 
the imagery and the discourse that gives us a sense of who the people are or should be. Of course, they make 
specific demands, but assembly is also a way of making a demand with the body, a corporeal claim to public space 
and a public demand to political powers.” 
251 For more on this form of egalitarianism, see Anderson (1999), Wolff (1998; 2019), Scheffler (2010), and Fourie, 
Schuppert, and Wallimann-Helmer (2015). 
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distinctive is its central concern with social hierarchies and interpersonal power.252 The central 
questions for many relational egalitarians then become: what is it that we owe one another, and 
what can we demand from each other?253 In being so focused, relational egalitarians highlight the 
“second-personal” dimensions of many core ethical concepts, like rights, duties, and justice.254  
On this view, complaints of injustice are best seen as demands, which casts them as second-
personal utterances rather than impersonal expressions of propositions. A second-personal 
utterance is a speech act that is directed at and calls upon a second person, a “you,” to give it 
specific uptake.255 And so, a moral claim is a performative utterance, where one makes a claim—
a demand—on another, and at the same time asserts their entitlement to do so. “A claim of 
justice,” Anderson (2012, 3) says, “is essentially expressible as a demand that a person makes on 
an agent whom the speaker holds accountable.” Therefore, on this reading, it matters to whom 
one makes a claim on, and whether the speaker is properly entitled with the proper moral 
authority to do so. Different kinds of calls create different kinds of outputs. Second-personal 
calls create distinct, relational statuses between the speaker and her target audience. 
It’s worthwhile to note that, for some philosophers in this camp, the inspiration for the 
theory comes directly from egalitarian social movements. For instance, both Anderson and Iris 
Marion Young take such social movements as the Civil Rights movement, LGTBQ+ rights 
advocates, and more, to be crucial for both our theorizing about concepts like justice, and to be 
 
252 This is opposed to the focus on material inequality that resource-egalitarians about distributive justice adopt. 
Though, it should be noted that both forms of egalitarianism are concerned with various inequalities of different 
sorts—social, material, welfare, etc.—the difference lies mainly in what is given greater explanatory power, along 
with distinct metaethical commitments. See Anderson (2010; 2012). 
253 The notions of second-personality found in this literature, including the centrality of demands, is mainly inspired 
by Darwall (2006). 
254 Anderson (2012) makes this most explicit. 
255 For more on the second-personal aspect of calls, see Kukla and Lance (2009); and Lance and Kukla (2013). 
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themselves a core engine of moral progress.256 As Anderson (2014a, 260) says, social 
movements are “the source of egalitarian ideas.” 
This appreciation of the second-personal nature of moral claims recognizes that protest 
and demands are distinct from mere moral arguments, which are indifferent to elements like 
speaker, audience, context, etc. Pure moral arguments—the type we might read in a philosophy 
paper or discuss in an ethics classroom—are often expressed in third-personal language to 
emphasize their presumed universality. There is a difference, therefore, between the argument 
that all moral agents should refrain from hurting other sentient beings because of the badness of 
pain, and the second-personal demand that you stop stepping on my toe.257 The latter, but not the 
former, highlights and grounds out in my authority to make a claim upon you and hold you 
accountable. It is this (meta-ethical) difference in address, that places protests in between the 
poles of “pure moral argument” on the one hand, and “riots, war, and other violent acts” on the 
other (Anderson, 2014b, 9). The broader point is that understanding moral claim-making in the 
real world requires taking stock of these broader contextual features that give moral life its 
richness and specificity.  
One element this attention to context reveals, then, is the invocation of the moral status of 
the person making a moral demand. Therefore, in the case of protest, the status and position of 
the protester is essential to fully understanding the act being performed. In protesting, one does 
more than express dissatisfaction with the status quo. They position this complaint as originating 
from a specific social location. Moreover, as we’ve seen, protest is fundamentally not an 
 
256 See Anderson (2014a), and (2014b), and Young (2011). 
257 To borrow one of Darwall’s (2006) favorite example. 
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individual act, but is rather performed as part of a larger group-action. This is evident when we 
look at the embodied practice of the speech acts of chanting slogans, As Colla notes: 
Slogans are chanted, shouted and sung by embodied people moving, often in coordinated 
ways, in and through public spaces; and 2) these movements and actions are not mere 
context for the production of slogan meaning, but are part of the text itself. (2013, 38) 
 
It is in this ways that the coordinated, collective speech acts of protesters call upon their moral 
standing and situated knowledge, issuing second-personal calls with distinct entitlements.258 That 
is, they put some distinctly collective authority behind their claims, and we must keep this in 
view. 
To further develop this notion of authority, I’ll now return to the topic of subordinating 
speech. This will help to fill in additional details concerning the role of context and social 
position, specifically with regards to how these inform speaker authority and shape the pragmatic 
force of speech acts. This helpful because, moral demands like “get off my toe” require only a 
general entitlement which most of us share, but, as we’ve seen many speech acts require a 
particular type of authority to be successfully carried out. 
 
3.2. Subordinating Speech and Collective Authority 
 
Recall why authority seems necessary to account for the force of hate speech. Once we 
consider what act is being done when one person hurls hate speech at another, we see these as 
degrading and subordinating acts. And so, to account for the pragmatic force of such speech 
acts, we’re drawn to the idea that hate speakers draw on some form of authority to perform these 
 
258 I believe reclamation projects are a helpful example of this, in part because reclamation depends on centering the 
perspective (and authority) of members of the group targeted by the contested term. That is, we cannot lose sight of 
the ‘we’ in “we’re here, we’re queer, get used to it.” Note, though, that reclamation is far from straightforward. For 
discussion of these issues, see Herbert (2015); and Tirrell (1999). 
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acts with their words. And as we’ve seen, subordinating speech generally relies on a dominating 
relation to perform its characteristic function of subordinating its targets. 
Subordinating speech is therefore asymmetrical speech, and speaker and target are not 
equally situated in regards to their speech capacity—it’s just not the case that the target of hate 
speech can just turn on their assailants and return fire with fire.259 But, as I’ve argued throughout, 
this authority is not essentially tied to formal positions of authority, and is achievable in a 
number of distinct ways. The authority at issue here relies on a richly contextual network of 
features that grant some, but not all, distinct normative powers in particular situations. Informal 
distinctions of power and privilege along lines of race, gender, ability, etc., play a large role in 
distributing this authority, significantly affecting the type of speech acts available to different 
speakers.260 This reveals how authority can be thoroughly contextual and interpersonal. 
 As I argued over the last two chapters, an important type of subordinating authority is 
collective authority. This is generated through repeated use of the same of similar utterances by a 
group of speakers. Where each individual utterance would seem to lack authority when 
considered in isolation, it is by noting the patter of repetition and amplification that we can 
understand these as authoritative—and subordinating—speech acts. Through this process, 
individual speakers fall from view, and instead, a somewhat faceless mass of speakers join to 
produce speech with a distinct, and stronger, pragmatic force.261 
 Protest, I believe, are another interesting instance of this. Like online abuse, the speech 
acts of protest gain a significance and strength that is incomprehensible when considered as 
simply originating from individual speakers. And to fully understand the speech acts of protest, 
 
259 And this shows the limits of the ‘more speech’ response to hate speech. 
260 For a structural account of the harms of injustice in speech in terms of speech capacity, see Ayala (2016). 
261 See Chapters Three and Four. 
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we must attend to this aspect of its pragmatic output. Colla (2013) describes this feature of a 
protest slogan in terms of how it “is intended to circulate as an authorless text.” He goes on to 
say that:  
one index of a slogan’s power is the degree to which it can detach itself from the specific 
conditions of its initial composition, and the degree to which it circulates as if it were the 
anonymous expression of a collective will. (Colla 2013, 38) 
 
Of course, by anonymous, this does not mean that the speech acts of protest are identity-less. The 
social location of those protesting is obviously significant. But, as this shows, it’s the identity of 
the group as a whole that’s relevant. This is, I believe, similar to how the ‘real’ identity of online 
trolls falls from view when their speech acts are understood as part of a larger, coordinated group 
activity. And, at least in one sense, it is through speech that this group comes into being, and acts 
as a collective. This is, in part, what these collective speech acts do, as their pragmatic function. 
They create or solidify a group identity. “Slogans are performatives,” Colla says, “in the sense 
they are deliberate compositions intended not so much to reflect collective will but to create it” 
(2013, 38, emphasis added). 
In the final section of this chapter, I return to the topic of how differences at the 
pragmatic level of speaker authority and uptake distinguish protest from subordinating speech, 
like propaganda. To help illustrate my claims, I first go over the idea of protest as provocation in 
order to show how putting the speech acts protest in their proper context, which often means 
receive some counter-protest speech in response, clarifies both speech acts. 
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4. PROTEST AS PROVOCATION 
 
Thinking of protest as provocation helpfully demonstrates an important interplay between 
protest and (a subset of) its audience. Booker T. Washington’s dismissal of protest out of 
prudence was partly based on this. Washington claimed that one danger of protest lies in its 
potential for provocation. “A provocation arouses an individual’s resentment,” Boxill (1976) 
notes, “because it challenges his moral claim to a status he enjoys and wants to preserve, thus 
black protest would have challenged the white South’s justification of the superior status it 
claimed.” The concern here is that protest arouses resentment because it constitutes a challenge 
to its targets, in part because it questioned their status. White Southerners would not accept the 
(equal) entitlement Black protesters claimed in protesting, and thus would react with hostility. 
Kate Manne raises a similar worry in her analysis of the violence and scorn directed at 
BLM protesters in Ferguson. She writes: 
The humanist line on Ferguson [i.e., that the violence and hatred is sourced in white 
American’s inability to see Black Americans as fully human] fails to explain what seems 
to provoke the aggression—namely, acts of political and personal defiance, which only 
people can demonstrate. Moreover, it is hardly surprising historically subordinated people 
should be perceived in this way when they try to assert themselves around, or over, 
dominant group members. They are liable to be perceived as belligerent, ‘uppity,’ 
insubordinate or out of order. (2014) 
 
As this shows, protest, because it both presumes a certain entitlement on the part of the speaker, 
and makes a specific claim on its target, can serve to trigger hostile and resentful reactions from 
those on whom the claim is being made. After all, as we saw, protest functions as a demand. But 
in a hierarchy, not everyone can (successfully) make a demand upon another, as demands are 
also asymmetrical speech acts in this context.  
So, in addition to the presumption of authority—the moral entitlement of the protester—
protest also implicates the status of its target—the group to whom the protest is directed. In this 
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way, it is like subordinating speech, in that it depends on the dynamics of power in the entire 
relation between speaker and target. Protest makes vivid not only the social position of the 
protesters themselves—their collective authority—but also the social position of their audience, 
that is, the more powerful. It challenges the justification for their superior status, which means it 
is often interpreted as threatening—because, in important ways, it is. And yet, of course, it is the 
denial of equality and justice that make protest necessary.  
So, under conditions of oppression, “acts of personal and political defiance” on the part 
of the oppressed, like protest, are in and of themselves a challenge to the status quo, and it is the 
broader political and contextual features that make this vivid, rather than any particular aspect of 
the protest’s content. Putting protest in context, seeing it as provocation that can lead to a range 
of reactions reveals this aspect more fully. 
 
4.1. A Strategic Objection 
 
This analysis, however, leads us to an important complicating factor, namely, that 
conditions of oppression lead many members of dominant social groups to dismiss oppressed 
people as sites of moral and epistemic authority. And hostile threats to the status quo are 
interpreted as proof of their unequal status. That is, anti-Black racism makes it difficult for 
people in a white-supremacist society to accept Black protesters as moral authorities in need of 
being listened to. To take one example, Shree Paradkar (2017) notes this in writing about the 
1992 Yonge St riots in Toronto. “Blacks who protest violently are thugs,” she writes, while 
“whites who do so have a righteous anger.”262 We see this time and again.  
 
262 She goes on to add: “The police continue to allege criminality by the victim and a society that prides itself on its 
decency silently shakes its head—not at the injustice but at the tactics of those who protest that injustice, the 
222 
One possible implication might be then, where there exists entrenched racisms and other 
forms of marginalization, talk of the moral authority of the protester is a luxury reserved for the 
more privileged. It’s no accident that Anderson’s analysis of British abolitionism focuses mainly 
on the white Britons who opposed the slave trade but weren’t themselves at risk of enslavement. 
This may lead one to suggest that, given this racist resistance and the tendency to see protest as 
provocation, it might be a strategic move to focus on the content of the claims being made rather 
than the people. If Black protesters are more likely to be perceived as violent criminals rather 
than authoritative voices on injustice—at least for white audiences—then maybe impersonal 
arguments are more effective. 
This is a serious concern, for both activists and for how protest ought to be analyzed and 
discussed. And I can offer only a partial response. One thing to note, though, is that a similar 
danger lurks when looking at protest in terms of presenting an argument, so perhaps this is no 
refuge. We see this when the particular claims being made by certain speakers—e.g., people of 
color—are subject to heightened scrutiny. Melissa Harris-Perry (2011) notes that when she and 
others write on racism in the United States, they tend to “encounter a few common discursive 
strategies that are meant to discredit our perspectives.” She writes that some common tropes 
emerge in response to an analysis that suggests racism might be the cause of someone’s actions, 
for example, the demand to “prove it,” and the related skepticism implicit in questions of “who 
made you an expert?”263 Together these tropes demonstrate the raised standards many claims of 
racial bias face, especially as they come from people of color.264  
 
injustice of their deaths at the hands of their defenders.” This is, of course, a familiar phenomenon, and I only use 
this example because it concerns Toronto, where I am from. 
263 She also notes the “I have black friends” deflection, though this is less relevant to my case here.  
264 See Fricker (2007) for a discussion of “epistemic injustice” that aims to make sense of these dynamics. 
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And while there is no doubt people of color encounter these ‘strategies’ more severely 
than whites, part of Harris-Perry’s point seems to be that in a racist society, the topic of racism 
itself invites frustrating skepticisms. As she notes, one strategy is simply to “scorn the study of 
race as an illegitimate intellectual pursuit.” As I see it, this heightened scrutiny relates in some 
ways to Kristie Dotson’s discussion of “risky” and “unsafe content” that can lead a speaker to 
silence herself, to pre-emptively avoid such scrutiny (Dotson, 2011). So, where racial injustice is 
present, even when the focus becomes content, it is similarly likely for some—typically white—
audiences to dismiss the concern being raised. And so, a retreat to the (disembodied) content 
being expressed offers no safe refuge from anti-Black racism. 
Provocation, in other words, is inevitable when one calls out injustice. And despite the 
criticisms I have raised above, Stanley has a clear grasp of this sad feature of political speech. “A 
salient feature of many paradigm cases of propaganda,” he says, “is that it is speech that owes its 
efficacy in ending rational debate not to its settling of the question, but rather to its erosion of 
second-personal ideals like reasonableness” (2015, 121). And so, we can see how many 
paradigm cases of propaganda would emerge as attempts to renounce the efforts of social 
movements. The ‘all lives matter’ response to the call of “Black lives matter” demonstrates this 
very efficiently. Protest invokes a demand—which presupposes the moral authority to do so—
and counter-protest propaganda looks to deny this entitlement.265 But as I have argued, an 
analysis that focuses at the level of content misconstrues the way these speech acts differ. 
Instead, it helps to see these acts in conversation with each other to see this crucial difference in 
uptake each aims at.  
 
265 And so, both may be examples of what Lance and Kukla dub an “activist speech act,” that is, “one that does not 
merely draw upon but in fact functions to subvert or reconfigure the normative context in which it operates” (2013, 
473).  
224 
Indeed, this interplay works to reveal the element of protest that I’ve argued Stanley’s 
account ignores. That is, while Stanley sees civic rhetoric and demagoguery—positive and 
negative propaganda—as structurally parallel, his analysis of both focuses most extensively on 
the effect each has on its audience. Demagoguery reduces empathy; civic rhetoric increases it. 
But the role of the speaker is obscured, as is the relationship between speaker(s) and audience.  
This is inappropriate, I argue, in the case of protest, which is a speech act that 
fundamentally aims to reveal the moral authority of the protesters, and in doing so relies on and 
makes us of a distinct form of collective authority. And it is in this way that protest may be an 
instance of positive propaganda. Not because it engages in clever (linguistic) manipulation, but 
because, through the act of protest oppressed people claim what they are properly entitled to, and 





In this chapter I examined what kind of speech act protest is from a pragmatic point of 
view. To do so, I questioned Jason Stanly’s claim that protest may be a form of positive 
propaganda. However, as I argued, his model of propaganda is an ill fit for paradigmatic types 
of egalitarian protest, like BLM protests, because of its single-minded focus of the effects of 
protest on the audience. Instead, I called attention to the speakers’ actions—the imposition of a 
demand on the unjustly dominant—and argued that understanding what makes this act possible 
requires different tools. By considering the distinct uptake protest aims at, along with the specific 
type of collective authority this act exerts, I suggested that the emancipatory potential of protest 
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consists fundamentally in its capacity to wield this authority. We see this, I argued, not by 
questioning what protest slogans ‘mean’ outside of their context, but by seeing the people 
engaging in these acts as embodied people, joining together to performs acts that would not be 
possible separately.  
It is in this way that the speech acts of protests are relevantly similar to some 
subordinating speech acts. Both are only properly understood by attending to the specific type of 
authority being invoked, and both rely on acts of solidarity to generate this specific type of 
collective authority. Looking at either isolated from its context of use offers only a poor 
understanding of the speech act being done. But by attending to the dynamic context of use, our 
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